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It is rare to find a thoughtful and scholarly blend of theoretical astuteness 
and clinical wisdom in a single book about addiction. The author accom-
plishes this goal by the skillful application of integral theory as a framework 
for understanding addiction and its treatment. An Integral Foundation for 
Addiction Treatment belongs on the shelf of every psychotherapist who treats 
addiction or is interested in the topic.
— Philip J. Flores, Ph.D., ABPP, author of Group Psychotherapy 
with Addicted Populations (3rd ed.) and Addiction as an 
Attachment Disorder
An Integral Foundation for Addiction Treatment is a brilliant overview 
of a truly integral or comprehensive approach to what has now become 
a crisis level epidemic in America (and indeed, much of the world). The 
great difficulty, up to this point, is that there are several different existing 
approaches to addiction and its treatment, and unfortunately none of them 
have worked nearly as well as it was hoped they would. This has left the 
field facing an epidemic with no agreed upon solution.
Guy du Plessis takes one of the most comprehensive metatheories now 
in existence—that of Integral Metatheory—and shows how it can indeed 
integrate and synthesize virtually every major approach to addiction now 
existing. The immediate benefit of such a far-reaching approach is a direct 
application to actual cases of addiction itself, and wherever this has been 
tried so far, the results are astonishingly effective.
This book is for, first of all, either those who treat, or those who suffer 
from, a specific type of addiction. Guy walks us through a clear, easy to 
understand, step by step introduction to each of the major areas of addic-
tion and its treatment, as well as demonstrates how this Integral approach 
draws together all of the hard-earned wisdom generated by each of the 
various schools of treatment—except now, all of this wisdom is brought to 
bear on each individual case, and not just a partial amount of it offered by 
any conventional, limited approach. And thus, second of all, this book is 
for anybody who simply wants to deepen their own self-understanding. To 
understand addiction in depth is to understand every major component of 
being human, because virtually every one of them is open to invasion by 
addictive dysfunction—and accordingly this means actually understanding 
oneself in general, top to bottom, and that is what this Integral approach offers 
(and thus among other things, it ties together Western forms of Growing Up 
with Eastern forms of Waking Up and therapeutic forms of Cleaning Up).
In short, this book is a thorough introduction to the major dimensions 
of your own being and awareness—many of which you very likely don’t 
even know exist—and hence shows how you can bring a truly wise and 
compassionate understanding to “all of you.” Highly recommended!
— Ken Wilber, Author of Integral Psychology and A Brief History 
of Everything
Integral Recovery pioneer, Guy du Plessis, single-handedly proves in 
this monumental volume that moving into and through addiction recov-
ery—whether personally or professionally or both—does not require the 
sacrifice of one’s faculties for critical thinking. To the contrary, in fact, what 
is implicit throughout Du Plessis’ incredibly keen and nuanced analysis is 
a requirement that, when face-to-face with addiction’s enslavement of so 
many, one must think both solidly and in-depth. In that spirit, Du Plessis 
provides us a carefully constructed, metatheoretical framework for both 
critiquing, and incorporating the best of, virtually every major perspective 
on both addiction and recovery.
What a relief, as but one example, to read so clear an articulation of how 
that which may rightly serve the recovering addict at one stage of his/her heal-
ing journey may be quite contraindicated, or at least be in need of significant 
supplementation, at a later stage. Sad to say, a not uncommon “one sizes fits 
all” mentality (Plato’s part/whole error, which mistakes one correct “part” for 
the “whole” territory) pervades the world of addiction recovery. Hence, addicts 
in sincere search for truly individualized help turn away, and often perish, 
owing to the limitations of being forced to rely on any one given approach. The 
Persian poet, Rumi, puts it well: “What is honey to one is poison to another.”
Du Plessis, in his thoroughly integral embrace, here at last provides 
all of us—recovering addicts and/or those who work with us—a roadmap 
sufficient to the complexity inherent in addiction . . . which really is to say, 
to the complexity inherent in being human. For anyone seeking a sound 
intellectual basis for navigating the real-life challenges at hand in addiction 
and recovery, there simply is no better place to begin than with Du Plessis’ 
latest stroke of compassionate genius.
—Robert Weathers, Ph.D., California Southern University
For those interested in deepening their understanding of the treat-
ment of addictive disorders, this book offers a wisdom and depth I have 
not encountered elsewhere in the literature. Du Plessis offers the reader a 
comprehensive and in-depth critique of the various theoretical models used 
in the treatment of addiction. He then offers us his own approach, one that 
integrates developmental, biological, social, and psychological frameworks 
necessary to the successful treatment of addictions. For recovery to be suc-
cessful, he states that on-going attention to relapse prevention must occur, 
and this involves treating the whole person.
Toward that end Du Plessis has created a brilliant model that he calls 
an “Integrated Recovery Program”. I would call it a comprehensive roadmap 
for those engaging in the treatment of addictions. His approach identifies six 
recovery dimensions, all of which are necessary components of a sustainable, 
long-term recovery process. The beauty and elegance of this model is that it 
provides a quantifiable and accountable recovery structure, where both client 
and therapist “plan and gage the complex recovery process”. In addition, 
Du Plessis stresses the importance of attending to existential and spiritual 
underpinning that often drive the addict’s search for meaning and purpose.
This book is must read for all clinicians, regardless of your clinical 
orientation or area of specialization.
— Patricia Gianotti, Psy.D., Academic Director of the Wayne 
Institute for Advanced Psychotherapy, and co-author of 
Listening with Purpose, and Uncovering the Resilient Core
Guy du Plessis’ latest offering proves once again he is one of the leading 
minds in the field of addiction treatment in the world today. An Integral 
Foundation for Addiction Treatment is timely, concise and a welcome breath 
of fresh air to a field desperate for new perspectives. It is my hope that it 
becomes required reading for anyone attempting to fully understand the 
scourge of addiction in all its complexity.
—Adam Gorman, Psy.D., Licensed Clinical Psychologist
Guy du Plessis has written an important book. This book serves not 
only as a brilliant addition to the growing library of integral literature and 
thought, but also as a beam of light into the arcane and esoteric domain of 
academic literature about addiction and its treatment.
True to the prime dictum of integral theory and practice, Du Plessis speaks 
the language of his academic audience, but like a dancing Wu Li master he blurs 
the surface of things and leads us to clarity and depth—every deconstruction 
is a reconstruction, and every seeming dark cul-de-sac a new doorway that 
leads to the what and the why and the how and then the where to now and 
beyond, to the lofty mountain tops of our true human potential and capacities.
—John Dupuy, M.A., author of Integral Recovery
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F O R E W O R D
A ddiction studies is one of the most important areas of contem-porary clinical and psychotherapeutic teaching and research. 
Although the treatment and researching of addiction is commonly, and 
mistakenly, seen as relevant for only a small segment of society, addiction 
and the human propensity for falling into the spiral of dependency are 
characteristics that lie at the heart of contemporary society. Wherever you 
might live in the world, addiction is present in your neighborhood in one 
form or another. Contrary to our conservative instincts, addiction is not a 
peripheral area of human experience. It is not something that afflicts only 
the marginal, the poor, the delinquent, or the weak. On the contrary, it lies 
at the center of our lives and at the center of the social structures through 
which we govern, educate, and entertain ourselves. Addiction is about 
nothing less than meaning and purpose in contemporary life.
Guy du Plessis rightly frames his approach to addiction studies within 
this broad context. He points out that substance abuse and addiction are 
among the most economically and socially destructive phenomena in 
contemporary societies across the world. However, the author also makes 
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the case that the field is characterized by fragmented and disconnected 
understandings of the causes of addiction and how they should be treated. 
Theoretical fragmentation is not merely an unfortunate, peripheral issue 
here. Du Plessis argues that our theories not only filter and interpret real-
ity, but also enact and shape the behaviors, social spaces, and structures 
that we design and build to bring about desired futures. If our theories are 
mistaken, reductive, or poorly designed, then so will be the interventions 
we make and the goals we aim for that result from those theories. This is 
one reason why poorly connected theory results in poorly connected health 
interventions.
One of the great powers of the human being is that we can shift and 
shape our environments to reproduce experiences that we find comfortable 
and pleasurable. This has great adaptive advantage in that we can build 
environments and design tools that make life easier, more amenable to 
flourishing as fleshy, sensing bodies in a world that is often perceived as 
insecure and threatening. The capacity to create environments also enables 
us to enjoy those things that we find rewarding and interesting, and to then 
enjoy them over and over again. We share this proclivity for repetitively 
sating our desires with all other creatures. Moths and humans are both 
drawn to “the light.” Both are genetically predisposed to orientate their 
behavior with reference to that which is rewarding and attractive. Hence, 
we both can end up endlessly circling the light. The difference between 
us lies not so much in the strength of our attractions, but in the human 
capacity to create the attraction in the first place. Moths can’t build lights 
but humans can. We spend a lot of our time manufacturing and acquiring 
objects and substances that give us pleasure and relief. Humans can and 
do spend whole lives, whole industries, and whole economies on inventing, 
designing, and building sources of attraction, pleasure, entertainment, 
and escape. Little wonder then that addiction and its treatment can be so 
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complex and characterized by such a diverse range of diagnostic lenses and 
treatment approaches.
Du Plessis’s book is a focused response to the pluralism of views and 
interventions that the treatment of addiction encompasses. Addiction is 
complex and engages all aspects of life and so needs a comprehensive and 
holistic approach to intervention. The author points out however, that, 
while eclectic and “holistic” approaches are commonly proposed, they 
lack coherency at a deep theoretical level and amount to little more than 
arbitrary and piecemeal groupings of interventions. He is interested in 
a more comprehensive conceptual understanding because this will have 
applied implications: “the more comprehensive our understanding, the 
more likely it is that we will be able to develop effective and sustainable 
treatment modalities.”
Central to his endeavor of developing a more integrative framework for 
situating addiction models is the metatheory and metaphilosophy of Ken 
Wilber. Du Plessis utilizes many of the core elements of Wilberian integral 
theory and philosophy to argue for a pluralistic study of how addiction is 
conceptualized and enacted in addiction models and therapeutic practices. 
Addiction is complex and that very complexity creates the space for diver-
gence in people’s understanding, experience, and enactment of addiction.
The author applies the Wilberian integral approach (also called the 
framework, an abbreviated acronym for All Quadrants, All Levels, All 
Lines, All States, and All Types) with greater fidelity than is often the 
case. For example, moving beyond the standard four quadrants application 
of categorizing forms/theories of consciousness, behaviors, cultures, and 
social systems, Du Plessis applies all the five AQAL elements to theories 
of addiction and in so doing he nicely describes and co-locates a number of 
addiction perspectives to show how they might be applicable to particular 
domains of human behavior and experience.
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The premise of the book is that integral theory, because of its metathe-
oretical background in recognizing and accommodating diverse theoretical 
positions, has great potential to serve as a conceptual philosophical frame-
work and scaffolding for a more comprehensive understanding of addition 
and its treatment. While Du Plessis recognizes the benefits of pluralism 
and diversity, he also critiques contemporary addiction theories as being 
conceptually disjointed and fragmented. Even approaches attempting some 
form of holism such as the compound approach of the biopsychosocial 
model are still based on assumptions that reduce the cause of addiction to 
particular aspects of human identity and behavior. This fragmentation results 
in an overall ineffectiveness of treatment and so the impact of an initial 
fragmented and incoherent theoretical position ripples down through the 
diagnostic and treatment phases to result in poor outcomes for individuals.
In aiming for an integral model of addiction, Du Plessis sets his bar 
high. He says that a comprehensive integral foundation of addiction should 
be assessed by the following criteria. First, an integral model should connect 
the methodology, epistemology, and ontology of addiction. This is complex 
territory and Du Plessis makes an admirable attempt to identify some 
fundamental qualities of addiction theories and in so doing locate areas 
of strength and weakness in the current theoretical landscape. Second, an 
integral approach to addiction should include a developmental model that 
incorporates numerous growth-related etiological models. This is where 
the major strength lies in a Wilberian integral approach. The spectrum of 
physiology, emotion, psychology, and existential phases of development 
are ideally suited to exploring forms of addiction and Du Plessis weaves 
these elements of the human development perspective throughout his 
discussions on the many forms that addiction can take. Third, an integral 
approach should provide a framework that accommodates the plurality of 
models that theorize addiction from various perspectives. This is perhaps 
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the strongest aspect of the author’s work in that he provides rich detail 
on several very different models of addiction and recovery including the 
12-Step model, existential psychotherapy, the compound approach of the 
biopsychosocial model, and social-environmental models. Fourth, integral 
models of addiction should be consistent with both the behavioral/empirical 
and experiential/phenomenological dimensions of living with addiction. 
A truly integrative perspective on addiction must take into account the 
experiences and feelings of the addict and their relationships and not only 
consider the objective realities of their condition. On this account, the book 
probably suffers from the lack of representative voices from people living 
with addiction and drug dependency. Nevertheless, there is the recognition 
that a conceptualization of the phenomenology of addiction is central to 
any adequate theoretical account of it. Finally, an integral model must be 
practical in that it can offer guidance for treatment and protocol develop-
ment. In this regard, Du Plessis offers several interesting tools and protocols 
for assisting professionals in developing a more holistic and integrative 
approach to diagnosis and treatment. Although he states that: “It is up to 
the individual therapist to provide the details in the therapeutic encounter 
with his client,” he offers a number of tools including “Integrated Recovery 
Indices,” the “Integrated Recovery Wheel,” and the “Integrated Recovery 
Planner” as resources for therapists. As to how well Du Plessis meets his 
stringent criteria, I will leave the reader to judge that.
In the final chapters, Du Plessis presents his integral model of addiction 
and its treatment. He aims firstly to provide “a new ontological and episte-
mological foundation for an understanding of addiction,” and secondly, to 
apply this foundation to the treatment of addiction. His proposition of an 
“integrated recovery meta-therapy” (IRMt) is an original and innovative 
application of Wilberian metatheory to an area of huge social importance. 
IRMt is a metatheoretical framework to apply counseling, coaching, and 
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psychotherapy techniques in a structured and integrated way to maximize 
the recovery and development of people living with substance abuse and 
addiction. Du Plessis offers a novel and interesting contribution to this 
important field; one that could make significant difference to the lives of 
people working to overcome addiction to find new meaning and purpose 
in their lives.
—Mark Edwards, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor, Jönköping University, Sweden, and 
author of Organizational Transformation for Sustainability: 
An Integral Metatheory
xix
P R E FA C E
A ttempting to understand and successfully treat addiction is a forbiddingly complex topic and endeavor. One of the reasons is 
that the scope of study and treatment of addiction spans nearly every dis-
cipline in the human sciences; it touches upon all aspects of what it means 
to be human. It is therefore understandable that researchers have mainly 
focused on studying isolated and abstracted features of this phenomenon 
in order to develop explanatory and treatment models. And those who have 
sought a more integrative understanding and treatment method have been 
faced with formidable conceptual and methodological challenges.
This book does not attempt to provide a better solution to the prob-
lem of addiction and the treatment thereof, nor does it present itself as 
a comprehensive overview of the topic. Its aim is simply to lay down the 
tentative outlines of a philosophical and conceptual foundation of addic-
tion that may have the potential for theoretical integration and improving 
treatment outcomes.
As with any exploratory work, many of the ideas that are presented in 
this book are undeveloped and tentative, and require further investigation 
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and critique. Furthermore, due to the vast scope of the book, and for sake 
of brevity, most of the topics discussed are presented as oversimplified and 
I was not able to do justice to its complexity.
My hope is that the integrative framework presented in this book may 
in some way enhance our understanding of addiction and its treatment, as 
well as inspire other researchers to contribute to the nascent field of integral 
addiction treatment and research.
I would like to express my gratitude to the following individuals who 
have either directly or indirectly contributed to the development of this 
book: Professor Vasi van der Venter, John Dupuy, Dr. Robert Weathers, 
Alwin Roux, Aristos Marinos, Spencer Hill, Marlien Wright, Ken Wilber, 
Lynwood Lord, Dr. Sean Esbjörn-Hargens, Dr. Adam Gorman, Debbie 
Fischer, Marie du Plessis, Lindsay du Plessis, Dr. Patricia Gianotti, Dr. Mark 
Edwards, Dr. Philip Flores, Dr. Mark Forman, Dr. Siebrecht Vanhooren, 
the staff at Integral Publishers, and to my beloved daughter Coco.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
If Dasein, as it were, sinks into an addiction then there is not merely an 
addiction present-at-hand, but the entire structure of care has been mod-
ified. Dasein has become blind, and puts all possibility into the service of 
the addiction. On the other hand, the urge ‘to live’ is something ‘towards’ 
which one is impelled, and it brings the impulsion along with it of its 
own accord. It is ‘towards this at any price.’ The urge seeks to crowd out 
other possibilities.
—M. Heidegger (1962, p. 195)
A ddiction, in its myriad forms, presents one of the foremost and mounting threats to the well-being of modern society. Addiction 
is the most ubiquitous form of mental health disorder in the United States 
and its burden on health care is so excessive and disproportionate as to 
constitute a medical and economic crisis (Kinney, 2003; Walters, 2007). 
The financial cost to society pales in significance in comparison to the daily 
human suffering that addiction causes.
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As a consequence of the magnitude of this disorder, many scholars, 
institutions, and clinicians have sought to understand this complex phenom-
enon—as is evident in the abundance of etiological models of addiction in 
existence today. How a society views and understands addiction has great 
significance for addicted individuals seeking treatment. In premodern times, 
addiction was understood as possession by demons and seen as a moral 
aberration, and its consequent treatment was similarly archaic and puni-
tive. It is only in the last 100 years that scientific theories and explanations 
for addiction have come into existence, and as a result, that treatment has 
become more effective (Alexander, 2008; DiClemente, 2003).
Although our explanation of addiction has become more sophisticated, 
there are still serious shortcomings in our understanding of it (DiClemente, 
2003; Du Plessis, 2012b, 2013, 2014a; Hill, 2010). Furthermore, there is 
such a cornucopia of theories and models of addiction that for treatment 
providers and policymakers it has become exceedingly difficult to inte-
grate this vast field of knowledge into effective treatment and prevention 
protocols (Du Plessis, 2012b, 2013).
The United States spends billions of dollars annually on the pre-
vention and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse. However, the unfor-
tunate reality is that most treatment programs have high levels of 
recidivism, with limited annual and lifetime coverage with low success 
rates (Alexander, 2008; Dawson, Grant, Stinson, & Chou, 2006; Hill, 
2010). Furthermore, studies have shown that many existing rehabil-
itation programs may be no more successful than the spontaneous 
remission that occurs in the untreated population (Alexander, 2008, 
2010). Despite the magnitude of addiction’s negative consequences for 
individual and civic well-being, we have failed to make adequate progress 
in controlling or preventing the spread of addiction on a global level. 
Alexander (2010) lamented that a “century of scientific research has 
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not produced a durable consensus on what addiction is, what causes it, 
and how it can be remedied” (p. 1).
Many scholars agree that two of the foremost problems in the field 
of addiction science and addiction treatment are definitional confusion 
(Shaffer, 1997; Shaffer et al., 2004; Vaillant, 1995; White, 1998) and the 
ineffectiveness of treatment (Alexander, 2010; Mill, 2010; Shaffer et al., 
2004; White, 1998). Consequently, there are many that believe a paradigm 
shift is urgently needed, because there are such an abundance and diversity 
of addiction theories (Hill, 2010; Shaffer, 1997; Shaffer et al., 2004; Vaillant, 
1995; White, 1998) that the field of addictionology is in “conceptual chaos.”
What is currently taking place in the field of addictionology is what 
Ken Wilber (2003a) referred to as a “legitimation crisis”—a breakdown in 
the adequacy of a particular mode of translating and making sense of the 
world. Subsequently, the current move in addictionology is toward more 
integrative models of addiction that can take into account new data gen-
erated in addiction research: data which highlight the multidimensional, 
dynamic, and complex nature of the addictive process. Consequently, some 
scholars believe there is a need for a theory that provides a parsimonious and 
integrative explanation for all the existing empirical data—a theory that can 
incorporate and integrate the existing theories of addiction (DiClemente, 
2003; Du Plessis, 2010, 2012b, 2013, 2014a; Hill, 2010; West, 2005).
In an attempt to find integration for all these divergent conceptions of 
addiction, there has been a movement toward holistic or compound models, 
of which the best known is the biopsychosocial (BPS) model (DiClemente, 
2003; Griffiths, 2005; Levant, 2004; Shuttleworth, 2002; Wallace, 1993). 
This book highlights that compound models, such as the BPS model, have 
not accomplished the much-needed integration. Although the BPS model 
may be seen as approximating a comprehensive integrated approach, there are 
still considerable positivistic, ontological, and epistemological underpinnings 
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and assumptions, namely, the abstractionist use of decontextualism, reduc-
tionism, and determinism, which hinder an authentic and comprehensive 
conceptual framework. The compound models do not provide a compre-
hensive metaframework to integrate these diverse explanatory perspectives 
or to explain multiple co-arising determinants. Current integrative models 
lack a metatheoretical foundation that adequately explains the simultaneous 
development, multicausality, and integration of the many factors in addiction 
(DiClemente, 2003; Hill, 2010). A truly comprehensive model of addiction 
should provide a metaparadigmatic integrative framework that highlights 
how various perspectives co-arise and link together, without having to 
reduce one perspective to another (Du Plessis, 2013, 2014a).
This book illustrates that addiction theories and definitions, like all 
scientific conceptions, begin with certain philosophical assumptions, 
which determine the nature of the concept and its trajectory (Bohman, 
1993; Richardson, 2002), Consequently, addiction science, in its pursuit 
of etiological models, often shares a common ontological foundation with 
other scientific disciplines, regardless of its surface theories.
It has been argued that the development of an alternative ontological 
foundation could possibly lead to an improved understanding and treatment 
of addiction (Du Plessis, 2013, 2014b; Hill, 2010). The premise of the book 
is that integral theory has great potential to serve as a conceptual philo-
sophical framework for a more comprehensive understanding of addiction 
and its treatment.
An adequate understanding of addiction has more than just epistemo-
logical and scientific value. It also has significant effects in the real world 
because the way that we understand addiction also determines the ways in 
which we treat it. Therefore, the more comprehensive our understanding, 
the more likely it is that we will be able to develop effective and sustainable 
treatment modalities.
Introduction  xxvii
Mark Forman (2010), a pioneer of integral psychotherapy, stated:
Psychotherapists, perhaps more than any other group of pro-
fessionals, are confronted with the full complexity of the human 
condition. So many factors—bibliographical, genetic, cultural, 
and social—come into play in the life of the client, mixing and 
interacting with largely unpredictable results. (p. 1)
This statement is particularly relevant when working with addicted 
populations because addiction is such a holistic disease—it leaves no area 
of the addict’s life untouched. To successfully treat and understand addic-
tion, all those affected areas must be treated, or at least acknowledged, for 
sustainable treatment. When working with addicts, therapists need a truly 
comprehensive and integrative therapeutic orientation to accomplish this 
goal. Joseph Califano (2008), author of High Society, echoed this sentiment:
So, in research as in practice, this disease demands a holistic 
approach: combining brain-imaging discoveries, genetic markers, 
and new knowledge about dopamine, serotonin, and chemicals that 
effect brain receptors with all the psychological, emotional, and 
spiritual knowledge we can muster, to create a personal-environment 
antagonistic to drug use and alcohol abuse. (p. 79)
In order to treat the numerous areas affected by addiction and for 
recovery to be sustainable, many therapists working with addicted popu-
lations often recognize themselves as eclectic. Without a sound orientating 
framework this can result in syncretism, where therapists haphazardly pick 
techniques without any overall rationale and this consequently, results in 
syncretistic confusion (Corey, 2005). Many of the current holistic addiction 
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treatment facilities are doing remarkable work, but on closer inspection of 
the philosophy behind these holistic approaches, albeit more holistic than 
more orthodox models, we find that they are merely stating the obvious: An 
integrative approach is better than a partial approach, without providing a 
truly holistic framework and method.
PURPOSE AND SCOPE
In an attempt to address the aforementioned problems (conceptual chaos 
and ineffective treatment) in the field of addiction studies and treatment, 
this book outlines an attempt at providing a new ontological and episte-
mological foundation for an understanding of addiction, and then applies 
this foundation to the treatment of addiction. This is done through the 
application of integral theory (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006, 2009; Wilber, 2000, 
2003a, 2003b, 2006) as a conceptual metatheoretical framework of addic-
tion (hereafter referred to as an integral foundation of addiction or integral 
metatheory of addiction), as well as for a meta-therapeutic framework for 
therapists (integral meta-therapy) when working with addicted populations.1
With the ideas presented in this book, I hope to lay a tentative founda-
tion for an integral metatheory of addiction. Such an integral metatheory 
of addiction should include several criteria. These are:
• It should provide an integrative conceptual etiological taxonomy that 
correlates methodology, epistemology, and ontology, and which as a 
framework is internally consistent.
1 The contents of chapter one to four of this book is an abridged version of my 
master’s dissertation (Du Plessis, 2014b) as well as articles published in the Journal 
of Integral Theory and Practice (Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a), reprinted 
with permission. When relevant, I will reference the sections of the text that were 
originally printed in the Journal of Integral Theory and Practice, but will not reference 
the sections from my master’s dissertation as this will unnecessarily clutter the text.
Introduction  xxix
• It should include the developmental stages of addiction and account 
for observations of developmental models.
• It should provide a framework for understanding addiction as a mul-
tiple object on a continuum of ontological complexity. Furthermore, 
the framework should allow for various etiological models to address 
addiction at various degrees/stages of ontological complexity (ontological 
depth), and adequately explain and incorporate ontological pluralism 
(ontological span).
• It should be consistent with empirical observations of addiction made 
by clinicians and researchers, and with the phenomenological experi-
ence of addicts. Moreover, it must be relevant for treatment protocol 
development.
THEORETICAL ORIENTATION
The theoretical orientation of this book involves a (meta)conceptual/the-
oretical analysis of the existing theories of addiction. Since the data to be 
analyzed are theories and an existing metatheory, this type of conceptual/
theoretical analysis is commonly known as metatheorizing. Mark Edwards 
(2010) said that metatheorizing “is a form of conceptual research that 
recognizes the validity of each theoretical perspective, while also discov-
ering their limitations through accommodating them within some larger 
conceptual context” (p. 387).
Ritzer and Colomy identified four types of metatheorizing, signified 
by their particular aims (as cited in Edwards, 2010). Metatheorising can be 
used: (a) to understand existing theories, (b) to develop midrange theories, 
(c) to develop an overarching metatheory for a multiparadigm study of 
some field, and (d) to evaluate the conceptual adequacy and scope of other 
theories. The type of metatheorising that is primarily applied throughout 
this book is the third type: a multiparadigm study of some field (addiction).
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Any researcher who attempts to metatheorize moves into murky waters. 
There are several difficulties facing any researcher using this theoretical 
orientation. Wallis (2010) expressed the opinion that although metatheo-
rizing is a method that is used often, it is currently in a similar position to 
premodern science as a result of there neither being acknowledged formal 
methods in existence nor recognition by academia that it is an important 
form of research. Although there has been a resurgence of metatheorizing 
in recent years, traditional forms of scholarship still hold sway in this field. 
According to Wallis metatheorizing has as yet no formal research method, 
and there exists no thorough endeavour at appraisal of the (meta) theory itself. 
For several decades, Ritzer (1991) called for the institutional recognition 
and establishment of metatheorizing as a core academic activity. He said 
that metatheorists have been pursuing their endeavors in a “half-hidden and 
unarticulated way” (p. 318) and under increasing criticism from those who 
undervalue the role of integrative knowledge. He added, “Metatheorists 
often feel defensive about what they are doing, because they lack a sense of 
the field and institutional base from which to respond to the critics” (p. 318).
Edwards (2008a) wrote, “The ‘data’ of metatheory is not found within 
this empirical layer of sense-making but within the ‘unit-theories’ themselves 
(i.e., the individual theories that are the focus of study for metatheorists)” 
(p. 65). Metatheories do not focus on empirical events, but rather on the 
analysis of other theory.
Metatheory is grounded on the analysis of other theory in the same way 
that middle-range theory is grounded on empirical data. . . . Where theory 
takes empirical phenomena as its source of data, metatheory takes other 
theories as its “data” to be explored and analyzed. (Edwards, 2008a, p. 65)
Metatheory can simply be understood as referring to a type of super-the-
ory built from overarching constructs that organize and subsume more local, 
discipline-specific theories and concepts. In short, whereas a theory within 
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a discipline typically takes the world as data, metatheory typically takes 
other theories as data. Overton (2007) highlighted the metatheory approach:
Scientific metatheories transcend (i.e., ‘meta’) theories and methods in 
the sense that they define the context in which theoretical and method-
ological concepts are constructed. Theories and methods refer directly to 
the empirical world, while metatheories refer to the theories and methods 
themselves (p. 154).
Integral Metatheory
Edwards (2010) pointed to the difference between metatheory studies that 
are localized in character and metatheory that is distinctly integrative, which 
he referred to as “integral metatheory.” Wallis (2010) described integral 
metatheorizing as integral in that it acknowledges the contributions and 
insights of a very wide range of theories, research programs, and cultural 
traditions. Integral metatheorising is characterized by its great scope, its 
openness to the diversity of scientific theory and sociocultural knowledge 
from all parts of the world, and by its use of other overarching approaches 
as metatheoretical resources. Edwards (2010) explained:
Research in any of these meta-studies activities becomes inte-
grative [integral metatheory] when it: i) is consciously and explicitly 
performed within an appreciative context that can move across and 
within various disciplines, ii) adopts systematic research methods 
and principles, iii) uses, as conceptual resources, other integrative 
frameworks such as Wilber’s AQAL, Bhaskars’s meta-reality 
(Bhaskar, 2002b), Torbert’s DAI (1999), Schumacher’s system of 
knowledge (1977), Nicolescu’s transdisciplinary studies or Galtung 
and Inayatullah’s (1997) macrohistory, and iii) is characterized by 
its inclusiveness and emancipatory aims. (p. 225)
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In short, an integrated metatheory is a metatheory that attempts con-
ceptual integration, whereas an integral metatheory is a metatheory that 
attempts the same aim, but is specifically informed by integral theory. 
Edwards (2008a, 2008b) pointed out that a metatheoretical framework 
like the integral model has great value for scientific disciplines of all types 
because it has a potent adjudicative capacity for critical analysis.
One of the chief principles of integral theory is nonexclusion. This 
feature is of particular importance for the purposes of this book. This 
principle acknowledges that meaning-making is not sovereign to only one 
approach and methodology. Nonexclusion means that a metatheorist is 
indebted to the various paradigms of the many theories with which he or 
she works (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2009; Wilber, 2003a, 2003b). This principle 
is actually common in metatheory building. Lewis and Kelemen (2002) 
argued: “Multiparadigm research seeks to cultivate diverse representations, 
detailing the images highlighted by varied lenses. Applying the conven-
tions prescribed by alternative paradigms, researchers develop contrasting 
or multi-sided accounts that may depict the ambiguity and complexity of 
organizational life” (p. 263). The principle of nonexclusion not only enables 
integral theory to perform metaparadigmatic integration of ontologically 
complex fields of study, but also to indicate the limits of the various para-
digms that it integrates into a metaframework.
OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS
In Chapter 1, a brief overview of the most prominent etiological models of 
addiction are presented. The discussion is structured under the following 
headings: genetic/physiological models, social/environmental models, per-
sonality/intrapsychic models, coping/social learning models, conditioning/
reinforcement behavioral models, compulsive/excessive behavior models, 
existential/spiritual, and altered states of consciousness models, and Twelve 
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Step programs. Finally, two approaches that have attempted to integrate 
addiction models are outlined, namely, the biopsychosocial model and the 
transtheoretical model.
In Chapter 2, the problems of definitional confusion and conceptual 
chaos in the field of addiction studies are discussed. As a result, many schol-
ars agree that a paradigm shift is needed to provide conceptual integration. 
In this chapter, the fact that compound models have not accomplished the 
much-needed integration, due to the positivistic ontological, and episte-
mological underpinnings and assumptions which hinder an authentic and 
comprehensive conceptual framework, is highlighted. It is argued that the 
development of an alternative ontological foundation could possibly lead to 
an improved understanding and treatment of addiction, and it is proposed 
that integral theory could assist in the development of this much-needed 
foundation.
In Chapter 3, the architectonic for an integral foundation of addiction is 
presented, that is, a set of conceptual lenses that can explain being-addict-
ed-in-the-world. Several critiques of integral theory that are necessary to 
consider in order to obtain a balanced view of the theory are also outlined.
In Chapter 4, the five elements of integral theory are explored as con-
ceptual lenses for the development of an integral meta-therapy of addiction. 
Each of these elements are discussed in the context of its application when 
working with addicted populations.
In Chapter 5, I present, as an example of an integral meta-therapy, a 
succinct overview of my own model, integrated recovery meta-therapy, and 
provide a brief outline of its philosophical foundations and application.2
2 In the present study, the term philosophical foundation is used as a general term 
to accommodate both ontological and epistemological foundations.

1
C H A P T E R  1
W h a t  i s  A d d i c t i o n ?
It is almost impossible for many young people to feel in any way useful 
in today’s society. Why should we be so amazed that so many take drugs, 
and why should we interpret addiction as a regressive renunciation of the 
ego when the person making this choice is actually seeking a few moments 
of heroic identity? The archaic necessity of identifying both heroes and 
enemies become concentrated in the addict’s creeping sensation of living 
a civil war between a minority faction, made up of angels of death, and 
a stronger majority of law-abiding citizens. The latter however seems to 
lack any identity of their own.
—Luigi Zoja (1989, pp. 15–16)
INTRODUCTIONI n many respects, the development of reliable definitions, theories, and models of addiction is problematic. This is largely because the 
concept of addiction is abstract and does not have an objective reality or clear 
boundaries. Furthermore, addiction is defined socially and thus, views as 
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to what the most apt definition is are varied. One cannot state categorically 
that some of the definitions are undoubtedly accurate and others inaccurate, 
but rather that some are more helpful than others, or that one is primarily 
accepted by experts (West, 2005).
A further problem is that theories in the field of addiction are rarely 
tested adequately in real-world settings because the dominant research 
methodology (based on a positivist paradigm) does not allow such test-
ing. However, a good theory of addiction should explain a related set of 
observations, generate predictions that can be tested, and be parsimonious, 
comprehensible, coherent, and internally consistent. Finally, a good theory 
should not be contradicted by any observations (West, 2005).
Since 1914, the word addiction has been printed in the titles or abstracts 
of over 40,000 scholarly articles in the U.S. National Library of Medicine 
database. The term addiction can be traced back to Roman law. Addiction, 
however, is not a new phenomenon, and there are multiple examples 
throughout ancient Egyptian and Greek writings that clearly indicate their 
understanding of the problem. Interest was growing in the scientific study of 
addiction by the end of the 19th century. The Society for the Study of Addiction 
held their first meeting in 1884, but their scientific ambitions necessitated 
a formalization of a lay understanding of addiction. Early attempts at this 
formalization established addiction as a medical disease rather than framing 
it as a moral or spiritual issue (West, 2005; Alexander, 2008).
As knowledge on the subject grew, definitions across authoritative 
texts also evolved with time. Despite the progress, addiction always faced 
the same theme of a physiological adaptation to persistent drug use, and 
the absence of the drug leading to physiological dysfunction that results 
in often unpleasant or life-threatening withdrawal symptoms. An addict 
was someone that could only maintain normal physiological function by 
taking a drug. This concept of addiction is still given credence in the public 
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perception as well as by certain researchers. They conjure up images of a 
heroin addict shivering with stomach cramps or the shaking hands of an 
alcoholic. This definition is attractive in many ways because it relies on 
the straightforward etiology and mechanism of action as a physiological 
problem. There is a physical problem that is observable and measurable, 
possibly even treatable (West, 2005; Alexander, 2008, 2010).
At present, addiction is generally understood as a syndrome char-
acterized by impaired control over behavior, which leads to significant 
harm. This focus on harm is important because it has created widespread 
interest in addiction, which has led to large sums of public money being 
used to research, prevent, and treat it. In this paradigm, there is a complex 
collection of symptoms of addiction that go far beyond simply control. As 
a result, withdrawal symptoms, cravings, and tolerance are all included in 
the syndrome. Since withdrawal symptoms pose little social threat and are 
not the core issue, addiction needed a new way to be conceptualized. Even 
if withdrawal is dangerous to the individual, the symptoms are temporary 
and can be treated medically. On the contrary, the compulsion to use 
drugs or engage in dangerous behaviors is the primary long-term threat 
to both the well-being of addicts and those around them; this problem is 
much more difficult to solve with practicable and ethical interventions. 
Hence, from a social perspective it is much more deserving of attention 
(West, 2005; Alexander, 2008, 2010; Du Plessis, 2014a).
ETIOLOGICAL MODELS OF ADDICTION
In the following section, models and theories of addiction are explored. 
It should be noted that it is beyond the purpose of this chapter to provide 
an exhaustive discussion. The discussion is structured under the following 
headings: genetic/physiological models, social/environmental models, per-
sonality/intrapsychic models, coping/social learning models, conditioning/
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reinforcement behavioral models, compulsive/excessive behavior models, 
existential/spiritual, and altered states of consciousness models, and Twelve 
Step programs. Finally, two approaches that have attempted to integrate 
addiction models are outlined, namely, the biopsychosocial model and the 
transtheoretical model.
Genetic/Physiological Models
The most substantial evidence concerning the role of genetics in addiction 
is derived from studies of alcohol dependence (Schuckit, 1980; Schuckit, 
Goodwin, & Winokur, 1972). Theorists have suggested that addiction 
runs in families and can be transmitted across generations. Twin studies 
suggest that a genetic transmission of alcoholism and chemical depen-
dence is possible, and seem to support the importance of genetics as a 
contributing factor (Hesselbrock, Hesselbrock, & Epstein, 1999). What 
is, however, now becoming evident is that a genetic explanation for 
addiction will be polygenetic and complex, and will not lie in finding a 
single gene that can explain addiction (Begleiter & Porjesz, 1999; Blume, 
2004; Gordis, 2000).
Historically, addiction and physical dependence were seen as synon-
ymous. Addiction was traditionally characterized by increasing tolerance 
and the onset of physical withdrawal symptoms. Theorists of the genetic/
physiological model of addiction have argued that the physiological aspects 
of tolerance and withdrawal are indicators that addictions are biological 
entities and medical problems. However, not all drugs and addictions 
produce withdrawal symptoms or create physiological dependence. Yet 
the physiological component of addiction remains an important one and 
there have been major advances in our understanding of the neurobiology 
of addiction (Roberts & Koob, 1997). Advanced neurobiological insight 
into addiction as having a physiological component and not constituting 
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morally reprehensible behavior has led to it being understood within the 
medical model as a disease.
The Disease Model of Addiction seeks to explain the devel-
opment of addiction and individual differences in susceptibility to 
and recovery from it. It proposes that addiction fits the definition 
of a medical disorder. It involves an abnormality of structure or 
function in the CNS that results in impairment. (West, 2005, p. 76)
The disease model has played a significant role in shifting society’s view 
of addiction from one of moral deviance to one that promotes treatment 
and understanding. Most neuroscientists studying addiction view it as a 
brain disease (Volkow, Fowler, & Wang, 2002). Addiction affects, among 
others, the mesolimbic system of the brain, the area where our instinctual 
drives and our ability to experience pleasure resides. This area contains 
the medial forebrain bundle, prevalently known as the pleasure pathway 
(Brick & Erickson, 1999). In addicts, the pleasure pathway of the brain is 
“hijacked” by the chronic use of drugs or compulsive addictive behavior. 
Owing to the consequent neurochemical dysfunction, addicts perceive the 
drug as a life-supporting necessity, much like breathing and nourishment 
(Brick & Ericson, 1999).
It seems clear, based on our understanding of the neurobiology of 
addiction, that physiological mechanisms and genetic factors potentially 
play a role in addiction; however, there are many concerns about assigning 
sole causality or priority to genetic/physiological factors. Although the 
genetic/physiological models are some of the most widely accepted models of 
addiction, they have also attracted much criticism (Blomqvist & Cameron, 
2002; Moos, 2003). DiClemente (2003) stated that: “So many different 
individuals can become addicted to so many different types of substances 
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or behaviors, biological or genetic differences do not explain all the cultural, 
situational, and intrapersonal differences among addicted individuals and 
addictive behaviors” (p. 11).
Social/Environmental Models
Many models of substance abuse have been criticized for not sufficiently 
emphasizing the role of social and contextual factors (Coppelo & Orford, 
2002). In addition, many research studies have shown that some of the 
greatest risks of becoming addicted are related to the social factors to which 
a person is exposed (Sremac, 2010). The social/environmental perspective 
highlights the role of social influences, social policies, availability, peer 
pressure, and family systems on the development and maintenance of 
addiction (DiClemente, 2003; Johnson, 1980). Furthermore, an influence 
on etiological factors of addiction is the prevailing degree of attitudinal 
tolerance toward the practice in the individual’s cultural, ethnic, and social 
class milieu. Research has pointed out that macroenvironmental influences 
also play a significant role in the initiation of addiction (Connors & Tarbox, 
1985). For instance, since the breakdown of the apartheid system in the 
early 1990s and the concomitant relaxation of border management, South 
Africa has been targeted as a conduit country for the transportation of drugs 
as well as a new lucrative market for the sale of drugs (Myers & Parry, 
2004). Poor law enforcement combined with sophisticated infrastructure 
and telecommunications systems have further compounded South Africa’s 
vulnerability as a lucrative drug trafficking destination, resulting in the 
increased use of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine in the country 
(Parry, Pluddermann, & Myers, 2005).
Some supporters of the social/environmental models focus on the more 
intimate environment of family influences as a central etiological factor of 
addiction (Merikangas, Rounsaville, & Prusoff, 1992). They suggested that 
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the onset of addiction is influenced by certain variables that emerge from 
dysfunctional family environments (Coleman, 1980; Kandel & Davies, 
1992). These theorists emphasized that problematic family situations such 
as conflicted and broken marriages, difficulties with relationships, and the 
use of alcohol and other drugs by parents are important influences in the 
child’s decision to experiment with drugs or continue addictive behaviour 
(Chassin, Patrick, Andrea, & Craig, 1996; Jessor & Jessor, 1977). Research 
has identified familial dynamics such as lack of parental support and inef-
fective parental control practices as high-risk factors for adolescent substance 
abuse (Hawkins, Catalano, & Miller, 1994).
It is clear that social/environmental models have relevance to our 
understanding of addictive behavior at a population level, but they often fail 
to explain individual initiation or cessation in any comprehensive manner 
(DiClemente, 2003).
Personalit y/Intrapsychic Models
Proponents of the personality/intrapsychic perspective link personality/
intrapsychic dysfunction and inadequate psychological development to a 
predisposition toward addiction (Flores, 1997; Khantzian, 1999; Kohut, 
1977; Levin, 1995; Ulman & Paul, 2006). For example, preexisting antisocial 
disorders, depression, low self-esteem, narcissistic disorders, hyperactivism, 
high novelty-seeking, and emotionality have been acknowledged to be possi-
ble precursors or predictors of later addiction (Jessor & Jessor, 1980; Kohut, 
1977). This has led theorists to seek a pre-addiction psychological profile for 
people who have become addicted. However, a single addictive personality 
type has not been established in spite of commonly held beliefs that there 
is such a thing as an “addictive personality.” Blume (2004) affirmed this 
when he said that “there are certain psychological disorders with specific 
clusters of symptoms that have a high co-occurrence with substance abuse 
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and dependence . . . . but there is no single personality type for people with 
addictive behaviors” (p. 73).
A common explanation, from a psychoanalytic perspective, is to view 
the etiological and pathogenic origins of addiction as a narcissistic dis-
turbance of self-experience (Khantzian, 1999; Meissner, 1980; Ulman & 
Paul, 2006; Wurmser, 1995). Kohut (1971, 1977) implied that there is an 
inverse relationship between an individual’s early experiences of positive 
self-object responsiveness and their tendency to turn to addictive behavior 
as replacements for damaging relationships. Scholars who support the 
self-medication hypothesis believe that addicts often suffer from defects 
in their psychic structure owing to poor relationships early in life (Flores, 
1997; Khantzian, Halliday, & McAuliffe, 1990; Levin, 1995). This leaves 
them prone to seeking external sources of gratification such as drugs, sex, 
food, and work in later life (Kohut, 1977). Khantzian (1999) declared:
Substance abusers are predisposed to become dependent on 
drugs because they suffer with psychiatric disturbances and pain-
ful effect states. Their distress and suffering is the consequence 
of defects in ego and self-capacities which leave such people 
ill-equipped to regulate and modulate feelings, self-esteem, rela-
tionships and behavior. (p. 1)
The self-medication model of addictive disorders demonstrates that 
individuals are predisposed to addiction if they suffer from unpleasant 
affective states and psychiatric disorders, and that an addict’s drug of choice 
is not decided randomly, but chosen for its particular effect because it helps 
with the specific problem(s) with which the person is struggling. Therefore, 
initiation of drug use and the choice of drug are based on the particular 
psychoactive effect sought by the individual (Khantzian 1999; West, 2005).
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Ulman and Paul (2006), in their fantasy-based self-psychological model 
of addiction, showed that addiction is better conceptualized as a kind of 
self-hypnosis than a type of self-medication. They believe that an archaic 
form of narcissism, namely, megalomania is at the unconscious etiology of 
addiction. Like other forms of archaic narcissism, it could become develop-
mentally arrested in the setting of a self–object milieu, which lacks empathy. 
In certain cases, such a developmental arrest may lead to addiction in later 
life. When using, addicts enter into a hypnoid or dissociated state involving 
an archaic fantasy of being a self as a megalomaniacal being endowed with a 
form of magical control over psychoactive agents (things and activities), and 
addicts then imagine that through possession of these agents they will undergo 
a metamorphosis or transmogrification into a radically new state of being.
Personality/intrapsychic approaches make a valuable contribution toward 
a better understanding of addiction; personality as well as intrapsychic 
factors appear to contribute to the development of addiction. However, as 
DiClemente (2003) argued, personality factors or deep-seated intrapersonal 
conflicts account for a possibly important, but relatively small part, of a 
comprehensive explanation needed for addiction.
Coping/Social Learning Models
Some theorists argue that addiction is often related to a person’s inability 
to cope with stressful situations. They believe that, as a result of poor or 
inadequate coping mechanisms, addicts turn to addiction as an alterna-
tive coping mechanism for temporary relief and comfort. An individual’s 
inability to cope with stress and negative emotions has been identified as 
an etiological factor in many theories of addiction. Therefore, the cop-
ing/social learning models relate addiction to inadequate coping skills, 
which result from certain personality deficits in the individual (Wills & 
Shiffman, 1985). According to DiClemente (2003), emotion-focused coping 
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has been identified as a particularly important dimension from a coping 
model perspective. Some believe alcohol is addictive because of its capacity 
for tension reduction and its dampening of the stress response (Cappell 
& Greeley, 1987). Researchers have shown that increased drinking after 
rehabilitation treatment is associated with both skills deficits and the failure 
to use alternative coping responses (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985).
The social learning perspective emphasizes more than just deficits in 
coping skills; it emphasizes social cognition. Bandura’s (1977, 1986) social 
cognitive theory focuses on cognitive expectancies, self-regulation, and 
vicarious learning as explanatory mechanisms for addiction. Moreover, this 
perspective highlights the role of peers and significant others as models. 
When advertisers use prominent public figures to promote a product, they 
are applying social influence principles.
Although coping and social learning perspectives have become pop-
ular in addictionology, generalized poor coping skills cannot be the only 
causal link to addiction. However, even if coping deficits do not sufficiently 
provide an etiological explanation, they certainly highlight an important 
consequence of addiction, namely, the narrowing of the addict’s coping 
repertoire (Shiffman & Wills, 1985). The coping/social learning models 
attempt to understand addiction from several perspectives including a phe-
nomenological mode of inquiry, a hermeneutical-interpretive perspective, 
a cultural anthropological perspective, and finally, an autopoiesis theory 
perspective (as do many of the cognitive sciences). Although the coping/so-
cial learning models do incorporate a multiperspectival understanding of 
addiction, they still chiefly focus on an individual’s psychological processes.
Conditioning/Reinforcement Behavioral Models
The compulsive use of addictive substances and process addictions is gov-
erned by reinforcement principles. Addictive substances and behaviors 
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deleteriously affect the pleasure centers of the brain (Blume, 2004). The 
stimulation of the pleasure center produces a euphoric experience that tends 
to positively reinforce addictive behavior. Reinforcement can be positive 
or negative. Reinforcement models focus on the direct effects of addictive 
behavior such as tolerance, withdrawal, and other physiological responses/
rewards as well as more indirect effects described in the opponent process 
theory (Barrett, 1985; Solomon & Corbit, 1974). Positive reinforcement 
involves pleasurable consequences related to addictive behavior. Negative 
reinforcement, as described by the opponent process theory, occurs when 
a person is rewarded through substance-reducing withdrawal or emotional 
distress. Both positive and negative reinforcement play a part in the devel-
opment and maintenance of the addictive process (Blume, 2004).
Some theorists have also suggested that Pavlovian conditioning is 
useful in understanding the addiction process. These individuals state that 
anticipatory drug-related behaviors can be linked to cues associated with 
the act of using the drug. Therefore, situational cues can elicit initial drug 
reactions and consequently, lead to the resumption of the addictive behaviour 
(Hinson, 1985). More contemporary classical conditioning approaches 
include cognition and physiological mechanisms in their repertoire of cues 
and responses (Adesso, 1985; Brown, 1993). This has led to an integration 
of conditioning and social learning perspectives (DiClemente, 2003).
Today there is significant evidence for the role of conditioning and 
reinforcement effects in the addictive process, and as with all of the pre-
viously mentioned models, it offers insight into the nature of addiction. 
However, conditioning/reinforcement behavioral models do not explain 
all initiation or successful cessation of addiction (Marlatt & Gordon, 
1985). They predominantly attempt to understand addiction from a phe-
nomenological mode of inquiry and by means of an autopoiesis theory 
perspective. These models tend to overemphasize a deterministic and 
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behaviorist approach to addiction with disregard for many psychological 
factors, as well as providing an inadequate explanation from social and 
cultural perspectives.
Compulsive/Excessive Behavior Models
Some physiognomies of addiction, like the inability to successfully stop the 
behavior as well as its repetitive nature, have led theorists to link addic-
tion with ritualistic compulsive behaviors. Theorists who link addiction 
to compulsive behaviors either come from an analytic or a biologically- 
based view. The analytic perspective views the compulsive component 
of addiction as reflecting deep-seated psychological conflict whereas the 
biologically-based view understands the compulsive behavior to be a result 
of biochemical imbalances reflected in irregular neurotransmitter levels in 
the brain. Adherents of the first view see treatment in terms of analysis 
whereas adherents of the latter explore psychoactive pharmacological 
treatments to bring the compulsive addictive behavior under control 
(DiClemente, 2003).
Some theorists view addiction as excessive appetite (Orford, 2000). 
Increasing appetite leads to excess and the developmental process of increas-
ing attachment, which is similar to elements of the social learning model. 
Potentially addictive substances share not only the potential for excess, but 
also a similar process of leading to access. Both the compulsive and excessive 
behavior models share the notion that an addicted individual’s behavior is 
out of control and that the addict is attempting to satisfy a psychological 
conflict or need (DiClemente, 2003).
Both the compulsive and excessive behavior models add some explanatory 
potential to some of the existing models. However, they do not highlight all 
the variables needed in order to adequately explain the etiology of addiction 
or why individuals continue to display addictive behavior.
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Existential/Spiritual and Altered States of Consciousness Models
Research has shown that an inverse relationship exists between spiritual-
ity and drug addiction, suggesting that spiritual involvement may act as 
a protective mechanism against developing an addiction and that a lack 
thereof can contribute toward developing an addiction (Laudet, Morgen, & 
White, 2006; Miller, 1997). Some theorists have suggested that addiction 
is a spiritual illness, a disorder resulting from a spiritual void in one’s life 
or from a misguided search for connectedness (Miller, 1998). Therefore, 
addicts may be unconsciously pursuing the satisfaction of their spiritual 
needs through psychoactive substances or addictive behavior. In a letter to 
Bill Wilson, the cofounder of AA, Carl Jung (as cited in Kurtz & Ketcham, 
2002) pointed out that he believed “alcohol was the equivalent, on a low 
level, of the spiritual thirst of our being for wholeness, expressed in medieval 
language: the union with God” (p. 113).
Many addicts state that they turned to drugs initially because of an 
existential void in their lives. Drugs instantly provided a new and often spec-
tacular sense of meaning for them in an otherwise barren existence.3 A sense 
3 An existential perspective of addiction also highlights possible non-pathological 
origins of addiction. I tentatively refer to this non-pathological perspective as the 
existential dissonance model of addiction. Virtually all theories of addiction begin 
with the premise that there is something wrong (pathological) with an individual, and 
substance abuse is an attempt to fix it (pun intended). The non-pathological model 
is based on the premise that in certain cases (not all) if genius, skill, or talent is not 
actualized or provided enough expression due to internal or external environmental 
factors, it can contribute as a significant risk factor to developing addictive disorders. 
For example, having an extraordinary musical talent in an environment where it is 
not nourished, becomes a risk factor for that individual, where for most people not 
having the opportunity for musical expression would not be a significant risk factor. 
This model will also attempt to explain why among the addicted populations there 
are so many intelligent, sensitive, and talented individuals. That is the real sadness 
of addiction; it often destroys the best of us. And like canaries in a coal mine—the 
most sensitive die first. Society often tends to see addicts as congenital, morally or 
emotionally inferior human beings. In many cases, I believe the exact opposite is 
true. Due to their otherworldly sensitivity they are often the most susceptible to the 
pathologies of their environment.
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of meaning and purpose is closely related to hope. Empirical findings show 
that recovering addicts who have hope are better able to cope with life’s crises 
(Sremac, 2010).
The archetypal need to transcend one’s present state at any 
cost, even when it entails the use of physically harmful substances, 
is especially strong in those who find themselves in a state of 
meaninglessness, lacking both a sense of identity and a precise 
societal role. In this sense, it seems right to see the behavior of a 
drug addict who announces, “I use drugs!” not only as an escape 
to some other world, but also as a naive and unconscious attempt 
at assuming an identity and role negatively defined by the current 
values of society. (Zoja, 1989, p. 15)
Some theorists believe that humans have an innate drive to seek altered 
states of consciousness (ASCs) because they encompass systemic natural 
neurophysiological processes involved with psychological integration of 
orholotrophic responses and reflect biologically-based structures of con-
sciousness for producing holistic growth and integrative consciousness 
(Grof, 1980, 1992; Siegel, 1984; Weil, 1972). Winkelman (2001) expressed 
the view that addicts engage in a normal human motive to achieve ASCs, 
but in a self-destructive way because they are not provided the opportunity 
to learn “constructive alternative methods for experiencing non-ordinary 
consciousness” (p. 340). From this viewpoint, substance use is not under-
stood as an intrinsic anomaly, but rather as a misguided yearning for the 
satisfaction of an inherent human need.
Since contemporary Indo-European societies lack legitimate 
institutionalized procedures for accessing ASCs, they tend to be 
Chapter 1: What is Addiction?  15
sought and utilized in deleterious and self-destructive patterns—al-
coholism, tobacco abuse and illicit substance dependence. Since 
ASC reflect underlying psychobiological structures and innate 
needs, when societies fail to provide legitimate procedures for 
accessing these conditions, they are sought through other means. 
(Winkelman, 2001, p. 340)
For a comprehensive understanding of addiction, the inclusion of exis-
tential/spiritual and ASC perspectives is essential, although addiction is too 
complex for its pathogenic origins to be reduced to these elements alone.
Twelve Step Programs
Twelve Step programs have such a central role in contemporary addiction 
treatment that it warrants a discussion within the context of this chapter. 
Although Twelve Step philosophy does not provide a clearly articulated 
etiological model of addiction, it nonetheless has many implicit assump-
tions. In order to provide insight into the etiological theory of Twelve Step 
programs, it may be useful to briefly discuss its origins and the ideological 
assumptions that inspired its methodology.
Twelve Step programs are considered by many to be the most effective 
treatment protocol in the treatment of addictions. Furthermore, “Alcoholics 
Anonymous has been called the most significant phenomenon in the his-
tory of ideas in the twentieth century” (Kurtz & Ketcham, 2002, p. 4). 
Although there has recently been significant critique against Twelve Step 
program methodology, there is substantial evidence that the Twelve Steps 
of Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) is an effective treatment modality and 
a vast body of research literature substantiates this claim. Research has 
shown that Twelve Step affiliation buffers stress significantly and therefore, 
leads to an enhanced quality in the recovering person’s life (Laudet et al., 
An Integr al Foundation For Addiction Treatment16 
2006). A longitudinal study found that AA affiliation and the application 
of AA-related coping skills were predictive of reduced substance abuse 
(Laffaye, McKellar, Ilgen, & Moos, 2008). The same study found a causal 
relationship with AA affiliation and self-efficacy, as well as changes in 
social network support and abstinence, thus, expanding existing literature 
that suggests the same relationships.
Flores (1997) expressed the opinion that Twelve Step meetings provide 
identification, support, and sharing of common concerns, which are powerful 
curative forces. Only recently have professionals understood the therapeutic 
value of groups. What AA intuitively realized, Yalom (1980) and others 
are only now taking advantage of. Peers are often more significant than 
professionals in producing behavioral change.
Histor y of A A and the Twelve Steps
The official starting date of Alchoholics Anonymous was in 1935, but actually 
it originated much earlier with its founder William Griffith “Bill” Wilson. 
Wilson was a seemingly hopeless alcoholic who made and eventually lost 
fortunes on Wall Street. He tried a multitude of techniques to control his 
drinking and failed every time. In November 1934, at Wilson’s fourth and 
final hospitalization—at the point of hopelessness and despair—he was 
visited by Ebby Thatcher, a “hopeless” alcoholic like him, who was sober. 
Ebby Thatcher revealed to Wilson that he got sober after joining the Oxford 
Group movement as a result of a recommendation by Rowland Hazard, who 
was treated by Carl Jung. Rowland had travelled to Zurich, Switzerland in 
1931 to enter analysis with Jung, after trying virtually every then-known 
cure for alcoholism. Shortly after his return to the United States, he relapsed.
After his relapse, Rowland was told by Jung that he “was frankly 
hopeless as far as any further medical and psychiatric treatment was con-
cerned” (as cited in Flores, 1997, p. 263). The only possible source of hope, 
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Jung suggested, might be a “spiritual or religious experience—in short a 
genuine conversion” (as cited in Flores, 1997, p. 263). Jung cautioned him 
“that while such had sometimes brought recovery to alcoholics, they were…
comparatively rare” (as cited in Flores, 1997, p. 263). Only much later did 
Wilson realize the significance of the story. Ebby Thatcher also introduced 
him to the work of William James. Wilson shared this information with his 
doctor, William D. Silkworth. Through the influences of Jung, Silkworth, 
James, and Thatcher, a series of events were set in motion that would help 
to create the foundation of the AA program. It was Silkworth’s influence 
that helped to lay the foundation of the disease concept.
On November 14, 1934, Wilson found himself in a hospital, being 
treated for a severe drinking spree. On this occasion, he had what is 
typically described in philosophical and religious literature as a mystical 
experience. Wilson said of this experience: “I now found myself in a new 
world of consciousness which was suffused by a Presence. One with the 
universe, a great peace stole over me” (as cited in Flores, 1997, p. 264). The 
day after Wilson’s mystical experience, Ebby Thatcher gave him James’s 
The Varieties of Religious Experience. Wilson poured over James’s writing 
and this helped him to understand and contextualize his own mystical 
experience and provided valuable insight for the future development of 
the Twelve Steps.
Spiritual experiences, James thought, could have objective 
reality, almost like gifts from the blue, they could transform people. 
Some were sudden brilliant illuminations; others came on very 
gradually. Some flowed out of religious channels; others did not. But 
nearly all had the great common denominators of pain, suffering, 
calamity. Complete hopelessness and deflation at depth were almost 
always required to make the recipient ready. The significance of all 
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this burst upon me. Deflation at depth—yes, that was it. Exactly 
that had happened to me. (Wilson, as cited in Flores, 1997, p. 265)
Kurtz (1979) went on to explain the historical significance that the 
above insight of Wilson had for the development of AA:
This was the substance of what Wilson had come to understand; 
also important was the meaning he found inherent in it, for his 
moment was—taken together with his “spiritual experience”—the 
third of the four founding movements of Alcoholics Anonymous. 
One-half of the core idea—the necessity of spiritual conversion—
had passed from Dr. Carl Jung to Rowland. Clothed in Oxford 
Group practice, it had given rise to its yet separate other half the 
simultaneous transmission of deflation and hope by “one alcoholic 
talking to another”—in the first meeting between Bill and Ebby. 
Now under the benign guidance of Dr. Silkworth, and the profound 
thought of William James, the two “halves joined in Wilsons’s 
mind to form an as yet only implicitly realized whole.” (p. 20–21)
Wilson intuitively realized that this “deflation at depth” was a crucial 
component of his recovery process. Consequently, surrender has become a 
cornerstone of AA’s Twelve Steps to recovery. “One submits to the alien and 
becomes diminished through submission, one surrenders one’s isolation to enter 
a large unit and enlarges one’s life” (Wilson, as cited in Flores. 1997, p. 266).
Crit ique of Twelve Step Programs
There has been much criticism against the Twelve Step program and its 
effectiveness from many individuals and organizations. Flores (1997) 
expressed the following opinion:
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As far as many professionals are concerned, Alcoholics 
Anonymous is a much-maligned, beleaguered, and misunderstood 
organization. A great many of AA’s critics who write disparagingly 
of the organization do so without the benefit of attending AA 
meetings or familiarizing themselves with its working on more 
than a passing, superficial, or purely analytical level. They fail to 
understand the subtleties of the AA program and often erroneously 
attribute qualities and characteristics to the organization that are 
one-dimensional and misleading and sometimes even border on 
slanderous. AA has been called by some a cult, a religion, ideo-
logical, unscientific, unempirical, and totalitarian. Its members are 
said to be coerced into regressive dependency that fosters servitude, 
compliance, and the surrendering of individual control to a higher 
power. Nothing could be further from the truth. Such a stance 
completely misses the point of AA. (p. 249)
One must keep in mind that the Twelve Steps is an injunctive para-
digm—a set of social practices. To truly understand the nature of Twelve 
Steps, one has to follow the three strands of valid knowledge accumulation: 
injunction, apprehension, and confirmation/refutation. This is where the 
problem originates with much of the critique of AA: To refute or validate 
the claims of AA, we have to follow the injunction first. It has to be expe-
rienced before one can confirm or refute the validity of the practice.
Therefore, attempting to understand the Twelve Steps objectively, with-
out a subjective perspective gained by following the injunctive practices, 
is misguided. Pragmatic philosopher John Dewey (1961) called this type 
of distal knowledge “spectator knowledge.” Dewey believed that authentic 
knowledge is only derived from one’s phenomenological experience of 
interaction in the world. Wilber (1995) echoed this:
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One of the great values of Thomas Kuhn’s work (and that of 
the pragmatist before him, and in particular Heidegger’s “ana-
lytic-pragmatic” side) was to draw attention to the importance 
of injunctions, or actual practices, in generating knowledge, and 
further, in generating the type of knowledge in a given world 
space. (p. 282)
This may be phrased more simply as follows: “The first strand of 
knowledge is never simply Look; it is Do this, then look” (Wilber, 1995, p. 
282). Therefore, if you want to claim any real understanding of the Twelve 
Steps, then “do” it—experience it—according to the suggestions. Without 
the “do,” all consequent interpretations (whether negative or positive) will 
necessarily be partial, and misguided.
In the next section, I will briefly explore the Twelve Step programs 
from a self psychology perspective, as this will help to further articulate 
the etiological assumptions underlying its method to recovery.
A Self Psychology Perspective of Twelve Step Programs
Self psychology can broadly be described as a generic label for any approach 
to psychology that makes the self the central concept of focus. Self psychology 
views addiction as a disorder of the self and understands narcissism, which 
is a common trait for addicted individuals, as “the problematic expression 
of the need for self-object responsiveness” (Flores, 1997, p. 292). Addiction 
can then be described as a misguided attempt at self-repair. Heinz Kohut 
(1971) understood narcissistic disorder to be a consequence of an injury of 
the self. Kohut suggested that individuals’ early dysfunctional experiences 
with others (self-objects) create a potential for addiction in later life. Drug 
addiction, alcoholism, or any addictive behavior is then understood as a 
misguided substitute for these missing relationships.
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Put simply, poor relationships in our early development may make us 
more prone to addiction in later life. Typically, addicts have unmet devel-
opmental needs and therefore, some are left with an injured, uncohesive, 
or fragmented self. This leaves them feeling empty and incomplete and is 
the “hole in the soul” of which addicts often speak. Because their internal 
resources were limited, they remain in constant need (object hunger) of 
having their self-regulating resources met externally. Since relationships 
were the source of their initial wounding, they feel that they cannot turn to 
others to have these needs met. As a result, they project this object hunger 
onto external sources like drugs, alcohol, sex, work, and so forth, all of 
which take on a regulating function while also constructing a false sense 
of self-sufficiency, sovereignty, and denial of the need for others.
I believe that in many cases the type of damage to the self determines 
what type of drug or addictive behavior an individual is attracted to. Kohut 
(as cited in Flores, 1997) wrote:
The addict finally craves the drug because the drug seems to him 
to be capable of curing the central defect in his self. It becomes for 
him the substitute for a self-object which has failed him traumatically 
at a time when he should still have had the feeling of omnipotently 
controlling its responses in accordance with his needs, as if it were a 
part of himself. By ingesting the drug, he symbolically compels the 
mirroring self-object to sooth him, accept him. Or he symbolically 
compels the idealized self-object to submit to his merging into it 
and thus to his partaking in its magical power. In either case, the 
ingestion of the drug provides him with the self-esteem which he 
does not possess. Through the incorporation of the drug, he sup-
plies for himself the feeling of being accepted and thus of being 
self-confident; or he creates the experience of being merged with 
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a source of power that gives him the feeling of being strong and 
worthwhile. And all these effects of the drug tend to increase his 
feeling of being alive, tend to increase his certainty that he exists 
in this world. (p. 187)
The perceptive reader may already begin to see why Twelve Step pro-
grams are so effective in the treatment of addiction. In recovery, individuals 
learn to have healthy interpersonal relationships “in which the needs for 
self-object responsiveness (mirroring, merger, and idealization) are satisfied 
in a gradual, gratifying way” (Flores, 1997, p. 292). Twelve Step programs 
accomplish the above in a variety of ways. They supply “a predictable and 
consistent holding environment that allows addicts and alcoholics to have 
their self-object needs met in a way that is not exploitive, destructive, or 
shameful” (Flores, 1997, p. 292). Because addicts have unmet developmental 
needs, they have very strong and often overpowering needs (object hunger) 
for human responsiveness that may feel insatiable. Addicts also feel ashamed 
of these needs. Through identifying with other addicts, they start to accept 
these previously unacceptable needs and realize they are not unique or 
alone. One recovering alcoholic expressed this after attending his first AA 
meeting: “I told everyone all these terrible, horrible, and shameful things 
about myself and instead of being disgusted with me, everyone gave me their 
phone number” (Flores, 1997, p. 292). In Twelve Step meetings, they begin 
to feel the responsiveness and gratification they missed for most of their lives.
If Freud was right about the apparent libidinal autonomy 
of the drug addict, then drugs are libidinally invested. To get off 
drugs, or alcohol (major narcissistic crisis), the addict has to shift 
dependency to a person, an ideal, or to the procedure itself of the 
cure. (Ronell, 1993, p. 25)
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As a holding environment, AA becomes a transitional object—a 
healthy dependency that provides enough separation to prevent 
depending too much on any single person until individuation and 
internalization are established. Gradually, alcoholics or addicts are 
able to give up the grandiose defences (narcissism) and false-self 
persona for a discovery of self (true self) as they really are. (Flores, 
1997, pp. 292–293)
Through working a Twelve Step program, addicts’ infantile ways of 
getting their needs met are progressively exchanged for more mature ways 
of establishing healthy and intimate human contact, and thereby, they are 
able to internalize more self-care.
Kohut (1971) believes that there are three types of transference disorders 
that addicts with narcissistic disorders may have: idealizing, mirror-hungry, 
or merger-prone. Twelve Step fellowships provide addicts with an idealized 
other such as a Twelve Step program and fellowship, and a goal that is 
practical and attainable. If addicts follow the suggestions of the fellowship, 
then they may get all the mirroring and confirmation they need. Twelve Step 
meetings are always accepting and open, and act as a “good-enough mother 
that serves as a transitional object until the principles of the program are 
internalized” (Flores, 1997, p. 296). Twelve Step fellowships, sponsors and 
other sober members act as idealized others with whom they can merge: 
“Merger with the idealized other serves as a container for the depleted self 
of the alcoholic” (Flores, 1997, p. 296). Flores (1997) added that:
AA works because once initiation into the program occurs, con-
tact with others is sustained, and through continued interaction with 
others, alcoholics are able to alter the dysfunctional interpersonal 
style that up to now has dominated their life. Khantzain explains 
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that only through this maintenance of contact with others can the 
disorders of the self be repaired. He identifies the four aspects of 
the disordered alcoholic as: (1) relation of emotions; (2) self-esteem 
or lack of healthy narcissism; (3) mutually satisfied relationships; 
and (4) self-care. He agrees with Kurtz that it is shame that makes 
the engagement and contact difficult, if not sometimes impossible, 
for many practicing alcoholics. (p. 293)
The Biopsychosocial Model
Dissatisfaction with the partial explanations proposed by the previously 
described single-factor models has prompted some theorists to propose an 
integration of these explanations (Donovan & Marlatt, 1998; Glantz & 
Pickens, 1992). By calling their model the “biopsychosocial model,” they 
suggested the integration of biological, psychological, and sociological 
explanations that are crucial to understand addiction. This model endeav-
ors to unify contending addiction theories into an integrated conceptual 
framework. According to this model, addictive behavior is, therefore, best 
understood as a complex disorder determined through the interaction of 
biological, cognitive, psychological, and sociocultural processes. Addiction 
“appears to be an interactive product of social learning in a situation involving 
physiological events as they are interpreted, labelled, and given meaning 
by the individual” (Donovan & Marlatt, 1998, p. 7). The biopsychosocial 
model argues for multiple causality in the accusation, maintenance, and 
termination of addictive behaviors.
Yet there are several researchers who feel that the biopsychosocial 
model is also inadequate in explaining addiction and that further inte-
grative elements are needed to make this model’s tripartite collection of 
factors functional. DiClemente (2003) stated that “although the proposal 
of an integrative model represents an important advance over more specific, 
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single-factor models, proponents of the biopsychosocial approach have not 
explained how the integration of biological, psychological, sociological 
and behavioral components occur” (p. 18). He goes on to say that “without 
a pathway that can lead to real integration, the biopsychosocial model 
represents only semantic linking of terms or at best a partial integration” 
(p. 18). DiClemente added:
The biopsychosocial model clearly supports the complexity of 
and interactive nature of the process of addiction and recovery. 
However, additional integrating elements are needed in order 
to make this tripartite collection of factors truly functional for 
explaining how individuals become addicted and how the process 
of recovery from addiction occurs. (p. 18)
Without an orienting framework that can explain how these various 
areas coenact and interlink, the biopsychosocial approach often represents 
merely a semantic linking of terms and exhibits limited integration.
Although the biopsychosocial model has not provided the field of 
addictionology with a truly comprehensive and integrative model, it was 
one of the first models to recognize the importance of treating the whole 
person and not merely the addiction. This has contributed greatly to the 
application of more holistic treatment protocols (Sremac, 2010). A com-
prehensive critique of the biopsychosocial model is provided in Chapter 2.
The Transtheoretical Model
In an attempt to find commonality amongst the diverse models of addiction 
and seek integrative elements, DiClemente and Prochaska (1998) proposed 
their transtheoretical model (TTM) of intentional behavior change. The 
TTM “attempts to bring together these divergent perspectives by focusing 
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on how individuals change behaviour and by identifying key change dimen-
sions involved in this process” (DiClemente, 2003, p. 19). The primary 
developer of TTM, DiClemente argued for this model by stating that “it 
is the personal pathway, and not simply the type of person or environment, 
that appears to be the best way to integrate and understand the multiple 
influences involved in the acquisitions and cessation of addictions” (p. 19).
The TTM proposes that the process of recovery from addictive behav-
ior involves transition through stages described as the precontemplation, 
contemplation, preparation, action, and maintenance stages. Different 
processes are involved in the transition between these different stages, 
and individuals can move forward and backward through these stages of 
change (West, 2005). Proponents of this model believe a person’s choices 
influence and are influenced by both personality and social forces, and that 
there is an interaction between the individual, and the risk and protective 
factors that influence the pathogenic origin or cessation of addiction. This 
process requires a personal journey through an intentional change process 
that is influenced at various points by a host of factors, as identified in the 
previously discussed explanatory models. “The stages of change, process of 
change, context of change, and markers of change identified in the TTM 
offer a way to integrate these diverse perspectives without losing the valid 
insights gained from each perspective” (DiClemente, 2003, p. 20).
Although this model indicates an integrative principle that is common 
to all the previous models and highlights the dynamic and developmen-
tal aspects of addiction, it does not seem to provide a metatheoretical 
framework that truly accommodates all the previous perspectives into an 
integrative framework. The TTM focuses predominantly on one dynamic 
integrating principle found in all the prominent addiction models, but does 
not provide the metaparadigmatic framework needed for a metatheory of 
addiction. The model has attracted substantial criticism; West (2005) is 
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of the opinion that “reservations have emerged about the model, many of 
which have been well articulated” (p. 68). Yet the TTM has contributed 
greatly to our understanding of addiction and recovery as a dynamic pro-
cess, by explaining it through a developmental-contextual framework. 
Furthermore, it has provided clinicians with a dynamic developmental 
framework to understand treatment resistance and ambivalence as well as 
to identify certain developmental markers indicative of positive change in 
recovery (Miller, 2006; Miller & Carroll, 2006; Miller & Rollnick, 2002).
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, the most prominent explanatory models of addiction were 
explored. It is clear that there appears to be very little consensus regarding 
the nature and etiopathogenesis of addiction. Furthermore, the integrative 
models have not yet been able to provide the sought-after integration.
In the next chapter, the conceptual chaos in addictionology and inef-
fectual treatment are discussed. Critiques of compound models are explored 
in more depth, with a special emphasis on the BPS model.
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C H A P T E R  2
C o n c e p t u a l  C h a o s  
i n  A d d i c t i o n  S t u d i e s
A paradigm shift is urgently needed in the field of addiction because, while 
the institutions of global health have expended vast resources over the past 
couple of centuries to control addiction to drugs, alcohol, and hundreds of 
other habits and pursuits, the flood of addiction has continued to deepen 
and spread.
—Bruce Alexander (2010, p.1)
INTRODUCTIONC urrently, addiction theories are so abundant and varied (Shaffer et al., 2004; Vaillant, 1995; White, 1998) that the field of addictionology 
was described by Howard Shaffer (as cited in Hill, 2010), the Director of 
the Harvard Medical School’s Division on Addictions, as “[c]onceptual cha-
os…a crisis of concepts and explanatory categories in the addictions” (p. 3).
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Many scholars agree on two of the foremost problems in addiction 
studies and treatment. The first is definitional confusion (Alexander, 2008, 
2010; Hill, 2010; Shaffer et al., 2004; Vaillant, 1995; White, 1998) and the 
second is the ineffectiveness of treatment (Alexander, 2008, 2010; Hill, 
2010; Shaffer et al., 2004; White, 1998). Alexander (2010) lamented the 
failure of the field of addictionology to bring forth adequate solutions to 
the problem of addiction. He provided an in-depth and scholarly study of 
the phenomenon of dislocation, which he called a “condition of human 
beings who have been shorn of their cultures and individual identities by 
the globalization of a ‘free-market society’ in which the needs of people 
are subordinated to the imperatives of markets and the economy” (p. 1). 
He believes that the “only real hope of controlling the flood of addiction 
comes from the social sciences, which are uniquely suited to replace society’s 
worn-out formulas with a more productive paradigm” (p. 1).4
DiClemente (2003) pointed out that in an attempt to find integration 
for all these divergent conceptions of addiction, amid dissatisfaction with 
the fractional explanations proposed by the single-factor models, there has 
been a movement in the last 20 years toward holistic or compound models. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the low success rate for addiction 
treatment is because substance abuse programs apply partial and outdated 
treatment models (Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a, 2013; Jung, 2001; McPeak, 
Kennedy, & Gordon, 1991).
BEYOND THE BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL MODEL OF ADDICTION
The integrated or compound approach to addiction is an attempt to inte-
grate the divergent and often conflicting philosophical foundations of the 
4 Alexander (2008) presented a powerful critique against the prevailing view(s) of 
addiction in his book, The Globalization of Addiction. Moreover, he presented an alter-
native view of addiction that is congruent with the argument presented in this book.
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biomedical, psychological, and sociological perspectives of human behavior 
(Graham, Young, Valach, & Wood, 2008; Levant, 2004; Pilgrim, 2002; 
Wallace, 1993).
Compound models are based on the premise that the interaction of 
a number of distinct factors is adequate for explaining the etiology and 
maintenance of addictive behavior (Batson, Brown, Zaballero, & Faulcon-
Gary, 1992; Griffiths, 2005; Griffiths & Larkin, 2004; Shuttleworth, 
2002; Wallace, 1985, 1993). Compound models of addiction have been 
known by a hodgepodge of names, for example, the biopsychosocial (BPS) 
model, the multicomponent model, the multicultural model, the integrated 
model, and the complex systems model (Hill, 2010). These models and 
others are indicative of the discontent with single-factor models (Gifford 
& Humphreys, 2006; Shuttleworth, 2002). The BPS model is the most 
widely recognized compound approach to addiction (Shuttleworth, 2002; 
Wallace, 1993). George Engel (1977), a New York psychiatrist, is credited 
with coining the term “biopsychosocial.” Engel asserted:
I contend that all medicine is in a crisis and, further, that 
medicine’s crisis derives from the same basic fault as psychiatry’s, 
namely, adherence to a model of disease no longer adequate for 
the scientific tasks and social responsibilities of either medicine or 
psychiatry . . . The boundaries between health and disease, between 
well and sick, are far from clear and never will be clear, for they are 
diffused by cultural, social, and psychological considerations. (p. 324)
Undoubtedly, this approach implies that no one isolated causal factor 
is responsible for addiction (Griffiths, 2005; Hill, 2010; Wallace, 1993). 
From the BPS perspective, addiction is better understood from a framework 
that locates underlying links, namely, the biological, psychological, and 
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sociological, as the most vital antecedents in the establishment of addiction 
(Gifford & Humphreys, 2006). Although the BPS model approach could 
be viewed as approximating a comprehensive, integrated approach, there are 
still considerable positivistic, ontological, and epistemological underpinnings 
and assumptions, which hinder a comprehensive conceptual framework.
The BPS model does not provide an adequate integrative conceptual 
framework for the many antecedent variables that it acknowledges and 
provides semantic linking at best (Alexander, 2008; DiClemente, 2003; 
Hill, 2010). Hill (2010) said: “Notwithstanding the apparent willingness 
to acknowledge multiple factors in addiction; simply classifying a model 
by a compound expression, as we will discover, does not automatically 
eliminate fundamentally abstractionists’ [natural scientific or positivist] 
assumptions” (p. 107). Hill qualified the above statement by indicating the 
“abstractionist use of de-contextualism, reductionism, and determinism in 
the biopsychosocial model of addiction” (p. 107).
Ontological foundation
In philosophy, the term ontology is often used within the context of meta-
physics, and refers to what exists or what can exist in the world. Epistemology 
refers to the nature of human knowledge and understanding that can be 
obtained through various types of investigation (Slife, 2005). Ontological 
and epistemological questions often are concerned with what is referred to 
as a person’s Weltanschauung, or worldview.
Philosophers and theoretical psychologists point out that all theories 
have ontological and epistemological ancestry or foundational assumptions, 
whether implicitly or explicitly stated (Bishop, 2007; Polkinghorn, 2004; 
Slife, 2005). Consequently, conceptions of addiction, like conceptions in any 
science, are based on certain philosophical assumptions, which influence the 
trajectory of the development of the concept (Bohman, 1993; Richardson, 
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2002). In addiction science, these initial assumptions often go unnoticed and 
consequently, are uncontested once treatment methodologies are employed 
and made the objects of research (Hill, 2010).
Ribes-Inesta (2003), for example, commented “psychologists have paid 
little attention to the nature of concepts they use, to the assumptions that 
underlie their theories, and the ways such concepts are applied in the study 
of behavior” (p. 147). Within the field of psychology there exists various 
ontological worldviews and hidden assumptions. Therefore, theories about 
and definitions of addiction and treatment methodologies may in the same 
manner have been influenced by ontological assumptions, which often 
remain implicit (Hill, 2010).
Hill (2010) argued that there are certain (often unrecognized) ontological 
assumptions made by those who study addiction (or any human behavior), 
and he pointed out that most of these assumptions are abstractionist or pos-
itivist, which he said were problematic; as a better alternative, he suggested 
a “relational ontological foundation.” His argument rests on the premise that 
if most addiction theories share the same ontological and epistemological 
foundation—all of which have not provided an adequate explanation for 
addiction—then perhaps an alternative ontological philosophy will bring 
forth unique insights. A brief evaluation of Hill’s argument reveals the foun-
dational shortcomings of most (if not all) contemporary compound models.
According to Hill (2010), most of the myriad (and often conflicting) 
etiological models of addiction actually share a similar ontological founda-
tion. He further suggested a solution to the conceptual chaos surrounding 
addiction studies. He summed up his main premise by saying that:
First, I will suggest that the conceptual confusion sur-
rounding addiction is more apparent than real, that there is in 
fact, a shared unity at the ontological level. Second, if it is true 
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that most conceptions share a similar ontological basis, then 
perhaps an alternative ontological viewpoint could offer a fresh 
approach to addiction and conceivably lead to greater treatment 
effectiveness. (p. 5)
According to Hill (2010) there are the two major ontological categories 
or foundations applied in the social sciences to understand human behavior: 
ontological abstractionism and ontological relationality (Bishop, 2007; 
Slife, 2005). Since addiction is often described in terms of human behavior 
(Brodie & Redfield, 2002; Flores, 1997), he investigated how these two 
ontological foundations underpin many studies of addiction. Hill discussed 
the ontological assumptions of the disease model, the life-process model, 
and the compound model; most researchers have agreed that these three 
generalized frameworks include the full spectrum of etiological theories 
(Campbell, 1996; Shaffer et al., 2004). His evaluation of these three broad 
classes of addiction models reveals a domination of an abstractionist or 
positivistic ontology.
An overview is provided of the positivistic or abstractionist ontology, 
which as Hill (2010) astutely indicated, underlies most addiction models 
including the biopsychosocial model. Thereafter, a synopsis follows of 
Hill’s suggestion of a relational ontology as an alternative foundation for 
addiction studies.
Ontological abstrac tionism of addic tion
Abstractionism is a way of viewing the world that identifies or considers all 
ontological reality as independent and isolated (Slife & Richardson, 2008). 
Abstractionism attempts, therefore, to isolate events from the context in 
which they occur, in order to obtain an unbiased understanding. “The key 
idea [behind abstractionism] is to isolate the properties in question from 
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the rest of the environment and analyze them in as context-free a manner 
as possible” (Bishop, 2007, p. 114).
Ontological abstractionism, therefore, “assume[s] that all things, 
including the self, are the most real and best understood when they are 
separated from the situations in which they occur” (Slife, as cited in Hill, 
2010, p. 15). This isolation gives rise to “law-like connections between causes 
and effects” (Bishop, 2007, p. 115). According to Hill (2010), “Addiction 
concepts from the abstractionist perspective would therefore only accept 
a contextless and individualist approach as the most fundamental way 
in which to understand and treat the disorder” (p. 15). An abstractionist 
ontology of addiction is to be “found in self-contained or isolatable factors 
considered to be basically unchanged and or at least similar from context 
to context” (p. 16).
The assumption of unchangeableness implies that addiction within 
an individual remains basically unchanged from context to context. Many 
contemporary models of addiction underscore this abstractionist notion of 
unchangeableness (Flores, 1997; White, 1998). For example, the disease 
model views addiction as residing within the individual, and continues to 
live on within the individual even after many years of abstinence (Flores, 
1997; Menninger, 1938; Vaillant, 1995). In short, addiction from the 
abstractionist position is viewed as “consistent regardless of the context in 
which the individual is found” (Hill, 2010, p. 16).
Ontological relationali t y
In contrast to this abstractionist ontology, Hill (2010) proposed a rela-
tional ontology as a foundation for understanding addiction: “Ontological 
relationality, by contrast, is a philosophy that asserts individuals and their 
behaviors can only be understood in relation to the contexts in which the 
individual exists or the behavior occurs” (p. 16).
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Addiction from a relational perspective would likewise not only 
value the similarities evident from context to context, but would also 
acknowledge the influence of contexts and relationships on the most 
basic meanings of addiction. Furthermore, factors associated with 
addiction would be conceived of not as self-contained or autono-
mous but as inter-related and mutually constitutive of other pertinent 
factors. Mutually constitutive refers to how each factor never exists 
as a self-contained entity but only in relationship to other factors. 
Pertinent factors are thus necessary for addiction to occur but not 
sufficient in and of themselves to account for the disorder. This 
suggests that factors of addiction, e.g., genetics, environment, and 
the contexts in which they occur, are not sufficient or “the cause” 
in and of themselves because they are not self-contained and do not 
remain fixed from context to context. (Hill, 2010, p. 17)
Hill (2010) implied that the concept of addiction is subject to context. 
Essentially, “a relational approach would view contexts and relationships 
as indispensable when trying to comprehend, conceptualize, and therefore 
treat addiction” (p. 17).
I agree with Hill (2010) that in order to arrive at a satisfactory expla-
nation of addiction there needs to be a fundamental departure from con-
ventional ontology. However, I am critical of the idea that the potential 
solution is to be found in his suggested relational ontology. This critique 
will be discussed in a subsequent section.
The Two -Fold Problem of the Biopsychosocial Model
On the surface, the BPS model of addiction seems to offer an integrative 
approach. As its name suggests, the researchers who adhere to this approach 
are often uncomfortable with the theoretical shortfalls of single-construct 
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approaches (Levant, 2004; Wallace, 1993). Griffiths (2005) echoed this: 
“Research and clinical interventions [for addiction] are best served by a 
biopsychosocial approach that incorporates the best strands of contemporary 
psychology, biology, and sociology” (p. 195).
When undertaking an analysis of the BPS’s ontological foundations, 
Hill’s (2010) critique of the BPS model is two-fold. He described the BPS 
model’s shortcomings in terms of (a) the separation of factors and (b) the 
prioritization of factors.
Separation of fac tors
Griffiths’s (2005) postulation that “interventions are best served” by the 
“best strands” (p. 195) of biological, psychological, and sociological units 
implies that they are also best conceptualized as separate or “self-contained 
individualities” (Slife, 2005, p. 3).
Consequently, the biological context is decontextualized from 
the psychological context, etc. That is to say biology is abstracted 
from or does not serve as a context for the psychological . . . . Thus, 
the phenomenon of addiction as a “whole”, according to the BPS 
model, is most meaningful when thought of as decontextualized 
or self-contained “strands.” (Hill, 2010, p. 536)
Engel (1980) confirmed the existence of abstractions, by means of 
self-contained entities, in the BPS model. He is of the opinion that:
Each system [within the BPS framework] as a whole has 
its own unique characteristics and dynamics. . . . The desig-
nation “system” bespeaks the existence of a stable configura-
tion in time and space. . . . Stable configuration also implies the 
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existence of boundaries between organized systems. . . . Each 
level in the hierarchy represents an organized dynamic whole, a 
system of sufficient persistence and identity to justify being named. 
Its name reflects its distinctive properties and characteristics.  
(pp. 536–538)
Here the BPS model is regarded as a hierarchical system with “its own 
unique characteristics and dynamics . . . a stable configuration in time and 
space [which also] implies the existence of boundaries” (Engel, 1980, pp. 
536–538). Therefore, each of the systems is abstracted from the other. Such 
a viewpoint naturally diminishes the whole of a disease to an assortment of 
“table configurations in time and space” (Engel, 1980, p. 536).
When we apply Engle’s viewpoint of disease to addiction it can be 
reduced to a “stable configuration [with] boundaries between organized 
systems” (p. 536). Separation of factors is thus assured because each of these 
self-contained factors demonstrate “sufficient persistence and identity to 
justify being named” (p. 536).
Hill (2010) rightly pointed out when there are, albeit implicitly, a sepa-
ration of factors present within the conceptual scaffolding of the BPS model, 
it cannot be called a truly integrated approach, and it does not adequately 
explain the coexisting and co-arising of the various factors.
Prior i t izing of fac tors
In the previous section, the BPS model’s supposition that “separating [the] 
factors of addiction” is the best way to “conceptualize the disorder” (Hill, 
2010, p. 112) was highlighted. As a result of these factors being separated, it 
is tempting for most researchers to prioritize certain factors. Many leading 
supporters of the BPS model emphasize the role of neurobiology in the 
etiology and maintenance of diseases such as addiction.
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In his presidential address for the journal Psychosomatic Medicine, 
Williams (1994) wrote, “My major message is that optimal growth in our 
understanding of how biopsychosocial factors interact in the etiology and 
course of human disease will come only if our research incorporates theories 
and techniques from neurobiology and cellular and molecular biology” (p. 
308). Further highlighting Williams’s (1994) prioritization of biological 
factors, he believes that the serotonin deficiency hypothesis is a fundamental 
explanation for early death due to “increased alcohol consumption” (p. 311). 
Williams (1994) asserted:
Rather than saying that a hostile personality trait somehow 
“causes” the clustering of the characteristics making up the hostility 
syndrome, I am proposing that all the characteristics [including 
smoking, eating, and alcohol use] . . . could be the result of a single 
underlying neurological condition [or] mechanism: deficient central 
nervous system (CNS) serotonergic function. . . . Low CNS sero-
tonin function has effects on biology and behavior that could be 
responsible for both the biobehavioral traits and consequent high 
rates of disease and death that have been found associated with 
high hostility. . . . There is very convincing and extensive evidence 
that weak brain serotonin function contributes to increased alcohol 
consumption. (pp. 310-311)
Locating “a single neurological condition [or] mechanism” as the primary 
causal factor of a variety of diseases illustrates the reductionist conception to 
attribute “the material of the body (biology) alone for explaining our minds 
and behaviors” (Slife & Hopkins, 2005, p. 2). In referring to Williams’s 
comments, Hill (2010) pointed out “three ways in which abstractions [reduc-
tionist/natural scientific foundations] underlie this particular approach to 
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addiction” (p. 103). Firstly, death is reduced to “coronary disease . . . and 
increased alcohol consumption,” which is reduced to hostility, which is 
reduced to “low serotonin function . . . [in the] CNS” (p. 113). With low 
serotonin function being the final reduction, there is clearly a prioritization 
of neurological structures.
Secondly, Hill (2010) pointed out that the primacy and supremacy 
of neurological mechanisms are implicit by situating “a single underlying 
condition,” (Williams, 1994, p. 311) that is, serotonin deficiency as the 
primary underlying causal link to which disease states such as increased 
alcohol consumption” are attributed. Thus, the underlying condition” of “low 
serotonin function” (Williams, 1994, p. 311) is established as the principal 
feature of both “biology and behaviour”, which, in turn, determines to a 
great extent “increased alcohol consumption” (Williams, 1994, p. 311).
Finally, Hill (2010) pointed out that Williams labels human behaviors 
as “those that may otherwise be listed under a psychosocial heading, e.g. 
increased smoking, increased eating, and increased alcohol use. . . . [as] 
“biobehavioral traits” (pp. 114–115), even further distancing these factors 
from their overall context. The above is an example of how “the central 
proposition of neuroscience is that the mechanisms of biology are sufficient 
to explain the human mind and behaviors [such as addiction] . . . whereby 
other, nonmaterial and nonbiological are viewed as less than fundamental 
or unimportant” (Slife & Hopkins, 2005, pp. 2–3).
Although some researchers have established a relationship between 
biological factors, heritable personality traits, and psychosocial factors, 
the “relationship is ontologically weak due to the reduction of factors to 
the self-contained properties of each” (Hill, 2010, p. 116). Moreover, 
biology is so profoundly decontextualized or self-contained that the 
interaction of the ontologically less basic psychosocial factors does not 
fundamentally change the essence of biology, but only amplifies its 
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self-contained properties. In contrast, Hill (2010) pointed out the value 
of a relational approach:
By comparison, relationality would assume that biological and 
psychosocial factors share a mutually constitutive relationship with 
one another. They are each necessary conditions for the phenome-
non being explained; no single condition is more or less necessary 
than—or more or less in control of—any of the others. (p. 124)
Therefore, biology—as a self-contained entity—is not “amplified by 
[self-contained] psychosocial factors,” but rather each entity serves to give 
meaning and identity to one another (Paris, as cited in Hill, 2010, p. 117).
INEFFECTUAL TREATMENT
Considering the variety of treatment options, treatment efficacy for addic-
tion is ostensibly low (Alexander, 2008; Dawson et al., 2006). Hill (2010) 
indicated that “large population analyses indicate relapse rates following 
treatment of alcohol dependence disorders to be between 70% and 90% and 
success in treating illicit drugs is even more discouraging, with recidivism 
rates exceeding 90% in many demographics” (p. 4). White (1998), the author 
of Slaying the Dragon: The History of Addiction Treatment and Recovery in 
America, echoed the above sentiment: “With our two centuries of accumu-
lated knowledge and the best available treatments, there still exist[s] no cure 
for addiction, and only a minority of addicted clients achieves sustained 
recovery following our intervention in their lives” (p. 342).
It is important to note that the ineffectiveness of the treatment is not 
due to a lack of attention or lack of genuine exertion by concerned groups 
(Flores, 1997; Ray & Ksir, 2004; White, 1998). Progress in public health 
in such issues as sanitation, epidemiology, emergency medicine, and drug 
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therapies has instilled hope that many diseases could also be treated effectively 
(Hoffman & Goldfrank, 1990; O’Brien, 1997). Unfortunately, the progress 
in public health has not been duplicated with regard to the treatment of 
addiction (Fields, 1998; Ray & Ksir, 2004; White, 1998).
CONCLUSION
In this chapter it was shown that the compound models of addiction such 
as the BPS model are built on a positivistic foundation, which by default 
provides a less than adequate conceptual framework for complex human 
behavior-in-the-world, such as addiction.5 I agree with Hill (2010) that a 
fundamental departure from conventional ontology is essential to arrive 
at a satisfactory explanation of addiction. However, I am critical of his 
suggested relational ontology. Hill has done valuable work in pointing out 
natural scientific and abstractionist ontological foundations as the under-
lying paradigm of addiction studies, yet I do not believe that his proposed 
“relational ontology” provides an adequate solution to the problems of 
conceptual chaos and ineffectual treatment.
This book presents another option, which differs from Hill’s (2010) 
relational ontology. Instead of proposing that the “conceptual confusion 
surrounding addiction is more apparent than real,” and that there is “a 
shared unity at the ontological level” (p. 5), I propose that what creates 
the so-called “conceptual confusion” in addiction sciences is real from an 
epistemological perspective, and is a result of ontological reductionism. 
Furthermore, I do not entirely agree that most conceptions of addiction 
share a similar ontological basis (as suggested by Hill), and would prefer to 
state that each conception enacts a certain ontological reality and implies 
5 Boss (1983), in his book The Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology, 
provided a robust similar critique.
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its own unique triadic relationship between ontology, epistemology, and 
methodology.
Hill (2010) identified the need for an alternative ontological viewpoint 
that “could offer a fresh approach to addiction and conceivably lead to greater 
treatment effectiveness” (p. 5). However, this seems viable only when placed 
in the above-mentioned triadic relationship. Moreover, it is also not clear 
how his alternative ontological viewpoint can provide conceptual integration.
In the next chapter I will argue that the solution is not to be found 
merely in a relational ontology, but rather in a pluralistic ontological and 
epistemological foundation. I propose that the application of integral theory 
as an epistemological and ontological (and methodological) foundation could 
provide an integrative conceptual framework, which could help address the 
problems of conceptual chaos and ineffectual treatment.
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C H A P T E R  3
A r c h i t e c t o n i c  o f  a n  I n t e g r a l 
M e t a t h e o r y  f o r  A d d i c t i o n
A new vision and understanding of something demands a new way of 
talking about it, for the old terminology gets in the way of this effort. 
Stubbornly entrenched behind the words coined by a particular conceptual 
orientation are its secret prejudices. Any attempt to open out an adequately 
human vista onto the phenomena of undisturbed existence must include 
a critique of the most important idea of traditional biology, physiology, 
and psychology.
—Medard Boss (1983, p. 125)
INTRODUCTIONI n the previous chapter, it was pointed out that the current state of addictionology presents a two-fold problem (Hill, 2010). Firstly, 
the cornucopia of theories and treatment methodologies appears to have 
resulted in confusion rather than cohesion and integration. Secondly, despite 
the wealth and variety of theoretical and treatment approaches to addiction, 
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both researchers and clinicians recognize the failure of current interven-
tions to produce significant effects at a population level; and it is clear that 
a paradigm shift is desperately needed in the field of addiction studies.
This paradigm shift would include alternative perspectives for studying 
human behavior (Reber & Osbeck, 2005; Richardson, 2005; Slife, 2005) 
like addiction (Du Plessis, 2013; Jay & Jay, 2000; Prentiss, 2005; Shaffer, 
1995, 2007; White, 1998).
This book represents the beginning of one such an attempt at an alter-
native perspective of addiction, which may provide adequate conceptual 
integration, and that accounts for and integrates the multitude of etiological 
models, while not falling prey to the same disadvantages of the BPS model. 
In this chapter I will show how integral theory could possibly provide the 
conceptual architectonic for an integrative metatheory of addiction.
INTEGR AL THEORY
American philosopher Ken Wilber’s (2000, 2006) integral theory is often 
referred to as the AQAL model, with AQAL representing all quadrants, 
all levels, all lines, all states and all types; these five elements signify some 
of the most basic repeating patterns of reality. Integral scholars believe that 
including all of these elements increases one’s capacity to ensure that no 
major part of any solution is left out or neglected (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2009).
Integral theory is both complexifying in the sense that it includes 
and integrates more of reality and simplifying “in that it brings order to 
the cacophony of disparate dimensions of humans with great parsimony” 
(Marquis, 2009, p. 38). The strength of integral theory is its ability to 
integrate vast fields of knowledge. According to Marquis (2008), integral 
theory provides a “meta-theoretical framework that simultaneously honours 
the important contributions of a broad spectrum of epistemological outlooks 
while also acknowledging the parochial limitations and misconceptions of 
Chapter 3: Architectonic of an Integral Metatheory for Addiction  47
these perspectives” (p. 24). Wilber (2006) believes that integral theory is 
comprehensive rather than reductionist, and viewed it as “a comprehensive 
map of human potentials” (p. 1).
Integral theory has been applied in over 35 disciplines (Esbjörn-Hargens, 
2006, 2009). The field of addiction studies and recovery is only one of these 
fields. Most of the articles published to date about the application of integral 
theory and substance abuse have focused on treatment design (Amodia, 
Cano, & Eliason, 2005; Du Plessis, 2010; 2012a; Dupuy & Gorman, 2010; 
Dupuy & Morelli, 2007; Nixon, 2012; Shealy, 2009) and only recently have 
articles exploring the application of integral theory in relation to etiological 
models of addiction been published (Du Plessis, 2012b, 2013, 2014a).
What makes integral theory particularly useful within the current context 
is its postmetaphysical stance and metatheoretical ability. Integral theory is 
“derived from the analysis of other theories, philosophies and cultural tra-
ditions of knowledge” (Edwards, 2008a, p. 65). It is important to point out 
that integral theory is not strictly a theory. In theory, data is the relevant set 
of empirical and conceptual experiences about which the theory makes some 
validity claim (Meehl, 1992). Integral theory is metatheoretical in that its ele-
ments are derived from the analysis of other theories. In other words, it “is not 
a theory because its subject matter is other theory and not the empirical world 
of immediate experience and the concepts and symbols that mediate those 
experiences” (Edwards, 2008a, p. 65). Edwards (2008a) further pointed out 
that integral theory, “has the capacity to adjudicate on how theories, and the 
core second-order conceptual elements that constitute them, relate to each other, 
how they appear in balanced or in distorted forms, and how they are combined 
to develop systems of knowledge, categories of social policy, and forms of 
practice that can either emancipate or enslave us and our communities” (p. 66).
Integral theory has been applied in integrally informed approaches to 
recovery (Amodia et al., 2005; Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a; 2012b; Dupuy & 
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Gorman, 2010; Dupuy & Morelli, 2007; Gorman, 2013; Nixon, 2012; 
Shealy, 2009) and tentative explorations of its relevance have been used to 
help understand the nature and etiology of addiction (Du Plessis, 2012b, 
2013, 2014a). However, only preliminary academic research has been under-
taken to explore the applicability of integral theory in the development of 
an integrative metatheory of addiction (Du Plessis, 2014b).
In previous research, the five elements of the AQAL model have been 
instrumental in developing integrally informed treatment protocols because 
of their consistency with empirical observation (Du Plessis, 2010; 2012a; 
Dupuy & Gorman, 2010). Although this application and analysis of the five 
elements of integral theory in relation to addiction and recovery is insightful 
and has assisted in treatment design, it is inadequate to provide a compre-
hensive schema of addiction or a comprehensive metatheory. Furthermore, 
many of the previous publications on integrally informed approaches to 
addiction fall prey to the same problems that Hill (2010) pointed out in his 
critique of the BPS model (Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a; Dupuy & Gorman, 
2010; Dupuy & Morelli, 2007; Shealy, 2009).
However, the foundation for true conceptual integration could possibly 
be developed by means of a sophisticated application of integral theory’s 
metaparadigmatic ability and its postmetaphysical stance. In the next 
sections we explore integral enactment theory and its application toward 
the development of an integrative metatheory of addiction.
Integral Enac tment Theory
Integral scholar-practitioner, Sean Esbjörn-Hargens (2010) explained that 
at the core of integral enactment theory is the triadic notion of integral 
pluralism. He identified three pluralisms that are explicit within integral 
theory, namely, epistemological, methodological, and ontological. Integral 
pluralism points out that “epistemology is connected to ontology via 
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methodologies. So, if we are going to have epistemological pluralism (the 
Who) and methodological pluralism (the How), then we ought logically 
(or integrally) to have ontological pluralism (the What)” (Esbjörn-Hargens 
& Zimmerman, 2009, p. 146).
Integral pluralism is composed of integral epistemological pluralism 
(IEP), integral methodological pluralism (IMP), and integral ontological 
pluralism (IOP) (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010; Esbjörn-Hargens & Zimmerman, 
2009). Before exploring the three facets of integral pluralism, the relevance of 
the concept of enactment, an essential feature of integral theory’s postmeta-
physical position, is discussed (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010; Esbjörn-Hargens 
& Zimmerman, 2009; Wilber, 2003a, 2003b, 2006).
In this chapter I will discuss how integral enactment theory highlights 
the phenomenon of addiction as a multiple and dynamic object arising 
along a continuum of ontological complexity. Integral enactment theory 
adeptly points out how etiological models co-arise in relation to methodol-
ogy (methodological pluralism) and enacts a particular reality of addiction 
(ontological pluralism), while being mediated by the worldview of the subject 
applying the method (epistemological pluralism).
Enactment
The idea of enactment is vital to understand why different theories of 
addiction do not have to contradict one another, as they are often inter-
preted, but can rather be understood as true but partial. Enactment is the 
bringing forth of certain aspects of reality (ontology) when using a certain 
lens (methodology) to view it (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010).
In short, reality is not to be discovered as a pregiven truth, but rather 
reality is cocreated or coenacted by the various paradigms that are used to 
explore it (using the construct of a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense—which 
includes the social injunctions associated with a certain worldview). For 
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example, when attempting to understand addiction using natural scientific 
research methods, a different ontological reality is enacted than when 
using a phenomenological approach. By avoiding what Wilber referred to 
as the “myth of the given,” addiction is understood as a multiple object 
with no existing pregiven reality to be discovered (Wilber, 2003a, 2003b, 
2006). Integral pluralism and its conception of enactment can be seen 
as a halfway position between subjective idealism or immaterialism and 
positivism or materialism.
This is why I use the word sub-sist. There is a reality or a What 
that subsists and has intrinsic features but it doesn’t ex-ist without 
a Who and a How. So that is where Integral Pluralism in general 
comes into being: it is bringing forth a reality but it is not creating 
the reality à la subjective idealism. (Wilber as cited in Esbjörn-
Hargens, 2010, p. 169)
Different research methods in addictionology enact addiction in unique 
ways and consequently, bring forth different etiological models. Most of 
the etiological models, typically based on a positivist foundation, treat 
addiction as a single object “out there” to be discovered or uncovered and 
therefore, eventually run into trouble attempting to explain a feature of 
addiction outside of its enacted reality.
For example, physiological models and their accompanying research, 
namely, naturalistic scientific methodologies, enact the biological reality of 
addiction and are inherently incapable of showing any truth of addiction 
outside the realm of biology, that is, societal, existential, and so forth. In 
acknowledging the multiplicity of addiction’s ontological existence, the 
incompatibility of the various etiological models disappears because we 
can see that each enacts a different reality of addiction—each brings forth 
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valuable insights in its specific ontological domain. What one considers 
real depends in part on the means and apparatus one uses, so objects are, 
therefore, enacted (Murray, 2010).
In discussing the ontology of climate change, Esbjörn-Hargens (2010) 
raised some stimulating points. In explaining the inevitability of ontological 
pluralism of climate change, he pointed out a relationship between the 
various methods that are used to “see” or enact this complex phenomenon, 
namely, the relationship of (a) the common professions that encounter the 
phenomenon (the Who), (b) the associated methodology of each discipline 
(the How), and (c) the consequent view of climate change (the What). Exactly 
the same assertion can be made for the enactment of addiction models.
Applying the above-mentioned triadic relationship to the notion of 
addiction highlights some fascinating, but seldom acknowledged, issues. 
When the various professions explore etiological models and apply their 
respective methodologies, they may not refer to the same ontic phenome-
non. It has often been acknowledged that various researchers and clinicians 
explore or treat different aspects of addiction, but often this is based on 
the assumption of a common ontic (and objective) reality of addiction and 
when “puzzled” together forms a comprehensive picture of addiction. This 
is the underlying ontological and epistemological assumption of the BPS 
model and other compound models. Is the above-mentioned a correct 
ontological assumption (What) on which to build theories (Why)? Is the 
neurobiologist seeing the same addiction as the existential therapist? Is 
the psychoanalyst talking about the same addiction as the Twelve Step 
counselor? Is the biochemist measuring the same addiction as the social 
scientist? Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that that they all attempt to view 
the socially defined and agreed-upon phenomena called addiction; and no, 
in the sense that they are “bringing-forth-into-the-world” and enacting 
different realities, ranging in ontological complexity (first, second, and 
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third orders of ontology)—which can overlap ontologically, but are not the 
same ontic phenomenon.
In short, there are essential structures of addiction that share the various 
enactments of it, but how it “exists-in-the-world” varies, depending on the 
unique permutation of its integral enactment triad of “Who–How–What.”
“In fact, there is not a clear, single, independently existing object, nor 
are there multiple different objects. There is something in-between: a mul-
tiple object. . . . This multiple object [addiction] is actually a complex set of 
phenomena that cannot easily be reduced to a single independent object” 
(Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010, p. 148).
The notion of enactment provides a lens of “ontological span” because 
it explains why different theories and their accompanying methodologies 
enact different aspects of an ontic phenomenon.
Integral Methodological Pluralism
Integral methodological pluralism (IMP) is derived from the eight zone 
extensions of the original AQAL model (Wilber, 2003a, 2003b, 2006). 
These eight primordial perspectives (8PP) are derived from an inside view 
(i.e., a first-person perspective) and an outside view (i.e., a third-person 
perspective) of the quadrants.
Each of the 8PP is only accessible through a particular method of 
inquiry or methodological family, and represents at least one of the eight 
most important methods for accessing reproducible knowledge (Esbjörn-
Hargens, 2006, 2010). Furthermore, each of these methodologies discloses 
an aspect of reality unique to its particular injunction that other methods 
cannot. As such, IMP represents one of the most pragmatic and all-encom-
passing theoretical formulations of any integral or metatheoretical approach 
to accessing reproducible knowledge (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2006, 2010).
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Wilber (2003b) believes that “any sort of Integral Methodological 
Pluralism allows the creation of a multi-purpose toolkit for approaching 
today’s complex problems—individually, socially, and globally—with more 
comprehensive solutions that have a chance of actually making a difference” 
(p. 14).
IMP has two essential features: paradigmatic and metaparadig-
matic. The paradigmatic aspect refers to the recognition, compilation, and 
implementation of all the existing methodologies in a comprehensive and 
inclusive manner. The metaparadigmatic aspect refers to its capacity to 
weave together and relate paradigms to each other from a metaperspective 
(Wilber, 2003b, 2006). Wilber (2003b) described the metaparadigmatic 
aspect of IMP as “a practice that can enact, bring forth, and illuminate 
the integral interrelationships between various holons originally thought 
discreet or non-existent” (p. 13). IMP can, therefore, be understood as 
the 8PP and its correlated methodologies with a metaframework, which 
provides metalinking between these disparate perspectives and paradigms 
(Martin, 2008).
The eight methodological families identified by Wilber (2003a, 2003b, 
2006) are zone 1: phenomenology (the insides of individual interiors), zone 
2: structuralism (the outsides of individual interiors), zone 3: hermeneutics 
(the insides of collective interiors), zone 4: cultural anthropology or ethno-
methodology (the outsides of collective interiors), zone 5: autopoiesis theory 
(the insides of individual exteriors), zone 6: empiricism (the outsides of indi-
vidual exteriors), zone 7: social autopoiesis theory (the insides of collective 
exteriors), and zone 8: systems theory (the outsides of collective exteriors). 
Wilber (2003a) used each of the names of these methodological families 
as an umbrella term, which includes many divergent and commonly used 
methodologies. These are depicted in Figure 1.
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By using IMP, one “generates a meta-practice of honoring, including, 
and integrating the fundamental paradigms and methodologies of the 
major forms of human inquiry (traditional, modern, and postmodern)” 
(Wilber, 2003b, p. 16). By applying integral theory in the context of 
addiction models, one may be provided with a “meta-theoretical frame-
work that simultaneously honours the important contributions of a 
broad spectrum of epistemological outlooks while also acknowledging 
the parochial limitations and misconceptions of these perspectives” 
(Marquis, 2008, p. 24).









































Figure 1: Eight methodological families of IMP. From “An Integral Ontology of Addiction: 
A multiple object existing as a continuum of ontological complexity,” by Guy Du Plessis, 
2014, Journal of Integral Theory and Practice, 9(1), p. 40. Reprinted with permission.
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Integral taxonomy of etiological models of addiction
In Figure 2, an integrative taxonomy of etiological models of addiction 
(discussed in Chapter 1) is provided, using the eight zones and method-
ological families of IMP, into which etiological models can be grouped. 
By viewing addiction through the quadrants and its 8PP, one can see that 
all these perspectives with their respective methodological families need to 
be acknowledged, and as many as possible should be included in order to 
gain a truly comprehensive view. This avoids what Wilber (2006) referred 
to as “quadrant absolutism,” where all realities of a phenomenon are reduced 
to the perspective of one quadrant, for example, reducing the multiple 
determinants of addictive behavior to merely impaired neurophysiology.
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Figure 2: Taxonomy of etiological models of addiction within the eight major 
methodological families of IMP. From “An Integral Ontology of Addiction: A multi-
ple object existing as a continuum of ontological complexity,” by Guy du Plessis, 
2014, Journal of Integral Theory and Practice, 9(1), p. 43. Reprinted with permission.
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By applying IMP to explanatory addiction models, it highlights how 
each of the single-factor models articulates addiction from a specific zone(s) 
because it applies a specific methodology, whereas the more integrative models 
view addiction across several of these zones. Each of the models indicated in 
Figure 2 brings valuable insight from a specific paradigmatic point of view and 
enacts certain features of addiction by virtue of applying particular methodol-
ogies. This pluralistic perceptive allows one to honor all the existing theories 
of addiction, and at the same time highlights their respective inadequacies.
From an IMP perspective, none of these models or perspectives has 
epistemological priority because they coarise and “tetra-mesh” simulta-
neously. Each of these explanatory models has advantages in describing 
certain features and etiological determinants of addiction, but also has 
limitations. Therefore, these models are valid from the perspectives they 
use to understand and study addiction, but are also always partial in their 
approach to the whole. From this perspective, a model is not correct or 
incorrect, but rather that it is more suited to explaining addiction from a 
certain perspective, and more limited from other perspectives. For instance, 
the genetic/physiological models are better at explaining the biological 
determinants and functions of addiction than the personality/intrapsychic 
models, whereas the personality/intrapsychic models are better at explaining 
the phenomenological determinants and experience of addicted individuals 
than the genetic/physiological models. Yet, both illuminate important and 
interlinked aspects of the same phenomenon.
Through the application of IMP, one can begin to develop a concep-
tual framework integration in which (a) all the evidence-based models 
are accounted for, (b) an explanation is given regarding which aspect of 
addiction they enact, and (c) metaparadigmatic integration of these diverse 
perspectives and their paradigmatic injunctions is provided.
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It must be noted that IMP has to be placed within the larger context 
of integral pluralism. If this is not done, multiple perspectives (episte-
mological pluralism) are overemphasized (a mistake I made in previous 
research; see Du Plessis, 2012b) without recognizing that there are actually 
multiple objects (ontological pluralism) correlated with those perspectives 
and their respective methodologies (Du Plessis, 2013, 2014b; Esbjörn-
Hargens, 2010).
Integral Epistemological Pluralism
Integral epistemological pluralism (IEP) refers to the multiplicity of per-
spectives or worldviews of how we can know a phenomenon. Each of the 
methodologies of IMP has a correlated epistemology. In other words, each 
method of studying addiction has its own belief regarding how we can know 
addiction. As already mentioned, IMP has to be placed within the larger 
context of integral pluralism.
All too often we talk as if the multiple perspectives (e.g. world-
views represented by the altitudes) are all looking at the same object: 
epistemological pluralism . . . . If they all use the same method, 
then they might indeed enact a single object, but if they use very 
different methods, then the probability increases that they will 
enact a multiple object. (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010, p. 155)
In short, not placing epistemological and methodological pluralism 
within the larger framework of integral pluralism tends to reinforce the 
myth of the given by implying a single “pre-given independent object” 
(Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010). Wilber (as cited in Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010) 
warned against the myth of the given by saying:
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There is no given world, not only because intersubjectivity is 
a constitutive part of objective and subjective realities, but also 
because even specifying intersubjectivity is not nearly enough to 
get over that myth in all its dimensions: you need to specify the 
Kosmic locations of both the perceiver and the perceived in order 
to be engaged in anything except metaphysics. (p. 150)
Murray (2012) pointed out that “Integral Pluralism says that what is 
perceived to exist depends on the methodology used to inquire and the 
developmentally-determined capacity of the observer/inquirer to perceive 
[epistemological pluralism]” (p. 35). Wilber’s (2006) stages of development 
are an example of epistemological pluralism within integral enactment 
theory. From a moral developmental perspective, an easy way to understand 
stages is to describe their progression from egocentric (preconventional) 
through ethnocentric (conventional) to world-centric (postconventional). 
This is an example of how IEP accounts for a developmental understanding 
of addiction as well as recovery, and can account for the many empirical 
observations relating to addiction and the process of change described in 
developmental models such as the TTM (DiClemente, 2003).
In conclusion, the discussion suggests that when IEP is placed within 
the triadic relationship of integral pluralism, it reveals integral theory’s 
capacity for conceptual integration and ontological span. In striving for 
conceptual integration, IEP highlights the underlying worldview or each 
model’s injunction/methodology, which gives rise to a specific ontological 
understanding of addiction (ontological span).
Integral Ontological Pluralism
Philosophers have long pointed out that all concepts have ontological 
roots or make assumptions about the nature of reality (Bishop, 2007; 
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Polkinghorne, 2004; Slife, 2005). Addiction theories and definitions, like all 
scientific conceptions, and addiction treatments likewise begin with certain 
philosophical assumptions that determine the nature of the concept and 
how it may be applied (Bohman, 1993; Richardson, 2002; Slife, 2005). As 
indicated previously, in addictionology, these ontological assumptions often 
go unnoticed and consequently, unchallenged by researchers and clinicians 
when they begin to explore and treat the disorder (Hill, 2010; Shaffer, 1986).
Most addiction models, including the compound models, are not based 
on a pluralistic ontological foundation. This may be one of the pivotal rea-
sons that conceptual integration has not yet been achieved in the addiction 
sciences. Ontological pluralism underscores that addiction is not a single 
pregiven entity, but rather a multiplicity of third-person realities. Moreover, 
the miscellany of the ontological realities of addiction has a special “enactive” 
relationship with etiological theories and their respective methodologies. 
Without acknowledging the ontological multiplicity of a complex phenom-
enon like addiction, conceptual integration cannot be achieved. Esbjörn-
Hargens (2010) adds that “theory is not merely interpretive but constitutive: 
theoretical pluralism lends itself to ontological pluralism” (p.498). Esbjörn-
Hargens (2010) described these relationships as “integral enactment.” The 
relational scheme of integral enactment can be valuable in providing insight 
into the nature and genesis of etiological models of addiction.




Figure 3: Integral enactment. From “An Ontology of Climate Change,” by S. Esbjörn-
Hargens, 2010, Journal of Integral Theory and Practice, 5(1), p. 157. Reprinted with 
permission.
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In Figure 3, the relationships involved in integral enactment are shown. 
In short, etiological theories (Why) are part of an integral enactment of 
epistemology (Who), methodology (How), and ontology (What). Therefore, 
to understand why and how a model arrives at its ontological truth claims, 
all three of these elements need to be considered. Consideration of the 
elements will highlight what aspects of addiction the model can explain 
and what aspects it cannot.
The notion of addiction as a multiple ontological object may be one of 
the missing links in addiction science’s goal to provide functional conceptual 
integration in the field. The perspective of integral ontological pluralism 
could help explain (and resolve) the difficulties encountered when attempting 
conceptual integration of explanatory models within a field as complex as 
addictions studies. It can account for conflicting empirical observations by 
incorporating an ontological pluralistic understanding of addiction. And it 
can highlight the ontological domain of research methodologies and their 
accompanied epistemologies. This can lead to various models not being 
understood as contradictory, but merely pointing to the different features 
of addiction on a continuum as a multiple object.
Addic tion as a Third - Order Complexit y
Ontological complexity can be a helpful notion in the quest for concep-
tual integration in the field of addiction studies. Esbjörn-Hargens (2010) 
described the three orders of complexity as follows:
The first order is characterized by phenomena that we can more 
or less ‘see’ with our own senses. The second order is the result of using 
various extensions of our senses (instruments, computer programs, charts) 
to see the phenomena . . . . The third order cannot be seen with our 
senses nor indirectly by our instruments, but only by indications. (p. 159)
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Addiction can thus be understood as a probability continuum of onto-
logical complexity, co-arising and enacted through different methodologies 
and worldviews. At the highest level of abstraction (third-order) lies the 
notion of an individual’s addiction-in-the-world, which is a staggeringly 
complex phenomenon beyond our senses or instruments. So addiction 
“is two steps removed from our direct experience (the first order) and 
our perception of it relies on many abstract indicators (the second order), 
which are epistemologically distant and ontologically complex” (Esbjörn-
Hargens, 2010, p. 159).
When understanding addiction as a third-order ontology, we 
begin to understand why certain models of addiction, especially the 
single-factor models, give rise to such partial and reductionist expla-
nations. They are good at explaining certain archaic features of addic-
tion in the realm of its enacted f irst- or second-order ontology, but 
methodologically and epistemologically, they are incapable of enacting 
addiction on a third-order ontology. A perspective from a f irst- or 
second-order ontology cannot comprehensively articulate a complex 
phenomenon like addiction. Heather (as cited in West, 2005) pointed 
out certain features of the ontological complexity of addiction and the 
problem faced when etiological models do not include a perspective of 
ontological complexity:
[A]ddiction . . . is best defined by repeated failures to refrain 
from drug use despite prior resolutions to do so. This definition 
is consistent with views of addiction that see decision-mak-
ing, ambivalence and conflict as central features of the addict’s 
behaviour and experience. On this basis, a three-level framework 
of required explanation is (needed) consisting of (1) the level of 
neuroadaptation [1st order ontology], (2) the level of desire for 
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drugs [2nd order ontology] and (3) the level of ‘akrasia’ or failures 
of resolve [3rd order ontology] . . . explanatory concepts used 
at the ‘lower’ levels in this framework can never be held to be 
sufficient as explanations at higher levels, i.e. the postulation of 
additional determinants is always required at Levels 2 and 3. In 
particular, it is a failure to address problems at the highest level 
in the framework that marks the inadequacy of most existing 
theories of addiction. (p. 2)
Most of the models discussed have as their foundation a natural 
scientific worldview and positivistic methodology that are typically ade-
quate for exploring phenomena existing on the first- and second-order of 
ontological complexity. However, such models are hopelessly inadequate 
in explaining complex phenomena such as addiction (or any human 
behavior), which exist on the third order of ontological complexity. For 
example, reward deficiency syndrome (Blum, 1995) can only be under-
stood as one of many possible physiological risks that interact with other 
aspects of being human, without having to reduce human behavior and 
motivation to neurotransmitter levels and brain metabolism. Simply 
put, even though an addict may have irregular brain metabolism and 
physiology, at the molecular realm of brain physiology, concepts such as 
addiction are meaningless.
In conclusion, the phenomenon of addiction is a third-order ontology, 
which can only be coenacted (brought-forth-in-the-world) when juxta-
posed with associated methodological variety and epistemological depth 
(Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010). The notion of epistemological distance highlights 
that some facts of addiction speak louder than others and some elements 
of addiction are only enacted within certain worldviews. Methodological 
variety refers to the fact that:
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The more epistemological distance and ontological complexity 
increase, the more methodological variety will increase. Thus, the 
more multiple an object becomes (the What), the more methods and 
disciplines you will need to study and make sense of it (the How), 
and the more perspectives there will be on what is or is not the 
nature of that object (the Who). (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010, p. 162)
IOP provides an ontological span and a pluralistic element, by clarifying 
the multiple object nature of addiction, whereas ontological complexity 
provides ontological depth by pointing out the various degrees of complexity 
each of these multiple objects can inhabit.
The value of an integral pluralism framework is that it provides a more 
accurate concept of how addiction is enacted—this right view lends itself 
to right action. The integral pluralism framework allows us to be more effi-
cient in dealing with the various realities of addiction. This is because the 
integral enactment theory provides a more precise view of how addiction 
comes into being. “It will take many years to flesh out the details of this 
approach, but integral theory already offers us a substantial platform from 
which to begin enacting Integral Pluralism and developing an Integral 
Enactment Theory” (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010, p. 165).
LENS-FIELD
To do justice to the total nature of man’s being-in-the-world, I believe the 
metaphor of a lens often used in integral theory is too restrictive and uni-
directional to symbolize the interdependent and coenactive nature of the 
epistemological/ontological/methodological pluralism it articulates. I prefer 
to use the metaphor of a “lens-field” epistemology when referring to ontic 
(in particular, human-being-in-the-world) phenomena, informed from the 
notion of field as described by philosopher-statesman Jan Smuts. Presaging 
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integral theory’s postmetaphysics,6 Smuts (1926) conceptualized his notion 
of “fields” in his remarkable proto-integral book, Holism and Evolution:
We have to return to the fluidity and plasticity of nature and 
experience in order to find the concepts of reality. When we do 
this we find that round every luminous point in experience there 
is a gradual shading off into haziness and obscurity. A “concept” is 
not merely its clear luminous centre, but embraces a surrounding 
sphere of meaning or influence of smaller or larger dimensions, in 
which the luminosity tails off and grows fainter until it disappears. 
Similarly a “thing” is not merely that which presents itself as such in 
clearest definite outline, but this central area is surrounded by a zone 
of intuitions and influences which shades off into the region of the 
indefinite. The hard abrupt contours of our ordinary conceptional 
system do not apply to reality and make reality inexplicable, not 
only in the case of causation, but in all cases of relations between 
things, qualities, and ideas. Conceive of a cause as a centre with a 
zone of activity or influence surrounding it and shading gradually 
off into indefiniteness . . . One of the most salutary reforms in 
6 Integral theory as developed by Ken Wilber (1995, 2000) and other integral scholars 
acknowledge many antecedent foundational influences, and proto-integral thinkers. 
Curiously, South African philosopher and Commonwealth statesman, General Jan 
Smuts’s (1926) theory of Holism is seldom acknowledged, although it has significantly 
contributed, albeit often implicitly, to the development of integral theory (Du Plessis, 
2010; Edwards, 2003; Du Plessis & Weathers, 2015). Furthermore, Smuts’s theory of 
holism also had a significant influence on scholars that integral thinkers point out as 
direct philosophical influences; though Smuts has been insufficiently acknowledged 
by contemporary integral scholars as an integral thinker in his own merit. It must be 
noted that Wilber (personal communication, July 21, 2009) does acknowledge Smuts’s 
book Holism and Evolution as having a significant influence on his early thinking, 
but has not indicated this sentiment in his writings. I have previously (Du Plessis & 
Weathers, 2015) argued that Smuts should be counted among one of the great pio-
neering integral thinkers of the 20th Century.
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thought which could be effected would be for people to accustom 
themselves to the ideal of fields, and to look upon every concrete 
thing or person or even abstract idea as merely a centre, surrounded 
by zones or aurae or spheres of the same nature as the centre, only 
more attenuated and shading off into indefiniteness. (pp. 17–19)
By using a lens-field epistemological metaphor and its relation to ontology, 
it highlights certain issues. Firstly, a lens-field enacts a specific ontological 
domain (or “luminous point”) of a phenomenon, depending on its method of 
enquiry. Secondly, the enacted ontological domain (always a partial abstrac-
tion of its complete ontic boundaries) is seen rather as a field with a center of 
gravity (luminous point) enacted by a specific epistemology and methodology. 
Each enacted ontology will contain the fields of all other possible enacted 
ontologies of the full possible ontological nature of the phenomenon.
In the discussion about IMP, it was highlighted that different episte-
mological lenses with their accompanying methodologies enact different 
ontological realities of addiction. It was further pointed out that, according 
to the principles of integral enactment, none of these lenses has epistemo-
logical priority. However, without giving any lens-field epistemological 
priority as such, addiction (in the context of an individual) as an ontological 
reality has a certain center of gravity (luminous point) that is more clearly 
articulated by certain lens-fields than by others.
CRITIQUE OF INTEGR AL THEORY
A discussion of integral theory would not be complete without pointing 
out some thoughtful critiques. What follows is a succinct discussion, as it 
is beyond the scope of this book to provide an in-depth critique.
One critique that has been leveled against the integral model (as with 
other metatheories) is that there are few assessment measures in place 
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for metatheory building. Science and the scientific method are chiefly 
linked with the empirical testing of theories rather than with their initial 
construction. Comparatively little programmatic research goes into the-
ory building. Edwards (2013) expressed the opinion that while there has 
been much progress in metadata analysis, the other metalevel branches of 
study, the move toward a system of metastudies is only at a nascent stage 
of development.
What Edwards (2013) indicated is that since the integral model is 
essentially a metatheory, there are few measures in place to assess if integral 
theory is effective in building overarching metatheories or even to assess if 
integral theory itself is constructed successfully. Therefore, a critique can 
certainly be made that there is little research to test the validity of integral 
theory’s metatheory building capacity as well as the soundness of its own 
metatheoretical foundation.
The neglec t of method
Edwards (2013) expressed the view that “the neglect of method” is the 
most glaring problem that metatheoretical research faces. Ritzer (1991) 
and Skinner (1985), among others, have pointed out that metatheorising 
is a common preliminary research activity, yet has not been formalized. 
When researchers conduct a literature review they often engage in certain 
features of metatheorising.
According to Edwards (2013), “Metatheorising is still largely done 
surreptitiously or seen as the poor cousin to the real scientific task of theory 
testing. One reason for this devaluing of metatheoretical research has been 
the lack of formal research methods for carrying out meta-level research” 
(pp. 182–183). In addition, Edwards pointed out that for metatheoretical 
research to be accepted as good science it must assume systematic methods, 
appropriate research designs, and meticulous forms of analysis.
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Idiosyncratic writ ing
Edwards (2008a, 2008b, 2013) has, in several articles, written about the 
weaknesses of the methodological approach used by Wilber (2006) as well 
as many other metatheorists because of the way in which they develop their 
overarching conceptual structures. He thus explained:
Wilber and many other metatheorists rely on traditional schol-
arship methods of essentially reading a broad, but idiosyncratic, 
selection of writings and research and then making of it what they 
will according to their own assumptions and predilections. This 
traditional approach is not adequate if metatheoretical research is 
to be taken seriously as a form of social science research. (Edwards, 
2013, p. 183)
Until the integral model develops a rigorous and methodological research 
activity it will, like many other metatheories, remain the idiosyncratic view 
of one visionary thinker and will have great difficulty in entering mainstream 
academia and being taken seriously by higher education institutions.
Epistemic fallacies
Murray (2010, 2011, 2012) made significant contributions in the field of 
integral theory by pointing out epistemic fallacies inherent in ontological 
schemes or models like integral theory. He astutely pointed out that integral 
theory needs to be packaged with an “indeterminacy analysis,” which he 
correctly indicated is the job of the knowledge-building community and 
not of the originating theorist. The critique of integral theory can be under-
stood as an indeterminacy analysis of integral theory’s capacity to build an 
integrated metatheory of addiction, and what I call its “enactive capacity”; 
the latter is a model’s inherent capacity to enact its observed ontological 
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reality faithfully. Emphasis, here, is placed on degree, for as postmodern 
approaches have pointed out, it is unlikely that any ontological scheme can 
faithfully enact any ontological reality, without some conceptual distortion 
or coloring.
Murray (2012) highlighted epistemic drives within integral theory:
Epistemic drives and various cognitive biases can lead to dis-
torted or demi-real interpretations of reality. Concepts and ideas 
can be located along several spectra such as abstraction, ‘ladder of 
inference’, or emergent levels of reality. The further a concept is from 
concrete reality and observations (the further the epistemological 
distance), along any of these spectra, the more indeterminacy is 
involved and the greater the risk that there will be a mismatch in 
the structural properties of the idea vs. the structural properties 
of reality. (p. 36)
Previous sections have emphasized the value of ontological pluralism 
in relation to integral enactment theory. Murray (2012) made the critique 
that as with other aspects of integral theory, ontological pluralism lends 
itself to a positivist approach. Murray expressed the opinion that theories 
like Wilber’s as well as the theories of other thinkers such as Bhaskar, 
Habermas, and Lakoff,
were born in response to deconstructivist and poststruc-
turalist approaches that, after rightly noting how knowledge is 
constructed and beliefs are strongly influenced by historical and 
sociocultural contingencies, went too far toward relativism and 
nihilism, completely dismissing the possibility of objective claims 
about reality. (p. 37)
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Murray (2012) believed that that they have overcompensated “in their 
attempts to counterbalance the postmodern trends” (p. 37) by moving too 
far from postmodern insights, and avoiding and acknowledging “a deep 
consideration of the fallibility of knowledge and the indeterminacy of core 
concepts” (p. 37). This particular critique, that integral theory has gone too 
far in countering postmodern theories, was suggested by the subtitle of 
Gary Hampson’s (2007) paper: “The [only] Way Out [of postmodernism] 
Is Through [it].”
Murray (2012) indicated how integral theory could “take some of its 
own medicine” by saying that:
Integral Pluralism uses the idea of Ontological Pluralism to 
describe the indeterminacy of some controversial objects, such as 
climate change. What I am suggesting here is that it is useful to apply 
the concepts of Ontological Pluralism and metaphorical pluralism 
to the core abstract categories that comprise the theory itself. (p. 37)
Murray (2012) said that although “Wilber does employ various epistemic 
forms (as implied in ‘tetra-enact’) to indicate that the concepts and models 
he uses do not have a simple categorical form” (p. 50), it must, however, 
be noted that “in the vast majority of his writing and dialogue, he uses 
the categories without such qualification” (p. 50) and “when he notes the 
non-simplicity of the constructs” (p. 50) it is “not the same as noting the 
indeterminacies and fallibilities of the constructs themselves” (p. 50). For 
instance, the concepts of “The True,” “the Good,” and “the Beautiful,” used 
by Wilber, often appear to be “given a foundational ontological status. But 
the True, the Good, and the Beautiful are metaphorical pluralisms that 
turn out to be difficult to pin down, and their meanings are contentious 
among philosophers” (Murray, p. 51).
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In summary, Murray (2012) is of the opnion that integral theory 
contains enormously valuable ideas worth propagating extensively, but 
“integral theory could be packaged with an ‘indeterminacy analysis’ and 
other self-critical and self-reflective ideas that would make it easier for 
intermediate and advanced learners and practitioners to avoid the pitfalls 
of simple categorizations” (p. 52). Murray’s statement has relevance for the 
project outlined in this book, and indicates that an indeterminacy anal-
ysis of the integral model will surely help to “avoid the pitfalls of simple 
categorisations” (p. 52) in attempting to develop a robust and functional 
integrated metatheory of addiction.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter I outlined how integral theory, in particular integral 
enactment theory, could possibly provide the conceptual architectonic for 
an integrative metatheory of addiction, which may assist with conceptual 
integration in the field of addiction studies.
The critiques raised against integral theory in this chapter are clearly 
valid, but they are not substantial enough to invalidate the use of integral 
theory in the development of an integrative metatheory of addiction.
In the next chapter I will explore how the five elements of the AQAL 
model can inform addiction treatment.
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C H A P T E R  4
I n t e g r a l  A d d i c t i o n  T r e a t m e n t
Since Copernicus, man seems to have got himself on an inclined plane—
now he is slipping faster and faster away from the center into—what? 
into nothingness? into a ‘penetrating sense of his nothingness?’ . . . . all 
science, natural as well as unnatural—which is what I call the self-cri-
tique of knowledge—has at present the object of dissuading man from his 
former respect for himself, as if this had been but a piece of bizarre conceit.
—Friedrich Nietzsche (1887/1969, pp. 155–156)
INTRODUCTIONT he conceptual chaos in the field of addiction research has direct implications for therapists working with addicted populations. 
For addiction treatment providers and therapists, it has become exceed-
ingly difficult to integrate this vast and conflicting field of knowledge into 
effective treatment and prevention protocols.
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Furthermore, it has been suggested that the low success rate for addiction 
treatment is because substance abuse programs apply partial and outdated 
treatment models (Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a, 2013; Jung, 2001; McPeak et 
al., 1991).
In this chapter7, I will explore how the five basic elements of integral 
theory (Wilber, 2000, 2006) or the AQAL model (AQAL representing all 
quadrants, all levels, all lines, all states and all types) can inform addiction 
treatment. I will outline how integral theory can lay the foundation for a 




According to integral theory, reality has at least four irreducible perspec-
tives, which must be consulted when attempting to fully understand any 
aspect of reality: the subjective, intersubjective, objective, and interobjective 
(Esbjörn-Hargens, 2009). These four universal perspectives are known as 
the quadrants. In previous articles, researchers have pointed out that any 
treatment program will be incomplete if it does not account for all four 
quadrants in its therapeutic understanding and design (Amodia et al., 2005; 
Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014a; Dupuy & Gorman, 2010; 
Dupuy & Morelli, 2007; Gorman, 2013; Shealy, 2009). In the following 
section of the chapter I will explore addiction and its treatment from each 
of these four perspectives.
7 The content of this chapter is adapted from previous publications, reprinted with 
permission (see Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a, 2012b).
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Figure 4: The quadrants. From “An Integral Guide to Recovery: Twelve Steps and 
Beyond”. Guy du Plessis, 2015, Tuscon, AZ: Integral Publishers, p. 14. Reprinted 
with permission.
Upper-Right Quadrant
In attempting to understand addiction and recovery through exploring 
objective aspects of an individual—from the upper-right quadrant perspec-
tive—we notice all the positivistic and objective perspectives of individual 
structures, events, behaviors, and processes (Marquis, 2008).
From this perspective, addiction is viewed as dysfunctional brain physiol-
ogy. Addiction affects the mesolimbic system of the brain, the area where our 
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instinctual drives and our ability to experience emotions and pleasure reside. 
The medial forebrain bundle, popularly known as the “pleasure pathway” 
is in this area (Brick & Erickson, 1999). The pleasure pathway of the brain 
is “hijacked” by the chronic use of drugs or compulsive addictive behavior. 
As a result of the consequent neurochemical dysfunction, the individual 
perceives the drug as a life-supporting necessity, much like breathing or 
meeting the demands of thirst or hunger (Brick & Erickson, 1999).
As addiction affects both physical and neurological well-being, an 
effective recovery model needs to address these areas. Holford, Miller, and 
Braly (2008) emphasized the importance of diet and nutritional supple-
ments in treating addictions and in the maintenance of recovery. Holford 
et al. believed that most addicts suffer from reward deficiency, which is a 
neurochemical imbalance in brain chemistry that translates into negative 
emotions such as anxiety, feelings of emptiness, and hypersensitivity. Many 
addicts have deficiencies in brain chemistry even prior to their addiction. 
There are many factors that can create a reward-deficient brain chemistry 
such as genetics, prenatal conditioning, malnutrition, stress, lack of sleep, 
physical or emotional trauma, and the long-term use of mood-altering 
substances. If not rectified, this brain chemistry deficiency will continue 
indefinitely through an addict’s recovery period, resulting in recovering 
addicts being prone to relapse, even though they are abstinent and doing 
psycho-spiritual work. The symptoms of reward deficiency only abate when 
the neurochemical imbalance is corrected. Erickson (1989) suggested that 
for treatment to be effective, a combined physiological and psychological 
approach is required and without improving an addict’s neurophysiology, 
treatment is often fruitless or incomplete.
It is indubitable that addiction has a significant biological compo-
nent, but to reduce addiction to neurophysiology (for example the “brain 
disease” model) is a gross error. The reason this way of thinking is so 
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readily accepted is that it is congruent with the prevailing scientific 
materialistic worldview that dominates most analyses of addiction and 
human behavior. Simply put, viewing addiction primarily as biology is 
making an error in assigning addiction an ontological status that is not 
befitting of its true complexity.
Upper-Lef t Quadrant
Exploring addiction and recovery from the Upper-Left Quadrant perspective 
includes the subjective dimensions of individual consciousness. Addiction 
wreaks havoc in the addict’s inner phenomenal world and has disastrous 
consequences for the addict cognitively, existentially, and emotionally. The 
addict starts to lose control of his or her inner world as the “addict voice” 
becomes progressively louder. Addiction is progressive and will eventually 
negatively alter the interior phenomenal world of the addict. Nakken (1998) 
expressed the view that addiction develops from a definite, though often 
seemingly indistinct beginning, towards a specific end-point. The end-point 
of the addictive process is complete control of the self by the illness.
Addicts are known to have turbulent and overwhelming inner worlds. 
From a psychodynamic perspective, addiction is often referred to as an 
attempt at self-medicating the addict’s painful and confused inner world 
(Khantzian, 1999). Owing to defects in ego and self-capacities, the sub-
stance of choice becomes the addict’s main method of mood management, 
which temporarily restores inner equilibrium. Flores (1997) believes that 
addiction can be
viewed as a misguided attempt at self-repair. Because of unmet 
developmental needs, certain individuals will be left with an injured, 
enfeebled, uncohesive, or fragmented self . . . alcohol, drugs, and 
other external sources of gratification (i.e., food, sex, work, etc.) take 
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on a regulating function while creating a false sense of autonomy, 
independence, and denial of need for others. (p. 233)
Therefore, an essential component of recovery is learning healthy ways 
to self-soothe and to cope with stress (Khantzian, 1999; Levin, 1995). If 
not addressed, these individuals will continue to seek dysfunctional ways 
to deal with their turbulent inner worlds, ineffective object-relations, and 
unresolved trauma (Flores, 1997).
A vital component of a comprehensive therapeutic protocol is some 
form of psychotherapeutic process that deals with unresolved trauma, 
family-of-origin issues, shadow work, and the building of emotional lit-
eracy. According to Ulman and Paul (2006), psychotherapy can serve as a 
transitional self-object, dispensing functions that serve as “psychopharmaco- 
therapeutic” relief. In other words, a psychotherapist can replace the faulty 
self-object-like functioning of a client’s drug of choice, and help the client 
to reexperience “archaic moods of narcissistic bliss” (Ulman & Paul, 2006) 
in a therapeutic, rather than an addictive fashion: “Such an altered state of 
consciousness may eventually supersede and supplant an addicted patient’s 
dependence on an addictive state of mind” (p. 63).
In a letter addressed to Bill Wilson, the cofounder of AA, Carl Jung 
wrote: “You see, alcohol in Latin is spiritus and you use the same word for 
the highest religious experience as well as for the most depraving poison. 
The helpful formula therefore is: spiritus contra spiritum” (as cited in Kurtz & 
Ketcham, 2002, p. 118). Jung was pointing out to Wilson that at the heart of 
a cure for alcoholism there often is a spiritual transformation, because he also 
believed that the thirst for alcohol “was the equivalent, on a low level, of the 
spiritual thirst of our being for wholeness, expressed in medieval language: 
the union with God” (Jung, as cited in Kurtz & Ketcham, p. 113). Due 
to the influence of Carl Jung and others such as William James, AA and 
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subsequent Twelve Step groups have seen the need for healthy spirituality 
as a central component of the recovery process (Kurtz & Ketcham, 2002).8
Rioux (1996) illustrated how certain spiritual healing techniques can 
play a role in a holistic addiction counseling approach as they focus on inner 
realities that produce harmony and self-wholeness. Winkelman (2001) fur-
ther suggested that spiritual practices can also free addicts from ego-bound 
emotions and provide balance for conflicting internal energies. Spiritual 
practices can help addicts achieve a sense of wholeness to counter the sense 
of self-loss, which lies at the core of addictive dynamics. These practices 
enhance self-esteem by providing connectedness beyond the egoic self, with a 
“higher power of your understanding” as suggested in Twelve Step programs.
Addicts often relate that the initial pull toward drugs was the perceived 
meaningless of their own lives and the instant sense of meaning that drugs 
as well as drug culture provided. Jungian analyst Luigi Zoja is of the opinion 
that “one often turns to drugs because of the insignificance, senseless and 
flatness of one’s present life, a dead and senseless thing fuelled by solely 
reflex action” (1989, p. 58). Viktor Frankl (1953), the founder of logother-
apy, said a human being’s most basic motivation is to find meaning in life. 
He believed other motivations are secondary to this primary motivation 
and lack of such purpose leads to a sense of frustration, emptiness, and in 
some cases, addiction.
8 The centrality of spirituality in current treatment programs can be problematic. 
Underlying these spiritually-orientated treatment approaches is a belief that a suc-
cessful recovery program must contain a spiritual component and that spirituality is 
an innate feature of our being-in-the-world. I believe this view is misguided. I do not 
want to underplay the usefulness or even the necessity of spirituality in many peo-
ple’s lives, but I do not believe that spirituality is ontological in the sense that it is an 
essential need, but rather an essential need underlies it—the need for personal and 
global meaning. Spirituality or religion is often a vehicle for this need, but personal 
and global meaning can also be found within a secular worldview. For those with a 
secular worldview or for those not inclined toward spiritual/religious practice, any pur-
suit(s) that provides meaning is adequate to satisfy their existential need for meaning. 
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Lower-Lef t Quadrant
Understanding addiction and recovery from the Lower-Left Quadrant, 
the “we” space or perspective includes the intersubjective dimension of the 
collective (Marquis, 2008). Addiction progressively erodes relationships 
and is often caused by eroded relationships. Addiction may be viewed as 
an intimacy disorder as addicts often have an inability to form healthy 
intimate relationships (Carnes, 2008).
Eventually, many addicts undergo a cultural shift and enter the world 
of addiction with its own rules and cultural norms. Addicts find themselves 
in a new culture where their addictive behaviors are accepted and often 
encouraged. “The physiological, psychological, and spiritual transformations 
that accompany the person-drug relationship occur within and are shaped 
by the culture of addiction” (William White, 1996, p. xxiii).
William Burroughs (as cited in White, 1996) said the following about 
heroin addiction: “Junk is not just a habit. It is a way of life. When you give up 
junk, you give up a way of life” (p. 2). It is these cultural and relational aspects 
of addiction, this way of life, that many addicts find the hardest to give up. Any 
form of treatment that does not acknowledge and understand the principles 
behind the culture of addiction as well as the need for a healthy recovery culture 
is bound to be ineffective. “Addiction and recovery are more than something 
that happens inside someone. Each involves deep human needs in interaction 
with a social environment. For addicts, addiction provides a valued cocoon where 
these needs can be, and historically have been met” (White, 1996, p. xxvi).
Scholars who support the self-medication hypothesis believe that 
addicts often suffer from defects in their psychic structure as a result of 
poor relationships when they were young (Flores, 1997; Khantzian et al., 
1990; Levin, 1995). This leaves them prone to seek external sources of 
gratification such as drugs, sex, food, and work in later life (Kohut, 1971, 
1977). Khantzian (1999) asserted that “substance abusers are predisposed to 
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become dependent on drugs because they suffer with psychiatric disturbances 
and painful affect states. Their distress and suffering is the consequence of 
defects in ego and self capacities which leave such behaviour” (p. 1).
For addicts to develop a healthy and stable sense of self, they need to be 
in a supportive and knowledgeable social environment. The addict’s psychic 
troubles are born from poor relationships and can only be modified through 
new relationships (Khantzian, 1999 Kohut, 1977; Kurtz, 1982). Some 
object-relation theorists believe Twelve Step fellowships provide the ideal 
social environment for addicts to heal their psychic deficits (Flores, 1997).
Lower-Right Quadrant
Exploring addiction and recovery from the Lower-Right Quadrant includes the 
interobjective perspective of systems, addressing observable aspects of societies 
such as economic structures, civic resources, and geopolitical infrastructures 
(Marquis, 2008). Addiction affects this realm profoundly. Addicts often lose 
their jobs, get evicted, get into trouble with the law, and may be incarcerated. 
While there are many acultural addicts who manage to keep their jobs and have 
financial stability, for the majority of addicts this quadrant is severely compromised.
The culture of addiction has its own infrastructure—crack houses, bars, 
night clubs, casinos, strip clubs, and such. As addicts progressively migrate 
from one culture to the next, they start spending more time within the infra-
structure of addiction culture. The more addicts frequent and live within the 
infrastructure of the culture of addiction, the more their behavior is normalized, 
which ultimately reinforces their denial of the problem. An essential component 
of treatment is addressing the damage done by addiction in this quadrant.
Lines of Development
According to integral theory, each aspect of the quadrants has distinct 
capacities that progress developmentally; these are known as lines of 
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development (Esbjörn-Hargens, 2009). Wilber (2000) has theorized that 
each person has multiple lines of development, similar to Howard Gardner’s 
(1993) conception of multiple intelligences. Each quadrant comprises many 
lines of development; for example, the Upper-Left Quadrant includes cog-
nitive, emotional intelligence, spiritual, moral, interpersonal, and so forth. 
Although the concept of multiple lines of development is a nondominant 
notion in developmental psychology and empirical proof for separate lines 
of development is inconclusive, it nevertheless remains a useful clinical 
metaphor (Forman, 2010; Ingersoll & Zeitler, 2010).
A lines of development perspective highlights the fact that an individu-
al’s recovery process has distinct, yet interrelated, components that can be at 
different stages of development. Viewing the recovery process from a lines of 
development perspective provides insight for therapists and clients as to what 
aspects of the client’s recovery program is doing well and what can be improved.
Stages of Development
An individual’s lines of development can be understood to fluctuate through a 
sequence of developmental altitudes, known in integral theory as stages or levels 
of development (Wilber, 2006). An insight into addiction and recovery from a 
stage perspective is imperative for truly all-inclusive understanding and treatment 
(Du Plessis, 2010, 2012a; Dupuy & Gorman, 2010; Dupuy & Morelli, 2007).
A therapist could incorporate three types of developmental stage models 
into his or her therapeutic orientation. The first is the client’s general stage 
of development (Cook-Greuter, 2004; Gruber & Voneche, 1977; Wilber, 
2006). A client’s overall development or center of gravity “is a key factor in 
treatment planning, profoundly influencing which categories of intervention 
are likely to be optimal, neutral, or contraindicated” (Marquis, 2009, p. 18). 
The second type is the client’s stage of change as defined by the transtheo-
retical model of intentional behaviour change (DiClemente & Prochaska, 
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1998). Finally, the third type is the general attitude of a client to recovery 
based on clean time and stage of recovery using recovery-based develop-
mental approaches (Bowden & Gravitz, 1998; Du Plessis, 2012b; Nakken, 
1998; Whitfield, 1991). Depending on the client’s stages of development, 
























































































Figure 5: Developmental models of addiction and recovery. From “Integrated 
Recovery Therapy: Toward an integrally informed individual psychotherapy for 
addicted populations,” by Guy du Plessis, 2012a, Journal of Integral Theory and 
Practice, 7(1), p. 130. Reprinted with permission.
An Integr al Foundation For Addiction Treatment82 
In Figure 5, the developmental model used in integral theory, devel-
opmental models of addiction and recovery, as well as my own composite 
developmental model is depicted (Du Plessis, 2012b). Although the stages 
of addiction and recovery may be better understood as chronological stages 
or phases, there may be a correlation between the stage model as articulated 
in integral theory and the various stages (or phases) of recovery models. 
Simply put, earlier stages of recovery may correlate with early developmental 
stages and later stages of recovery may correlate with more complex devel-
opmental stages. The figure is a simplification of the developmental stages 
at which a client’s “center of recovery gravity” can possibly rest. It must be 
noted that the figure is speculative regarding how the stages of recovery 
and addiction relate to other developmental models, and is best used as a 
clinical metaphor.
Recover y Stages
The stages of recovery indicated on the far right in Figure 5 are understood 
in the following way: Early stage recovery refers to the stage where the focus 
is on abstinence and relapse prevention.
Middle-stage recovery is where the focus is on working through various 
psychological issues and behavior patterns that often predate the onset of 
addiction. In this stage of recovery, many addicts also begin to work on 
codependency issues, relationship issues, and behavioral addictions, which 
tend to surface once their substance abuse has been addressed.
High-altitude stage recovery is perhaps best understood as an exis-
tentially-oriented stage, where the recovering addict is faced with life and 
social concerns that transcend issues related to addiction. At this stage, the 
distinction between addict and nonaddict begins to fall away. A recovery 
lifestyle will share similarities with the lifestyle of any individual at a 
similar stage of development. This is also the stage where the concept of 
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fellowship begins to have a much more inclusive scope than merely Twelve 
Step fellowships.
The transpersonal stage of recovery can be understood as a stage that 
requires a special type of practice and orientation to attain. This develop-
mental stage of recovery is normally reserved for those that have engaged 
in a significant amount of contemplative practices.
Clinical social worker and researcher Gary Nixon (2012) has written 
extensively about stages of recovery and suggested that the recovery process 
can be understood in three stages, similar to my addiction/recovery stage 
model discussed above. In Stage 1, the focus is on abstinence from alcohol 
and drugs. This stage correlates with what I refer to as early stage recovery. 
In Stage 2, similar to my middle stage recovery,
The behavioral abstinence of stage one recovery can be enhanced 
by working through a range of prepersonal and personal emotional 
issues of stage two recovery, such as dissolving the false core driver 
and reestablishing basic trust, reintegrating the shadow, dismantling 
the internal critic, burning though social anxiety and co-depen-
dency patterns, dismantling the crystallized ego, and embracing 
existential issues of meaning and authenticity. (Nixon, 2012, p. 245)
In Stage 3, which I call the transpersonal stage of recovery (see Figure 
5), Nixon (2012) applied Wilber’s ego-transcendence transpersonal levels, 
and points out that:
Clients learn to let go of their separate self egos in each 
moment to embrace nondual living and become fully integrated 
beings. The long journey of transformation turns from the ini-
tial descent of addiction to a wondrous beingness of moment to 
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moment existence for the person who has now fully embraced 
stage three recovery. (p. 245)
In my addiction/recovery developmental model, as pointed out previ-
ously, I included a level of development referred to as high-altitude stage 
recovery between Nixon’s Stage 2 and Stage 3 of recovery.
What Nixon (2012) referred to as Stage 1 and Stage 2 recovery, and 
what I refer to as early- and middle-stage recovery, is fairly well-articulated 
in recovery literature and there is significant guidance for those at these 
stages. On the other hand, there is very little guidance for those who are at a 
high-altitude stage or for those at a Stage 3/transpersonal stage of recovery. 
At a high-altitude stage and at a Stage 3/transpersonal stage of recovery, it 
now becomes the recovering addict’s responsibility to seek guidance beyond 
the confines of traditional recovery literature and fellowship. There are many 
communities and teachers that can assist in these stages of development. 
The integral community is one such example. It is encouraging to see, for 
many recovering addicts entering these stages of development, that there 
is recovery literature emerging that is beginning to address these higher 
stages of recovery.9
A drawback of not viewing the recovery journey from a developmental 
perspective is thinking that recovery is about reaching the “recovery nirvana,” 
often referred to as “serenity” in Twelve Step fellowships. This is not to say 
that recovering addicts do not become more serene, but rather that there is 
no final place of “ultimate serenity.” Developmental theories enlighten us to 
the fact that each new stage brings forth its own rewards, challenges, and 
possible pathologies. Moreover, each new stage requires more sophisticated 
9 See Gary Nixon’s book, The Sun Rises in the Evening, John Dupuy’s book, Integral 
Recovery, Robert Weathers’ soon-to-be published book, Plural Recovery: Integrally 
Informed Therapy and Relapse Prevention for Couples, and my book, An Integral Guide 
to Recovery: Twelve Steps and Beyond.
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recovery technology to be able to navigate the new stage adequately. If we 
look at this phenomenon from a developmental perspective, it is obvious 
why: The recovery practices, which worked at a previous stage will not be 
effective at a new stage. They may still have many benefits, but they need 
to be augmented to be effective at the higher recovery stage.
States of Consciousness
“In addition to levels and lines there are also various kind of states associated 
with each quadrant. States are temporary occurrences of aspects of reality” 
(Esbjörn-Hargens, 2009, p. 13). Understanding addiction and recovery 
from a state perspective may be one of the missing links in contemporary 
addiction treatment programs’ attempts to create sustainable treatment 
protocols. Addicts are obviously experts on states. Using substances or 
engaging in any mind-altering behavior is an attempt to create an altered 
state of consciousness (ASC), and the specific psychoactive effect of various 
drugs and mind-altering behavior creates various types of ASCs (Milkman 
& Sunderworth, 2010). It follows that viewing addiction in terms of an 
ASC perspective is crucial for a complete understanding of the nature of 
addiction (Winkelman, 2001).
Some researchers have argued that the majority of addiction treat-
ment programs fail to integrate a huge body of literature that highlights 
the therapeutic benefits for addicts in experiencing ASCs. They propose 
that a principal reason for the high relapse rate in treatment programs is 
the failure of those programs to address the basic need to achieve ASCs 
(McPeak et al., 1991). Some scholars believe that humans have an innate 
drive to seek ASCs (e.g., McPeak et al., 1991; Weil, 1972; Winkelman, 
2001; K. Wilber, personal communication, January 13, 2011). They believe 
that addicts follow a normal human motive to achieve ASCs, but they use 
maladaptive methods because they are not provided with the opportunity 
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to learn “constructive alternative methods for experiencing non-ordinary 
consciousness” (McPeak, as cited in Winkelman, 2001, p. 340). From this 
viewpoint, substance use is not understood as a pathology, but rather as a 
yearning to have a basic human need met.
AA acknowledges the importance of an alteration of consciousness for 
recovery to be effective: It calls for “a new state of consciousness and being” 
(Alcoholics Anonymous, 1987, p. 106) designed to replace the self-destructive 
pursuit of alcohol-induced states with a healthier life-enhancing approach. 
AA advocates meditation, a change in consciousness, and spiritual awak-
ening as fundamental to achieve and maintain sobriety.
Blum (1995) expressed the opinion that addicts often have a neurologi-
cally based inability to experience pleasant feelings within simple life expe-
riences and suggested that a neurological-normalizing shift may happen as a 
result of neurotherapy, which rectifies the endless quest for neurotransmitter 
balance; the latter is explained in his reward deficiency syndrome model.
Every human being engages in various activities to feel good. Feeling 
good and avoiding unnecessary pain are universal needs. To feel good, 
we seek out activities that alter our brain chemistry. Addiction can be 
understood as this normal need gone awry. Milkman and Sunderworth 
(2010) stated, “In light of the seemingly universal need to seek out altered 
states, it behooves researchers, educators, parents, politicians, public health 
administrators, and treatment practitioners to promote healthy means to 
alter brain chemistry” (p. 6). Addicts have found a dysfunctional way to 
meet this innate need through substances or certain behaviors to which they 
become addicted. Addicts normally have three dominant ways of seeking 
comfort and altering their consciousness:
We repeatedly pursue three avenues of experience as antidotes for 
psychic pain. These preferred styles of coping—satiation, arousal, and 
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fantasy—may have their origins in the first years of life. Childhood 
experiences combined with genetic predisposition are the founda-
tions of adult compulsion. The drug group of choice —depressants, 
stimulants, or hallucinogens—is the one that best fits the individual’s 
characteristic way of coping with stress or feelings of unworthiness. 
People do not become addicted to drugs or mood-altering activities as 
such, but rather to the satiation, arousal, or fantasy experiences that 
can be achieved through them. (Milkman & Sunderworth, p. 19)
The quotation above clearly points to the need for addicts in recovery 
to find healthy behaviors and activities to manifest their preferred coping 
style since this preferred coping style (satiation, arousal, or fantasy) often 
correlates with their drug of choice (Du Plessis, 2012a).
Types
“The notion of types in the Integral model describes the diverse styles 
that a person (UL or LL) may use to translate or construct reality within 
a given stage of development” (Forman, 2010, p. 231). Esbjörn-Hargens 
(2009) added, “Types are the variety of consistent styles that arise in var-
ious domains and occur irrespective of developmental levels. As with the 
other elements, types have expression in all four quadrants” (p. 15). We 
can, therefore, have various classifications of different types in the context 
of addiction and recovery in each of the four quadrants: types of substance 
use disorders such as alcohol use disorder, stimulant use disorder, opioid 
use disorder; types of cultural enmeshment, for example acultural, bicul-
tural, and culturally enmeshed; types of dual-diagnosis; types of kinship 
in subcultures; DSM-5 disorder types; and many more.
The usefulness of viewing addiction and recovery from a typology per-
spective is illustrated in the following two examples. First, in the discussion 
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of states, we see that among addicts there are typically three different types 
of coping styles, namely, satiation, arousal, or fantasy that correlate with 
their drug of choice: depressants, stimulants, or hallucinogens.
Figure 6: Typologies in the quadrants
Milkman and Sunderworth (2010) stated, “After studying the life 
histories of drug abusers, we have seen that drugs of choice are harmonious 
with an individual’s usual means of coping with stress” (p. 19). Applying this 
simple typology to a client’s drug of choice informs the therapist regarding a 
number of important factors. It enables the therapist to identify the client’s 
primary mode of stress reduction by correlating it to his or her drug of choice. 
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When in recovery, the client will continue to use a preferred coping style 
and will be attracted to activities that produce a similar effect to his or her 
drug of choice. For example, an amphetamine user will likely be attracted 
to high-risk, physically demanding activities that are stimulating.
Another useful typology is the bioself-psychological typology of addic-
tion of Ulman and Paul (2006), which is a synthesis of the self-psychological 
and biological-psychiatric versions of bipolarity. Kohut (as cited in Ulman 
and Paul, 2006) whose concept of the bipolar self, represents the foundation 
for Ulman and Paul’s model stated:
The self should be conceptualized as a lifelong arc linking two 
polar sets of experiences: on one side, a pole of ambitions related 
to the original grandiosity as it was affirmed by the mirroring 
self-object, more often the mother; on the other side, a pole of 
idealizations, the person’s realized goals, which, particularly in 
the boy though not always, are laid down from the original rela-
tionship to the self-object that is represented by the father and his 
greatness. (p. 30)
In the bioself-psychological typology, addiction is understood as a 
psychological end result of developmental arrest in the bipolarity of the 
formation of the self. Biological psychiatrists, in their conception of bipolar 
spectrum disorder, devote considerable attention to depression and mania 
as they manifest in this disorder. These mood disorders correlate with dis-
orders of the bipolar self as understood by Kohut (in Ulman & Paul, 2006):
In general, a disturbance in the pole of grandiosity may find 
expression in either an empty, depleted depression or, in contrast, 
in over-expansive and over-exuberant mania or hypomania; whereas 
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a disturbance in the pole of omnipotence may appear in either 
depressive disillusionment and disappointment in the idealized 
or, in contrast, in manic (or hypomanic) delusions of superhuman 
physical and/or mental powers. We maintain that an individual 
maybe subject to specific outcomes resulting from a disturbance in 
either or both of these poles of the self. (pp. 395–396)
Owing to the specific accompanying mood disorder of each of the possible 
disturbances of the poles of the self, individuals will be attracted to certain 
psychoactive substances, which can be understood as an unconscious attempt 
at rectifying a specific deficit in self and coping style (Ulman & Paul, 2006).
There are many personality types that can be applied in the context 
of addiction and recovery. One example is that of feminine and masculine 
types. “When we speak of ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ we are not necessar-
ily speaking of biological ‘male’ or ‘female’. Rather we are referring to a 
spectrum of attitudes, behaviors, cognitive styles, and emotional energies” 
(Dupuy & Morelli, 2007, p. 37). The psychoactive properties of drugs 
and even aspects of process addictions can have a masculine or feminine 
“voice.” “Downers” such as tranquilizers, barbiturates, and heroin can be 
understood as having a feminine voice, and moreover, addictions such as 
codependency, love addiction, certain aspects of sex addiction, and certain 
aspects of gambling (particularly slot machines) have a similar voice. On 
the other hand, “uppers” such as cocaine, methamphetamine, and process 
addictions such as certain high-risk aspects of sex addiction and gambling 
(especially gamblers who play tables) have a more masculine voice (Du 
Plessis, 2010, 2012a).
Using the masculine and feminine typology, we can see how the psy-
chopharmacological properties of certain classes of psychoactive substances 
correlate with masculine and feminine typologies (i.e., depressants/feminine 
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and stimulants/masculine), and how these poles of the self can also be classi-
fied within a masculine and feminine typology (pole of grandiosity/feminine 
and pole of idealizations/masculine). We can, therefore, see how certain 
“masculine” or “feminine” drugs act as a structural prosthesis in an attempt 
to rectify dysfunctional masculine or feminine poles of the self and coping 
styles (Du Plessis, 2010). Furthermore, I have observed that there seems to 
be a correlation between the quality of an addict’s early relationships with 
their caregivers and their drug(s) of choice (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1977).
Understanding the voice of the addiction can help in choosing an 
appropriate therapeutic treatment plan. Furthermore, some addictions 
only function in the dialectic between the masculine and feminine voices, 
that is, the alcoholic and the codependent enabler, the dance of the love 
addict and the love avoidant. It is important for the treatment professional 
to know which voice has become pathological and to bring that voice back 
into healthy balance.
TOWARD AN INTEGR AL META-THER APY
Applying an integral foundation to therapy is not the same as methodol-
ogy. An integral framework merely provides the conceptual scaffolding 
for a therapist, but does not indicate what methodology to use. It merely 
illuminates the territory. It would be inaccurate to think that an integral 
framework is going to improve poor therapeutic skills or make inadequate 
methodologies effective. Therefore, applying integral theory to therapy is 
best understood as a meta-therapy, in the sense that it provides a multiper-
spectival and metatheoretical perspective of the therapeutic process when 
guiding addicted clients in their recovery process.
As shown in this chapter, an integral meta-therapy will apply the five 
conceptual lenses of integral theory in the therapeutic process. An inte-
gral meta-therapy for addicted populations will have two main features, 
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paradigmatic and metaparadigmatic. The paradigmatic aspect refers to the 
recognition, compilation, and implementation of various methodologies 
in a comprehensive and inclusive manner. The metaparadigmatic aspect 
refers to the capacity to weave together, relate, and integrate the various 
paradigmatic practices.
The paradigmatic aspect refers to all therapies and recovery practices 
available to and practiced by the client. This is similar to:
Integral Transformative Practices (ITP), wherein a full range 
of human potentials are simultaneously engaged and exercised in 
order to enact and bring forth any higher states and stages of human 
potential, leading individuals through their own legitimating crisis 
to an increase in authenticity. (Wilber, 2006, p. 13)
The therapist applies therapies and recommends practices that clients 
apply and practice that are appropriate for their current recovery altitude 
and stage of change (DiClemente & Prochaska, 1998). For example, a 
client in early recovery and at a precontemplation stage of change will be 
assigned certain practices appropriate for his recovery altitude as well as 
practices that will help the client to move from a precontemplation to a 
contemplation stage of change (DiClemente & Prochaska, 1998). The client’s 
recovery altitude and stage of change as well as his or her general stage of 
development must be considered when choosing appropriate therapies and 
recovery practices (Wilber, 2006).
The metaparadigmatic aspect refers to its capacity to weave together as 
well as relate various recovery paradigms to each other. The therapist, by 
applying integral theory, “generates a meta-practice of honoring, including, 
and integrating the fundamental paradigms and methodologies of the major 
forms of human inquiry” (Wilber, 2006, p. 16). From this metaparadigmatic 
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perspective, the therapist acknowledges that all the available recovery-based 
therapies and recovery practices potentially may have value in their client’s 
recovery when applied at the right time. Furthermore, the therapist is then 
able to observe how certain therapies and recovery practices relate to and 
strengthen each other when practiced concurrently. The therapist is then 
able to orchestrate these recovery paradigms in their client’s process.10 
Moreover, the therapist also assists clients to achieve a metaperspective on 
their own recovery process.
In short, an integrally informed therapist constantly functions from a 
paradigmatic and metaparadigmatic perspective, therefore, working in an 
comprehensive and nonexclusive way with his or her clients, while keeping 
a metaperspective on the interrelatedness and relevance of the recovery 
paradigms simultaneously in operation in his or her client’s process.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we explored how the five basic elements of integral theory 
can inform our understanding of addiction and its treatment. I outlined a 
tentative proposal for how an integral meta-therapy can be developed, and 
discussed its paradigmatic and metaparadigmatic features.
In the next chapter, I provide a brief overview of my own application 
of an integral meta-therapy, called integrated recovery meta-therapy.
10 What may be useful to develop in the future is a taxonomy of recovery-based 
interventions, similar to the integral taxonomy of therapeutic interventions (ITTI) as 
devised by Andre Marquis (2009).
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C H A P T E R  5
I n t e g r a t e d  R e c o v e r y  M e t a - T h e r a p y
Addiction, whatever its form, has always been a desperate search, on a 
false and hopeless path, for the fulfilment of human freedom.
—Medard Boss (1983, p. 283)
INTRODUCTIONI n this chapter, I provide a succinct overview of my own applica-tion of an integral meta-therapy, known as integrated recovery 
meta-therapy (IRMt). IRMt is a meta-therapy in the sense that it provides 
a big-picture or overarching framework for the therapeutic process with 
addicted populations.
It is not the aim of the IRMt framework to be specific as to what 
techniques a therapist must employ, but rather to provide an orienting 
metaframework of the therapeutic scope and process when working with 
addicted populations, with the aim that no essential area or process is left 
out. Yet it must be noted that, as therapists, we are dealing with the immense 
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complexity of another human being that will ultimately remain only partly 
intelligible to us. The aim of IRMt is simply to make it more intelligible 
than it would be without a metatheoretical framework, to provide stronger 
headlights for navigating the recovery journey of a client.
To assist this journey, I have designed visual aids/templates that pro-
vide a structure that affords the therapist and client a shared language, 
and further supplies a way to track progress or lack of progress. It is based 
on the simple premise that if a recovering addict is engaging in the right 
practices and developing a recovery-orientated lifestyle then they will likely 
have a sustainable recovery. It is also important to note IRMt becomes more 
useful as a meta-therapy once a recovering addict has a stabilized recovery. 
In short, IRMt is more suitable for those clients that have completed the 
primary/acute phase of their treatment and for those that acknowledge their 
addiction and need for a recovery program.
I this chapter, I provide an overview on how to assist a client in com-
piling an integrated recovery program and to develop a recovery lifestyle. 
A more detailed discussion of the integrated recovery approach can be 
found in my book, An Integral Guide to Recovery: Twelve Steps and Beyond 
(Du Plessis, 2015a).11
IRMt is principally informed by two philosophical foundations. The 
first is an existential foundation that defines our being-in-the-world or our 
recovery-in-the-world, and the second, an overarching metatheoretical 
foundation informed by integral theory. Although integral theory includes 
11 A previous version of IRMt was called Integrated Recovery Therapy (Du Plessis, 2012b, 
2015), and also included mindfulness-based interventions, positive psychology, and 
Twelve Step philosophy as part of its theoretical foundation. I have made adjustments 
to my original approach to keep the foundation metatheoretical, and have not included 
specific methodological orientations. It is up to the therapist to apply methodology; 
IRMt merely provides a metatheoretical orientation. It must be added that I view IRMt 
as open-ended, in the sense that it is a project that is in continuous development, 
therefore open to incorporate critique and adapt its foundational perspectives. 
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an existential perspective (among many others), in its metatheoretical orien-
tation, it is important to make the existential foundation of IRMt explicit. I 
have discussed how to apply integral theory in the context of addiction and 
recovery in the previous chapter and it is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss 
it any further. In the next section, I will briefly articulate the existential 
foundation of IRMt.
EXISTENTIAL FOUNDATION
The term existential foundation can be misleading if not defined. In this book, 
an existential foundation refers to the insights of existential philosophy, 
existential phenomenology, existential psychology, and existential therapy.12
It is beyond the scope of this book to provide a comprehensive discus-
sion of an existential perspective of addiction and recovery, and I will only 
focus on some aspects that are relevant to IRMt.
In the following section, I briefly explain what these terms mean and 
how I interpreted them as part of the existential foundation of IRMt. 
Please note that these are my interpretations of an existential approach 
to addiction and recovery; other scholars may have significantly different 
interpretations. Before I proceed in discussing the various influences of the 
existential foundation of IRMt, I will briefly articulate the importance of 
an existential foundation for understanding addiction.
Why an Existential Foundation
Most of the models of addiction discussed in the previous chapters have 
as their foundation a natural scientific worldview and positivistic method-
ology, which are typically adequate for exploring phenomena that exist on 
12 The existential foundation that informs IRMt is derived from many existential 
philosophy and psychology schools of thought, but Medard Boss’s approach of 
Daseinsanalysis is the primary influence.
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a certain level of ontological complexity: primarily denoting the physical 
realm. However, such models are hopelessly inadequate in explaining 
complex phenomena such as addiction or any human behavior, which exist 
on higher levels of ontological complexity. For example, reward deficiency 
syndrome can only be understood as one of many possible physiological risks 
that interact with other aspects of being human, without having to reduce 
human behavior and motivation to neurotransmitter levels. Simply put, even 
though an addict may have altered neurotransmitter levels, concepts such 
as addiction are meaningless at the molecular realm of brain physiology. 
To talk at molecular level about addiction is like saying that an amoeba, 
which only primarily exists in a primitive level of ontological complexity, 
has abandonment issues originating from poor object relations.
Existential psychiatrist Medard Boss (1983) pointed out that the nat-
ural scientific method has its limitations in explaining the human realm as 
it originated from and is only sovereign in the nonhuman realm (natural 
sciences). He is of the opinion that “they largely overlook how radically the 
nature of their object of study—human reality—differs from the make-up 
of every other realm known to us” (Boss, 1983, p. xxix).13
In our current context, one could say that Boss (1983) echoed the 
dangers of explaining higher-order complex phenomena, for example any 
aspect of human being-in-the-world, by using methodology (i.e., empirical 
observation) and epistemology (i.e., positivistic) that are only relevant for 
lower orders of complexity. He believed that in Freud’s metapsychology and 
most other theories of human existence, there is inevitably an abstraction 
13 Boss’s approach of Daseinsanalysis, based on Heidegger’s (1927/1962) ontology, 
may be edifying in developing a more realistic understanding of addiction. Heidegger 
developed a method and grounding through which to explore the ontological structure 
of being human, which he called Dasein; translated as “there-being.” Boss’s method 
could be described as an ontic articulation of Heidegger’s ontology.
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and tapering from our lived engagement in-the-world. In other words, 
human-being-in-the-world reduced to lower orders of ontic complexity.
Models based on a natural scientific approach, such as biologically 
oriented models, provide useful information about addiction, but they 
cannot adequately account for addiction, because human beings are more 
than their physiology. In fact, the popular brain disease model of addic-
tion, in the light of the above, can only be described as absurd. Boss (1983) 
suggested that we need an existential philosophical foundation to truly 
understand what it means to be human and what psychopathology is. An 
adequate understanding of addiction and recovery should be informed by 
an existential understanding of human nature, otherwise we remain prone 
to reducing our being-in-the-world to its constitute parts and consequently, 
may miss the big picture.
Background
Existential philosophy is often associated with philosophers such as Søren 
Kierkegaard, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. 
These philosophers dealt with the troubled relationship between man and 
existence. Kierkegaard (1849/1954) examined his own existence through 
his existential anxiety, and he found this “angst” has a more potent and 
drastic reality than any concept. Nietzsche (1883/1954) tried to free man 
from religious and metaphysical consolations by proclaiming, “God is 
dead.” Heidegger (1927/1962) revolutionized Western ontology by char-
acterizing man as “being-in-the-world” (Dasein), thus, destroying the 
noted Cartesian aphorism, “I think, therefore I am.” Sartre (1943/1971) 
declared that humans are radically free. Sartre found life to be defined 
by nothingness, but he believed that man could derive subjective mean-
ing through ownership of one’s choices and that man needs a personally 
meaningful project in order to live.
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Existential phenomenology is a form of philosophy that emerged pri-
marily from the combination of existential philosophy and phenomenology. 
Existentialists and phenomenologists placed special emphasis on man’s 
relational openness with his surroundings (the other). Kierkegaard (1954) 
indicated that existence
is a striving, and is both pathetic and comic in the same degree. 
It is pathetic because the striving is infinite; that is, it is directed 
toward the infinite [the other], being an actualization of infinitude, 
a transformation which involves the highest pathos. It is comic, 
because such a striving involves a self-contradiction. (p. 8)
Husserl (1901/1973) said that our thoughts intentionality, in other words 
they always refer to something, and are related to objects. It is this openness 
for the other, in the thought of both existential and phenomenological think-
ers, that gave rise to a natural merger between these two schools of thought.
The central idea of existential philosophy is the concept “exis-
tence,” which indicates that our being is essentially and always 
openness to the other. A central idea of phenomenology is that 
of “intentionality,” by which is meant that our consciousness is 
always consciousness-of-something, i.e., it is interwoven with the 
other. Precisely because these fundamental ideas are common to 
existentialism and phenomenology, these two streams of thought 
have been able to merge into a single stream as existential phenom-
enology. (Kwant, 1965, p. 23)
By emphasizing the primacy of man as existence or intentionality, 
existential phenomenologists are interested in the whole man in his relation 
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to the other. Man, as existence or intentionality cannot be reduced to one 
dimension of his being. He is best understood as existing as the irreducible 
and inseparable dimensions of feeling, thinking, and acting-in-relation-to-
other. Existential man is a whole man that includes the other in his wholeness.
Existential psychology developed at a time when behaviorism and the 
application of the natural scientific method to psychology and psychother-
apy was dominant (May, 1953). The existential psychology approach can be 
understood as a reaction against this scientific reductionism (studying the 
parts in an attempt to understand the whole), when trying to understand 
and describe human behavior and experience.
Yalom (1980) notes that the scientific tradition has focused too 
intently on breaking down a complex organism into its parts. These 
parts, even when combined do not explain the whole. Such research 
is often found to be inapplicable and inappropriate in explaining 
the meaning of what the individual is dealing with as it does not 
focus on the entire subjective experience, rather, on singular aspects 
of psychic structure (Temple and Gall, 2016, p. 4)
Following the popularity of existential philosophy, existential therapy 
began to emerge in the 20th century with the work of such thinkers as 
Ludwig Binswanger, Otto Rank, Medard Boss, Viktor Frankl, Rollo 
May, Karl Jaspers, and Irvin Yalom (Cooper, 2003).14 For example, Frankl 
(1953) drew from his experience in a concentration camp during World 
War II in formalizing his logotherapy approach, which centers on man’s 
search for meaning. Holding meaninglessness as the central sickness of 
14 For an excellent introduction to existential psychotherapy see Hans Cohn’s 
(1997) Existential Thought and Therapeutic Practice: An Introduction to Existential 
Psychotherapy. London, England: Sage.
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the modern world, Frankl’s logotherapy approach centered on man’s will 
to meaning. May (1953) translated key concepts of existential psychology 
into psychotherapeutic practice, which helped transition the philosophy 
from Europe to North America. Yalom (1980), who wrote an essential text 
on existential psychotherapy, centered his existential approach on the four 
ultimate concerns (derived from the work of Paul Tillich) of clients: death, 
freedom, existential isolation, and meaninglessness.
Temple and Gall (2016) described the current status of existential 
therapy by stating that it can be “thought of in four different approaches 
or schools from which various training programs have emerged” (p. 4). 
They go on to say that,
The first school is referred to as Daseinsanalysis, or the analysis 
of human existence, and is largely influenced by Heidegger’s writings 
(Cooper, 2003b). This approach focuses on an open therapeutic 
relationship in which the client is able to freely express himself or 
herself and is moved toward developing openness toward her or 
his world (Vos et al., 2015). The second school, logotherapy, was 
developed by Frankl (1992) and aims to help clients discover the 
meaning and purpose in their lives (Cooper, 2003b, Vos et al., 
2015) . . . . The third approach can be identified as the British school 
of existential psychotherapy and is based largely on the writings of 
R. D. Laing (Cooper, 2003a; Spinelli, 2007; Vos et al., 2015) and 
pioneered primarily by Emmy van Deurzen (Cooper, 2003a, Cooper, 
2003b). This approach is phenomenological in nature and focuses 
on exploring the client’s experience of existence and relationship 
with others (Cooper, 2003b; Spinelli, 2007). The final school of 
thought is often referred to as an American approach and includes 
the existential–humanistic approach. It focuses primarily on the 
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client’s inward, subjective experience and was established by Rollo 
May, who acted as mentor to James Bugental, Irving Yalom, and 
Kirk Schneider (Cooper, 2003a, Cooper, 2003b). From within the 
American school, two schools have emerged: supportive–expressive 
group therapy which is directed toward cancer patients; and expe-
riential–existential which focuses on bridging existential therapy 
with experiential interventions (Vos et al., 2015). (p. 4)
Existential Givens and Existential Anxiet y
A central issue in addiction treatment and recovery is how an individual 
deals with the existential anxiety that arises when confronting ultimate 
concerns or existential givens. Moreover, addictive behavior can also be 
understood as a dysfunctional way of dealing with the anxiety induced by 
a confrontation of existential givens. It is imperative that an individual in 
recovery finds healthy ways to confront the givens of existence.
There are certain aspects of life that are within our capacity to control 
and manipulate, but there are also aspects that are given and cannot be 
avoided; we are “thrown” into these circumstances (Heidegger, 1927/1962). 
For Yalom (1980), the most significant givens of existence are the unavoid-
able freedom to choose the way we live our lives, the unavoidability of 
death, our social isolation, and the meaninglessness of life. For Yalom, 
the confrontation with these existential givens may evoke anxiety that we 
often try to circumvent or suppress. What distinguishes existential anxiety 
from neurotic anxiety, is that all people share the former, it is ontological 
in nature (Cooper, 2003). Temple and Gall (2016) made the distinction 
between the concepts of existential anxiety and fear. They point out that:
Fear is a sensation the individual experiences resulting from an 
external object, that is, a definitive source. Anxiety, on the other 
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hand, has no object, the threat of anxiety is nowhere (Heidegger, 
1962; Stolorow, 2007; Tillich, 2000; Weems, Costa, Dehon, & 
Berman, 2014; Yalom, 1980). For Heidegger (1962), the lack of 
object in existential anxiety renders external factors meaningless and 
irrelevant. Existence itself becomes equal to nothingness because 
embedded in existence is the understanding of the certainty of death, 
that is, the end of existence. Everyday significance thus collapses 
and the individual is left with a feeling of strangeness and the 
sensation of “not-being-at-home” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 188). (p. 7)
In addiction, the existential anxiety generated with a confrontation with 
these four existential givens is even further magnified. In active addiction, 
the threat of death is ever present and many addicts have friends that have 
died as a result of addiction. Addiction isolates the individual in a pursuit 
that is ultimately meaningless where the capacity to choose is inhibited by 
the powerlessness over the substance and/or behavior. The experience of 
meaninglessness has been shown to develop into depression and substance 
abuse (Moore & Goldner-Vukov, 2009). In the next section, I will focus on 
one of these existential givens, freedom, and its relation to powerlessness.
Freedom (and Powerlessness)
The concepts of freedom and powerlessness are frequently used in addiction 
treatment and recovery groups. Freedom is mostly considered a positive 
state to strive for, and powerlessness as something to be avoided. Yet it is 
not that simple. Temple and Gall (2016) said that:
In the existential sense, freedom means to be distinct from 
external structures however, this leads to being engrossed by dread 
(Yalom, 1980) or angst (Langdridge, 2013). Human beings desire 
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structure and experience a sense of being ungrounded when con-
fronted with freedom. (p. 9)
May (1981) believed that freedom can enhance our lives or it can cause 
one to escape and regress from the “dread” or “angst” that it may bring forth.
Like the existential thinkers, IRMt stresses the significance of freedom, 
personal responsibility, and freedom of choice. This perspective emphasizes 
the unique experiences and needs of each individual, and the responsibil-
ity each of us has for our choices and what we make of our lives. South 
African philosopher and statesman Jan Smuts’s theory of Holism—in its 
application to the human personality—is aligned with an existential view 
of freedom.15 The striving toward freedom is an essential and central com-
ponent of Smuts’s view of human nature (Du Plessis & Weathers, 2015). 
Smuts (1926) asserts that:
To be a free personality represents the highest achievement of 
which any human being is capable. The Whole is free, and to realize 
wholeness or freedom (they are orrelative expressions) in the smaller 
world of individual life represents not only the highest of which the 
individual is capable, but expresses also what is at once the deepest 
and highest in the universal movement of Holism. (p. 321)
15 Although the concept of holism has been implied by many thinkers, the term 
holism, as academic terminology, was first introduced and appeared publicly in print, 
by General Jan Smuts (1926) in his book Holism and Evolution. He writes that: “Holism 
(from ολος = whole) is the term here coined for this fundamental factor operative 
towards the creation of wholes in the universe” (p. 86). It must be noted that the 
concept of holism as introduced and applied by Smuts is not the same as the word 
“holism” as it is generally applied in many disciplines. Smuts used the word in a 
metaphysical context, not as a broad principle as it is often used today. Smuts (1926) 
defined holism as “the ultimate synthetic, ordering, organising, regulative activity in 
the universe which accounts for all the structural groupings and syntheses in it, from 
the atom and the physic-chemical structures, through the cell and organisms, through 
Mind in animals, to Personality in man” (p. 326).
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Addiction can be understood as a lifestyle that severely constricts free-
dom, whereas a recovery lifestyle allows for a fuller expression of freedom 
and wholeness in our being-in-the-world. A person has the free will to make 
choices that support either a recovery lifestyle or an addictive lifestyle. The 
choice and the responsibility is theirs alone. Even though a person might have 
a condition that limits their free will in relation to their addiction, known 
as powerlessness in recovery circles, it does not make them powerless over 
the choices they make, and they have to get the right support and to follow 
practices that will prevent them from regressing into this powerless condition.
While existential philosophy and psychology applauds the notion 
of freedom, it also acknowledges limitations of our freedom. The notion 
of existential limitations has significance in the context of addiction and 
recovery. From one perspective, addiction can be understood as an attempt 
to bypass certain of our inherent limitations. While in active addiction, an 
individual tries to control the uncontrollable, in an attempt to avoid and 
medicate natural human experiences of pain, disappointment, boredom, 
and so forth. Ironically, this attempt at control ends up with a person being 
more out of control, enslaved by the medium which they use to try and 
control what ultimately cannot be controlled. Flores (1997) pointed out that, 
“Powerlessness over alcohol and the acceptance of one’s limitation in relation 
to alcohol serves as a prototype for the alcoholic facing and accepting other 
limitations of the human condition” (p. 273).
Ulman and Paul (2006), in their book The Self Psychology of Addiction 
and its Treatment: Narcissus in Wonderland, brilliantly explained how at 
the core of addiction dynamics, there is a narcissistic fantasy of having an 
unrealistic sense of control of oneself, others and things/events in the world:
In the case of addiction, such a narcissistic fantasy centers on a 
narcissistic illusion of a megalomaniacal being that possesses magical 
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control over psychoactive agents (things and activities). These latter 
entities allow for the artificial alteration of the subjective reality of 
one’s sense of one’s self and one’s personal world. Under the influ-
ence of these intoxicating fantasies, an addict imagines being like 
a sorcerer or wizard who controls a magic wand capable of manip-
ulating the forces of nature—and particularly the forces of human 
nature. Eventually, a person becomes a captive of these addictive 
fantasies and then becomes an addict, lost in a wonderland. (p. 6)
The focus of the next section is how addicts deal with their basic exis-
tential needs—either by denying them (trying to control the uncontrollable) 
or attempting to have these basic existential needs met through destructive 
or misguided methods.
Basic Existential Needs
Chilean economist, Alfred Max-Neef (1991), who developed the theory of 
human scale development, stated that:
Fundamental human needs [basic existential needs] are finite, 
few and classifiable and are the same in all cultures and in all his-
torical periods. What changes, both over time and through cultures, 
is the way or the means by which the needs are satisfied. (p. 18)
He went on to say that:
Each economic, social and political system adopts different 
methods for the satisfaction of the same fundamental human 
needs. In every system, they are satisfied (or not satisfied) through 
the generation (or non-generation) of different types of satisfiers 
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[the object or process used to satisfy a need]. We may go as far as 
to say that one of the aspects that define a culture is its choice of 
satisfiers. Whether a person belongs to a consumerist or to an ascetic 
society, his/her fundamental human needs are the same. What 
changes is his/her choice of the quantity and quality of satisfiers. 
In short: What is culturally determined are not the fundamental 
human needs, but the satisfiers for those needs. Cultural change 
is, among other things, the consequence of dropping traditional 
satisfiers for the purpose of adopting new or different ones. It 
must be added that each need can be satisfied at different levels 
and with different intensities. Furthermore, needs are satisfied 
within three contexts: (a) with regard to oneself (Eigenwelt); (b) 
with regard to the social group (Mitwelt); and (c) with regard to 
the environment (Umwelt). The quality and intensity, not only 
of the levels but also of contexts, will depend on time, place and 
circumstances. (p. 18)
According to the theory of human scale development, an individual’s 
quality of life is correlated with the actualization of nine classes of interre-
lated ontological needs. In this model, needs are categorized in two classes: 
existential and axiological, which are combined and displayed in a matrix, 
“This allows us to demonstrate the interaction of, on the one hand, the 
needs of Being, Having, Doing and Interacting; and, on the other hand, the 
needs of Subsistence, Protection, Affection, Understanding, Participation, 
Idleness, Creation, Identity and Freedom” (Max-Neef, 1991, p. 17).
Max-Neef (1991) is of the opinion that:
Human needs must be understood as a system: that is, all human 
needs are interrelated and interactive. With the sole exception of 
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the need of subsistence, that is, to remain alive, no hierarchies exist 
within the system [as opposed to Maslow’s model]. On the contrary, 
simultaneities, complementarities and trade-offs are characteristics 
of the process of needs satisfaction. (p. 17)
According to Max-Neef, (1991) any “fundamental human need not 
adequately satisfied generates a pathology” (p. 22).
In Max-Neef ’s (1991) model, satisfiers refers to the method of having 
a basic existential need met (satisfying the need), and various groups of 
satisfiers are proposed. Five types of satisfiers are suggested: violators or 
destroyers, pseudo-satisfiers, inhibiting satisfiers, singular satisfiers, and 
synergic satisfiers. A brief description of each of the types of satisfiers fol-
lows. I then conclude with the relevance this has in the context of addiction 
and its treatment.
Violators or destroyers are paradoxical in nature because when they are 
applied to satisfy a need, “not only do they annihilate the possibility of its 
satisfaction over time, but they also impair the adequate satisfaction of other 
needs” (Max-Neef, 1991, p. 31). Pseudo-satisfiers “generate a false sense of 
satisfaction of a given need. Although not endowed with the aggressiveness 
of violators or destroyers, they may on occasion annul, in the not too long 
term, the possibility of satisfying the need they were originally aimed at 
fulfilling” (Max-Neef, 1991, p. 31). Inhibiting satisfiers tend to over-satisfy 
a given need, consequently, limiting the possibility of other needs being 
satisfied. Singular satisfiers tend to satisfy one specific need. They are neutral 
in relation to the satisfaction of other needs. Synergic satisfiers satisfy a given 
need and “simultaneously stimulating and contributing to the fulfillment 
of other needs” (Max-Neef, 1991, p. 34).
From the above description, it should be clear that addictive behavior 
can be understood as violators or destroyers, and pseudo-satisfiers. Addictive 
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behavior is always directed at satisfying a need, but what differentiates 
addictive behavior (violators or destroyers) from other methods (or other 
satisfiers) of having needs met is that it paradoxically destroys the indi-
vidual’s capacity to meet the need(s) it is attempting to satisfy, as well as 
the capacity to meet other needs. As an addictive lifestyle progresses, the 
individual’s capacity to have most of his or her needs met is diminished, 
until there is a near total reliance on the substance or behavior to meet most 
basic existential needs.
Within the context of the above discussion, it should be clear that a 
recovery program and lifestyle is a process of replacing destroyers/violators 
with synergistic and singular satisfiers. A similar sentiment is echoed 
by Vanhooren, Leijssen, and van Dezutter (2017) in their discussion 
of the application of experiential and existential approaches to treating 
criminal offenders:
Very different from cognitive-behavioral approaches, experiential 
and existential offender therapies focus on the exploration of the 
underlying dynamics of criminal behavior in terms of their basic 
existential needs (Braswell & Wells, 2014; Gunst, 2012; Ronel & 
Segev, 2014; Vanhooren et al., 2015; Ward & Fortune, 2014). Just 
like all human beings, offenders try to reach fulfillment of their 
existential needs, such as the need for efficacy, connectedness, 
love, and meaning (Braswell & Wells, 2014; Ward & Fortune, 
2014). The way they try to fulfill their needs or the way they cope 
with the inability to reach their goals is often through unadjusted 
or antisocial behavior (Ward & Fortune, 2014). When the basic 
existential needs are not met, offenders gradually become stuck in a 
criminal spin: a downward process marked by existential loneliness 
and alienation (Ronel & Segev, 2014). (p. 15)
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An Existential -Phenomenological Perspective of the 
Twelve Step Program
In the context of our current discussion, and considering the central role 
that Twelve Step programs have in many addiction treatment centers and 
programs, it may be useful to explore it from an existential-phenomeno-
logical perspective. Moreover, this perspective also highlights some of the 
reasons why Twelve Step programs are effective.
Carl Thune interpreted AA from a phenomenological perspective 
and believed one of the reasons AA is effective is because its members 
share their life histories in AA meetings. He expressed the view that in 
recounting their life stories, alcoholics are “taught how to interpret their 
past in a way that gives meaning to the past and hope for the future” 
(Flores, 1997, p. 281). Thune (1977) wrote about the importance of 
life histories:
In a sense, then, one of the first lessons AA must teach new 
members is that their lives were incoherent and senseless as they 
knew them. Simultaneously, it must reveal the “correct” under-
standing and interpretation of the drinking alcoholic’s vision of 
the world before a new member can accept the full benefits of 
the program—a program which offers a different coherence and 
meaning to their active alcoholic lives. In other words, according 
to AA, not only do drinking alcoholics incorrectly perceive and 
understand the world, but they cannot even correctly perceive and 
understand their perceptions and understanding of it. Through 
therapy, they must learn new methods for evaluating them. More 
abstractly, it is not just a revised and now coherent vision of the 
world which AA offers, but one which has altered the relation 
between its components. (pp. 81–82).
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AA states that the alcoholic suffers from a spiritually defective mode 
of being rather than a mere physical disability. For that reason, AA uses 
a more spiritually-oriented vocabulary “in the absence of a more accurate 
but inaccessible philosophical-ontological terminology” (Flores, 1997, p. 
283). AA believes that alcoholism is only one, albeit the most important, 
manifestation of a defective lifestyle or mode of being. Stopping drinking, 
therefore, is the first, but only one aspect of recovery. The alcoholic needs a 
complete lifestyle change. From a phenomenological perspective, an alco-
holic must give up their “self-perceived construction of his or her self that is 
associated with the alcoholic lifestyle” (Flores, 1997, p. 283). Thune (1977) 
concluded that “AA’s ‘treatment,’ then involves the systematic manipulation 
of symbolic elements within an individual’s life to provide a new vision 
of that life and of his world. This provides new coherence, meaning, and 
implications for behavior” (p. 88).
Another feature of AA that Thune (1977) felt is significant in its success 
is the constant introduction of oneself as an alcoholic. The self-proclamation 
of “I am an alcoholic” constantly reminds alcoholics that they are a drink 
away from their old lives. This is often a problematic issue for those whose 
interest in AA is superficial or purely academic. Unfortunately, they often 
fail to see the significance of this ritual. They tend to erroneously equate this 
statement with a form of self-debasement. What they fail to understand is 
that alcoholics practice this ritual proudly, and with every introduction, they 
are indirectly conveying an important message about and to themselves. 
Flores (1997) stated:
The term “alcoholic” signifies everything (self-centered behavior, 
negative attitudes, corrupt values) that sober AA members must 
guard themselves from if they are to maintain a healthy sobriety. By 
constantly utilizing the self-definition of alcoholic, AA members 
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automatically imply the opposite, which is everything a healthy, 
recovering, and sober member of AA must attain. AA members 
are thus reminded with each pronouncement of themselves as an 
alcoholic that they are just a drink away from losing what they have 
become, which is a person whose values, attitudes, and behavior 
is the direct opposite of an alcoholic. From this perspective, alco-
holism is viewed as more than just excessive drinking. This is why 
AA believes that alcohol consumption cannot be curtailed with-
out addressing and treating the rest of the alcoholic’s personality 
disturbances. Abstinence from alcohol is the first step required for 
breaking the alcoholic style of living. (p. 286)
Understanding addiction from this perspective validates the need for a 
new recovery lifestyle; without a shift in lifestyle and a new set of healthy 
practices, the addict will eventually gravitate towards his or her habitual 
mode of being-in-the-world.
Kurtz (1982) is of the opinion that AA works because it shares and 
addresses many features found in existential philosophy. As mentioned 
previously, a prominent theme in existential philosophy is the realiza-
tion that, as humans, we exist within limitations. By admitting their 
powerlessness over alcohol in Step One, they recognize and admit this 
fundamental limitation.
Apart from the acceptance of this limitation, AA requires alcoholics 
to share this limitation with other alcoholics. “The invitation to make 
such a connection with others and the awareness of the necessity of 
doing so arise from the alcoholic’s very acceptance of limitation” (Kurtz, 
1982, p. 53). Although AA suggests the acknowledgment of limitation, 
it does not abdicate the alcoholic of responsibility. Being confronted by 
our limitations “engenders the dread, fear, and trembling of Kierkegaard, 
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the angst of Heidegger, the angoisse of Sartre, and the abyss of Burber” 
(Flores, 1997, p. 274).
Furthermore, as indicated previously, a common theme in existen-
tial philosophy is the problem of suffering. AA recognizes suffering as 
an innate aspect of existence, with potential positive influence on our 
lives. In the context of AA, suffering is given meaning because it creates 
impetus in the alcoholic to question his or her existence and to be open 
for change. Viktor Frankl (1953) believed that when we can place our 
suffering within some meaningful context, we are not defeated by it, but 
are helped to transcend it.
Similarly, in AA members share “the kinship of suffering” and recovery 
depends on the mutual sharing of suffering. AA teaches the alcoholic that to 
be fully human is to need others, and provides alcoholics with a universally 
shared explanation for their suffering.
From a Buddhist perspective, suffering or dukkha is caused by our 
unwillingness to accept the world as it is and our insistence on trying to 
make it fit our expected ideas or fantasies. Addiction is, in essence, a refusal 
to accept things as they are and an attempt to avoid the reality of necessary 
suffering. An important aspect of recovery is realizing the inevitability of 
suffering and learning how to cope with it in a healthy way. Happiness is 
earned only through hard work—not through instant gratification. Flores 
(1997) summed up this existential predicament of the alcoholic:
Many existential writers believe that in such a confrontation 
between the realistic acceptance of the world as it is and the 
self-centered demands for unlimited gratification, reason would 
prevail and the individual would choose more realistically between 
the alternatives—continued unhappy struggles with old patterns of 
expectations or authentic existence with expanded freedom of choice 
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and responsible expression of drives and wishes. With Socrates, we 
argue to ‘know thyself.’ In this fashion, AA members are taught to 
believe that the authentic existence advocated by the AA program 
holds the key to self-examination, self-knowledge, emancipation, 
cure, and eventual salvation. (p. 280)
THE SIX RECOVERY DIMENSIONS
IRMt views an individual’s recovery-in-the-world through six lenses 
called the recovery dimensions. The six recovery dimensions are influ-
enced by the quadrants of integral theory and Max-Neef ’s (1991) theory 
of human scale development. The six recovery dimensions are defined 
as: physical, which refers to all aspects of physical health; intellectual, 
which describes all the intellectual features of the recovery process; 
psychological, which refers to all the emotional and therapeutic aspects; 
existential, which entails all the spiritual and existential elements; social, 
which captures all interpersonal, cultural, and social relationships; and 
environmental, which refers to all administrative, legal, monetary, and 
environmental aspects (Du Plessis, 2015).16 Like the quadrants in integral 
theory, they represent abstract interrelated and nonreducible aspects of 
our being-in-the-world.
16 These six recovery dimensions can be understood as a Quality of Life (QOL) 
classifications system. QOL is applied as a fundamental concept across health care 
research (Padaiga, Subata, & Vanagas, 2007), especially in mental health care and 
disability studies (Masthoff, Trompenaars, Van Heck, Hodiamont, & de Vries, 2005). 
There has been controversy over the meaning of this concept; no agreement has 
been reached about its definition (Fischer, Rehm, & Kim, 2001a, 2001b; Moons, Budts, 
& De Geest, 2006; Taillefer, Dupuis, Roberge, & Le May, 2003). Regardless, QOL is 
increasingly recognized as a valuable indicator of the impact of treatment, need for 
health care, evaluation of interventions, and for cost-benefit analyses (Allison, Locker, 
& Feine, 1997; Foster, Peters, & Marshall, 2000).
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Figure 7: Six Recovery Dimensions17
These six interrelated yet irreducible recovery dimensions provide a 
multiperspectival hexagonal framework on an individual’s therapeutic pro-
cess. According to IRMt, it is vital that these six recovery dimensions of a 
client are maintained at an essential level of health (what defines essential 
health is relative and unique for each client) for sustainable recovery. If there 
17 This image was designed by Guy du Plessis, licensed under the Creative Commons 
License Attribution-NoDerivs 2.5.
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is pathology in any of these areas the whole recovery system suffers (Du 
Plessis, 2012a, 2015). Clients are assisted by their therapists to find and 
apply suitable therapies and recovery practices in each of these six recovery 
dimensions. The therapist works within a continuum of change agents 
and therefore, does not need to be trained in all the therapies or practices 
needed in their client’s process, but works together with other therapists 
when necessary, yet always maintains a metaperspective on their client’s 
process. The compilation and action plan of these recovery therapies and 
practices is defined as the client’s integrated recovery program.
The therapist functions like the conductor of an orchestra, keeping a 
metaperspective of the client’s process and ensuring that the various therapies 
and recovery practices fit together in a balanced way, as well as ensuring 
that all essential areas of a client’s recovery process are addressed.18 The 
construct of the six recovery dimensions and the various tools of an integrated 
recovery program provides an easily accessible recovery structure for both 
client and therapist that assist in navigating the complex recovery process.
Heidegger (1927/1962) described human existence as being-in-the-world 
(Dasein). Being-in-the-world encompasses more than human conscious-
ness; it also constitutes the fact that we exist as part of the world. This view 
points out that we are of the world, rather than in it; we coexist with our 
world. We and our experience of the world constitute an interdependent 
unity. A person’s existence cannot be reduced to one dimension of his or 
her being. Rather, his or her existence is best understood as the irreducible 
and inseparable dimensions of feeling, thinking and acting interdependently 
18 IRMt is derived from integrated recovery model, originally designed primarily 
as a clinical model for inpatient treatment protocol design (Du Plessis, 2010), which 
has shown great promise since its inception and application in 2007 in several Cape 
Town-based addiction treatment centers. Preliminary research shows promising results 
(see Duffett, 2010, Outcomes-based Evaluative Research at an Integrally Informed 
Substance Abuse Treatment Centre Using the Integrated Recovery Model).
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with others and the world. An existential person is a whole person, who 
includes others and the world in his or her wholeness.
The different recovery dimensions are informed by this existential view. 
Each of the recovery dimensions (physical, psychological, intellectual, exis-
tential, social, and environmental) constitutes an aspect of our total being-in-
the-world; they represent fundamental and irreducible aspects of our existence. 
When in active addiction, each of these dimensions of an individual’s being is 
affected, and their capacity to authentically exist in the world in each of these 
dimensions becomes, often severely, limited and dysfunctional. Consequently, 
for recovery to be sustainable, each of these recovery dimensions needs to be 
acknowledged as an essential component of a recovery lifestyle.
INTEGR ATED RECOVERY PROGR A M
In the following section I will provide a brief outline of the various templates 
and tools that are used in IRMt: the integrated recovery program template, 
the integrated recovery wheel, and the integrated recovery indices.
These recovery tools also serve an underlying psychodynamic purpose 
for recovering addicts. Most addicts suffer from various degrees of patho-
logical narcissism, which can be understood as the regression/fixation to 
the stage of the archaic, nuclear self. The narcissistically regressed/fixated 
individual often has a need for omnipotent control, a characteristic of the 
grandiose self. In active addiction, such power is sought through fusion 
with an omnipotent self-object (drug of choice) and manifests as impul-
sivity. Once in recovery, this need for control will initially manifest as 
the obsessive-compulsive personality traits of ritual and rigidity. Without 
some clear recovery structure and the absence of the previously idealized 
self-object (drug/s of choice), the narcissistically regressed individual will 
be subject to massive anxiety, stemming from fear of fragmentation of self 
and empty depression, which reflects the scantiness of psychic structure 
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and good internal objects. The structure of an integrated recovery program 
can help satisfy the need for ritual and rigidity in a healthy way and once 
this recovery structure is internalized, it will help build much needed 
psychic structure.










































Figure 8: Template for the design of an Integrated Recovery Program (IRP)19
19 This image was designed by Guy du Plessis, licensed under the Creative Commons 
License Attribution-NoDerivs 2.5.
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An integrated recovery program template provides an outline that an 
individual in recovery can use to plan his or her personalized integrated 
recovery program. On the template there are the six recovery dimensions, 
and the integrated recovery graph.
The integrated recovery graph helps to visually plot the developmental 
altitude of each of an individual’s six recovery dimensions. Therefore, at a 
glance, therapist and client can see which areas of a client’s recovery lifestyle 
are optimally developed and which are not. Obviously, our clients do not 
have to be exceptional in each recovery dimension, but rather optimal for 
their stage of overall development. Somebody with 1 year of being clean or 
10 years of being clean will have different focuses in their recovery and their 
integrated recovery graphs may look different, but one is not necessarily 
better “recovered” than the other; rather it is relative.
My aim with the one-page template was to find the simplest visual 
system to represent the complex recovery process. The template can be 
completed weekly or monthly, or whenever the components of an individ-
ual’s program change. This provides clear goals and practices as well as a 
degree of accountability.
It must further be noted that a central aim of IRMt is to teach the client 
how to apply this method in his or her own life. Therefore, once therapy has 
been terminated, the client will be able to integrate this metaframework 
into his or her thinking and doing. Before the second template is discussed, 
it would be useful to explore the two types of development that happen in 
a recovery process and how this relates to the templates.
Horizontal/ Ver tical Development in Recovery
According to Suzanne Cook-Greuter (2004), a leading adult developmental 
expert, human development can happen vertically (transformation) and 
horizontally (translation).
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When we talk about development in the context of human 
development, we distinguish between lateral and vertical 
development. Both are important, but they occur at differ-
ent rates. Lateral growth and expansion happens through 
many channels, such as schooling, training, self-directed and 
life-long learning as well as simply through exposure to life. 
Vertical development in adults is much rarer. It refers to how 
we learn to see the world through new eyes, how we change 
our interpretations of experience and how we transform our 
views of reality. It describes increases in what we are aware 
of, or what we can pay attention to, and therefore what we 
can inf luence and integrate. In general, transformations of 
human consciousness or changes in our view of reality are more 
powerful than any amount of horizontal growth and learning. 
(Cook-Greuter, 2004, pp. 2–3)
A therapist can view and measure their client’s recovery progress on 
two planes: the horizontal and vertical, often referred to as translating 
and transformation in integral psychology (Forman, 2010; Ingersoll & 
Zeitler, 2010). Clients’ vertical growth in recovery refers to how they 
grow developmentally—here we can use various developmental models 
(Cook-Greuter, 2004; Wilber, 2000). As clients slowly and painstakingly 
grow through these vertical stages, their perspective of themselves and the 
world changes: it gradually becomes less self-centered, more inclusive, and 
embracing (Wilber, 2000).
Horizontal development indicates how well a client is applying their 
recovery tools at a certain stage of development and how well they are 
integrated at that stage. This is far more important than aiming for the 
next stage of development. The idea is that working a recovery program 
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eventually translates into vertical development or transformation. One 
of the primary aims of a recovery therapist is to help clients translate 
effectively at their current stages of development and not just aim at 
vertical growth.
Clients use the integrated recovery graph to indicate their vertical 
development in each of the recovery dimensions. As we have seen, each 
of the six recovery dimensions can also be at different stages of vertical 
development. For the sake of simplicity, the integrated recovery graph plots 
three stages: pathological, adequate, and excellent.
The horizontal or lateral growth of a client indicates how well they 
have practiced each of their recovery dimensions within a chosen time 
frame, which could be daily, weekly, or even monthly. The scales used for 
horizontal growth do not correlate with stages of development, but can 
be compared with a test or assessment of a practice, as in, “How much of 
what you should have done did you do?” The idea is that constant horizontal 
practice (or translation) in a recovery dimension will translate into vertical 
development (or transformation) in that recovery dimension, and eventually 
contribute to overall vertical development.
I apply a hexagonal-circular model called the integrated recovery 
wheel to illustrate a recovery lifestyle on a horizontal plane and within a 
chosen time frame. The inner circle signals dangerous behaviors or risk 
factors and the outer circle signifies the healthy practices or protective 
factors that are taking place in the six recovery dimensions within a 
specific time frame.
From a needs perspective, the outside circle represents healthy ways of 
having needs met (Singular or Synergistic Satisfiers). On the other hand, 
the inner circle represents unhealthy attempts of having your needs met, 
pseudo-satisfiers “that generate a false sense of satisfaction of a given need” 
(Max-Neef, 1991, p. 31).
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Figure 9: The Integrated Recovery Wheel20
The integrated recovery wheel is used in the form of a daily diary, where, 
for each of the six recovery dimensions, healthy recovery actions (protective 
factors) are indicated in the outer circle and dangerous behaviors (risk factors) 
are indicated in the center. Each day, clients can also score themselves (from 
0 to 10) for each of their recovery dimensions. This provides them with 
a total daily score when added together as well as a weekly score for each 
recovery dimension when the scores for each day in the week are totaled. 
20 This image was designed by Guy du Plessis, licensed under the Creative Commons 
License Attribution-NoDerivs 2.5.
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For the purpose of keeping scores of their horizontal development, they can 
use various indices. Each of their daily scores can be recorded on a weekly 
integrated recovery index for each week and then over a period of a month 
on a monthly integrated recovery index. These enable them to see patterns 
in the way they practice their recovery program. If they continue on average 
to score well in each of their recovery dimensions, this will translate into 
vertical development and reduce the likelihood of relapse.
Figure 10: Integrated Recovery Indices21
21 This image was designed by Guy du Plessis, licensed under the Creative Commons 
License Attribution-NoDerivs 2.5.
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BEING - IN-RECOVERY AND DOING - IN-RECOVERY
One of the perils of any personal development program is that we can develop 
unrealistic expectations of ourselves and our development. Unrealistic 
expectations force us to continuously measure ourselves against unattainable 
and perfectionist ideals. Instead of improving our well-being, this adds to 
our distress and feelings of inadequacy.
Recovering addicts working in a recovery program run the risk of suc-
cumbing to this inherent problem. Addicts are known to have perfectionistic 
tendencies with overdeveloped inner critics, fueled by low self-esteem an 
internalized shame. Their low self-esteem often drives them relentlessly to 
prove to themselves and others that they are good enough.
Throughout most of this chapter, I have focused primarily on the doing 
of recovery, the practice components of a recovery lifestyle. Another equally 
important, and perhaps even more important component of recovery, is what 
I call the “modes of being-in-recovery.” What I mean by this term is that for 
every recovery practice, there is an attitudinal, or being, component, which 
is the way we relate to the practice. These modes of being-in-recovery can 
positively or negatively influence the outcome of a person’s recovery practices.
The practice, or doing-in-recovery, should not be confused with 
being-in-recovery. Very often, those of who are involved in a process of 
self-development or a recovery program spend so much time practicing 
and self-developing that they forget to live; forget to enjoy just being and 
being-with-others.
The attitude of participation will affect the value one gets from the 
practice. I call these attitudinal or modes of being-in-recovery our “exis-
tential attitude” toward a practice. In short, each recovery practice can be 
understood as having two qualities: the doing or the result of the practice, 
and the being or existential attitude toward the practice. Each recovery 
dimension may consist of healthy practices, which are done to the utmost, 
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but if they are done with an undesirable existential attitude, it will seriously 
compromise or could even have a destructive effect on a client’s well-being. 
For example, a client could be going to gym five times a week, but if this is 
mediated by existential attitudes, like perfectionism and over-criticalness, 
it could result in a negative influence on his or her recovery.
I would go as far to say that the overall quality of an individual’s recovery 
is determined by the quality of their existential attitudes, rather than the 
results of their practices. In practical terms, this means that when clients 
design their programs, they (and we as therapists) should remain mindful 
of the existential attitudes mediating these practices.
In conclusion, it is important that your clients maintain a healthy balance 
between doing and being, and that their recovery program does not become 
another futile attempt (like their substance use and addictive behavior) to 
“fix what ain’t broke.” Recovery practice is a paradox. Individuals in recov-
ery have to work hard, not to be better, but merely to become conscious of 
the fact that essentially they are good enough as they are right now. The 
ultimate aim of working a recovery program is not about being fixed, but 
rather the slow process of realizing that there is nothing to fix.
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C O N C L U S I O N
In the last resort a civilization depends on its general ideas; it is nothing 
but a spiritual structure of the dominant ideas expressing themselves in 
institutions and the subtle atmosphere of culture. If the soul of our civili-
zation is to be saved we shall have to find new and fuller expression for 
the great saving unities—the unity of reality in all its range, the unity 
of life in all its forms, the unity of ideas throughout human civilization, 
and the unity of man’s spirit with the mystery of the Cosmos in religious 
faith and aspiration.
—General Jan Smuts (1926, pp. v-vi)
I n the previous chapters it was pointed out that the two foremost problems in the field of addiction science and addiction treatment 
are definitional confusion (Shaffer et al., 2004; Vaillant, 1995; White, 1998) 
and the ineffectiveness of treatment (Alexander, 2010; Fields, 1998; Hill, 
2010; Shaffer, 1997; Shaffer et al., 2004; White, 1998). Many scholars agree 
that a paradigm shift is urgently needed for the field of addiction because 
currently, there is such an abundance and diversity of addiction theories 
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(Hill, 2010; Shaffer, 1997; Shaffer et al., 2004; Vaillant; 1995; White, 1998) 
that the field of addictionology is in conceptual chaos.
It was argued that the development of an alternative ontological foun-
dation for addiction could possibly assist moving toward conceptual inte-
gration and improving treatment outcomes. In this book, it was proposed 
that integral theory could provide this much-needed alternative ontological 
(as well as epistemological and methodological) foundation for addiction.
Various elements of integral theory’s postmetaphysical position was 
explored, and although the argument presented in this book has several 
limitations, it can be concluded that integral theory has great potential as 
a framework for conceptual integration in addiction studies and improving 
treatment outcomes, and warrants further research and exploration.22
Only a truly integral approach may be able to adequately address the 
massive and mind-boggling, complex problem of addiction. As the great 
philosopher-statesman, Jan Smuts (1926,) declared: “If the soul of our 
civilization is to be saved we shall have to find new and fuller expression 
for the great saving unities” (p. vi). This book has indicated that integral 
theory could serve as a “fuller expression” in the quest for a comprehensive 
understanding of addiction, and as a result—beyond the realm of theories 
and academia—can help save lives.
22 My current research is exploring the relationship between ideology and addiction 
from an integral perspective. I propose that ideologies are psychoactive and potentially 
addictive. Ideology addiction can be understood as a type of ideological possession 
and zealotry, with deleterious consequences for the individual and society. An indi-
vidual in the grips of an ideology addiction exhibits psychological and behavioral 
patterns common to all addicted populations. From a psychodynamic perspective, 
ideology addiction can be understood as the result of a narcissistic disturbance of 
self experience and deficits in self capabilities. Consequently, the activism of an 
ideology addict is fundamentally a narcissistic project. A misguided attempt at self 
repair and satisfaction of archaic narcissistic needs, and seldom motivated by the 
ideals of the ideology.
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